2 hours ago
If you look at #Snapchat from the outside, it feels like a fun photo-sharing app where people send disappearing #snaps . But inside the #company ?
It’s a data-driven, ad-powered, creator-friendly, and AR-first machine built for the next generation of the #internet .
I’ve been analysing different #apps for PratsDigital, and Snapchat genuinely has one of the most unique #business models in the social media world. It’s not like Instagram, not like TikTok and definitely not like Facebook.
In this #article , I’ll break down Snapchat’s business model in a very simple and easy-to-understand way the way I explain it to my #seo clients when discussing platform strategies.
https://pratsdigital.in/in...
It’s a data-driven, ad-powered, creator-friendly, and AR-first machine built for the next generation of the #internet .
I’ve been analysing different #apps for PratsDigital, and Snapchat genuinely has one of the most unique #business models in the social media world. It’s not like Instagram, not like TikTok and definitely not like Facebook.
In this #article , I’ll break down Snapchat’s business model in a very simple and easy-to-understand way the way I explain it to my #seo clients when discussing platform strategies.
https://pratsdigital.in/in...
4 months ago
Who Owns The Future-
"Why Power, Not Just Progress, Is Still the Global Currency"
In the 21st century, progress is everywhere—new technologies, rising literacy rates, faster internet, green transitions.
But beneath the sleek façade of development lies a persistent truth: power still determines who sets the rules, who gets to rise, and who remains on the margins.
Despite talk of shared prosperity and global cooperation, it is power—not just progress—that remains the ultimate currency in international affairs.
Progress Without Power Is Precarious-
A country can build smart cities, educate its youth, and digitize its economy.
But **
"Why Power, Not Just Progress, Is Still the Global Currency"
In the 21st century, progress is everywhere—new technologies, rising literacy rates, faster internet, green transitions.
But beneath the sleek façade of development lies a persistent truth: power still determines who sets the rules, who gets to rise, and who remains on the margins.
Despite talk of shared prosperity and global cooperation, it is power—not just progress—that remains the ultimate currency in international affairs.
Progress Without Power Is Precarious-
A country can build smart cities, educate its youth, and digitize its economy.
But **
4 months ago
Focus on Cyber Warfare and Fraud-
What roles do global alliances (e.g., NATO, QUAD, ASEAN) play in cyber defense?
Global alliances play increasingly vital and multifaceted roles in cyber defense, recognizing that cyber threats transcend national borders and require collective action.
They provide frameworks for cooperation, information sharing, capacity building, and, in some cases, collective response.
Here's a breakdown of how different alliances contribute:
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):
NATO is arguably the most advanced military alliance in terms of its cyber defense integration, primarily because its core mission is collective defense.
Collective Defense (Article 5): A cornerstone of NATO's cyber defense strategy is the understanding that a cyberattack could potentially trigger Article 5 (an attack against one Ally is an attack against all). While the threshold for this is intentionally ambiguous and assessed on a case-by-case basis (based on the effects of the attack), it signifies a strong commitment to mutual defense in cyberspace.
Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations: NATO officially recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations (alongside land, sea, and air) in 2016. This allows NATO military commanders to better integrate cyber capabilities into missions and operations.
Information Sharing and Threat Intelligence: NATO facilitates the real-time sharing of information about cyber threats, malware, and best practices among Allies through dedicated platforms and expert networks.
Rapid Reaction Teams (RRTs): NATO maintains cyber rapid reaction teams that can be deployed to help Allies address cyber challenges, providing technical assistance and coordinating responses to incidents.
Capacity Building and Training: NATO works to enhance the individual cyber defenses of its member states through training programs, exercises (like Cyber Coalition), and setting common targets for national cyber defense capabilities.
Norms and International Law: NATO consistently reaffirms that international law, including the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace, contributing to the development of responsible state behavior norms.
Public-Private Partnerships: NATO strengthens its relationship with industry and academia through initiatives like the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership to leverage external expertise and resources.
QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue - Australia, India, Japan, United States):
The QUAD, while not a military alliance in the traditional sense, has significantly increased its focus on cybersecurity cooperation, particularly given the shared concerns about threats in the Indo-Pacific.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: A key priority for the QUAD is to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure across member states and the broader Indo-Pacific region against cyber disruptions. This involves sharing approaches to policy development and threat information.
Supply Chain Risk Management: Collaboration on securing digital supply chains, recognizing that vulnerabilities in one component can impact all users.
Software Security Standards: Efforts to align and ensure the implementation of baseline software security standards, potentially leveraging the collective purchasing power of their governments to drive secure-by-design principles in the software ecosystem.
Information Sharing: Promoting rapid and timely sharing of threat information between governments and with industry partners.
Capacity Building: Collaborating on capacity-building programs in the Indo-Pacific region to help partner nations enhance their cybersecurity capabilities.
Workforce Development: Working together to enhance the collective cybersecurity workforce and pool of talented cyber professionals among member states.
Responsible Cyber Habits: Launching public campaigns like the "Quad Cyber Challenge" to improve cybersecurity awareness and habits among Internet users.
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations):
ASEAN's approach to cyber defense is focused on regional cooperation, capacity building, and harmonizing policies among its diverse member states.
Regional Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy: ASEAN has a strategy (e.g., 2021-2025) focused on advancing cyber readiness, strengthening regional cyber policies, enhancing trust in cyberspace, and capacity building.
ASEAN CERT Network: Facilitating coordination and information sharing between national-level Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) of member states. An ASEAN CERT is being established to enable timely exchange of threat information.
Cybercrime Operations Desk: Collaborating with INTERPOL to promote information sharing on cybercrime threats and better integrated operations for the region.
Capacity Building and Training: Numerous initiatives (often supported by dialogue partners like Singapore, Japan, and the U.S.) to build technical, policy, and strategic cyber capacity among member states through training programs, workshops, and joint exercises. Examples include the ASEAN Cyber Capacity Programme (ACCP) and the ASEAN–Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre (AJCCBC).
Cyber Defense Network (ACDN): A defense-focused network aiming to link the cyber defense centers of all member states, assist in developing new centers, and identify information-sharing gaps.
Norms and Responsible Behavior: Encouraging member states to subscribe to voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace.
Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP): Launched to allow member states to share timely cybersecurity threat information.
Common Roles Across Alliances:
Despite their differences in scope and structure, these alliances share several common roles in cyber defense:
Information and Threat Intelligence Sharing: This is foundational. By sharing insights into TTPs, vulnerabilities, and ongoing campaigns, members can collectively improve their defenses and develop more effective countermeasures.
Capacity Building: Many alliances invest in programs to uplift the cybersecurity capabilities of their members, especially those with fewer resources. This includes training, exercises, and sharing best practices.
Norm Development: Alliances contribute to the ongoing global dialogue about responsible state behavior in cyberspace, advocating for the application of international law and promoting peaceful conduct.
Policy Coordination: They provide platforms for members to discuss, coordinate, and harmonize national cybersecurity policies and regulatory frameworks, leading to more cohesive responses to transboundary threats.
Collective Response and Deterrence: For military alliances like NATO, this involves explicit commitments to collective defense. For others, it involves coordinated public attribution or diplomatic pressure, aiming to deter malicious actors.
Joint Exercises and Drills: Simulating cyberattacks and responses helps members test their readiness, identify weaknesses, and improve coordination in real-world scenarios.
In summary, global alliances are indispensable in the cyber domain. They recognize that no single nation can effectively combat sophisticated, borderless cyber threats alone, fostering a collaborative environment to enhance collective resilience, deter aggression, and shape the future of cybersecurity governance.
What roles do global alliances (e.g., NATO, QUAD, ASEAN) play in cyber defense?
Global alliances play increasingly vital and multifaceted roles in cyber defense, recognizing that cyber threats transcend national borders and require collective action.
They provide frameworks for cooperation, information sharing, capacity building, and, in some cases, collective response.
Here's a breakdown of how different alliances contribute:
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization):
NATO is arguably the most advanced military alliance in terms of its cyber defense integration, primarily because its core mission is collective defense.
Collective Defense (Article 5): A cornerstone of NATO's cyber defense strategy is the understanding that a cyberattack could potentially trigger Article 5 (an attack against one Ally is an attack against all). While the threshold for this is intentionally ambiguous and assessed on a case-by-case basis (based on the effects of the attack), it signifies a strong commitment to mutual defense in cyberspace.
Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations: NATO officially recognized cyberspace as a domain of operations (alongside land, sea, and air) in 2016. This allows NATO military commanders to better integrate cyber capabilities into missions and operations.
Information Sharing and Threat Intelligence: NATO facilitates the real-time sharing of information about cyber threats, malware, and best practices among Allies through dedicated platforms and expert networks.
Rapid Reaction Teams (RRTs): NATO maintains cyber rapid reaction teams that can be deployed to help Allies address cyber challenges, providing technical assistance and coordinating responses to incidents.
Capacity Building and Training: NATO works to enhance the individual cyber defenses of its member states through training programs, exercises (like Cyber Coalition), and setting common targets for national cyber defense capabilities.
Norms and International Law: NATO consistently reaffirms that international law, including the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace, contributing to the development of responsible state behavior norms.
Public-Private Partnerships: NATO strengthens its relationship with industry and academia through initiatives like the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership to leverage external expertise and resources.
QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue - Australia, India, Japan, United States):
The QUAD, while not a military alliance in the traditional sense, has significantly increased its focus on cybersecurity cooperation, particularly given the shared concerns about threats in the Indo-Pacific.
Critical Infrastructure Protection: A key priority for the QUAD is to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure across member states and the broader Indo-Pacific region against cyber disruptions. This involves sharing approaches to policy development and threat information.
Supply Chain Risk Management: Collaboration on securing digital supply chains, recognizing that vulnerabilities in one component can impact all users.
Software Security Standards: Efforts to align and ensure the implementation of baseline software security standards, potentially leveraging the collective purchasing power of their governments to drive secure-by-design principles in the software ecosystem.
Information Sharing: Promoting rapid and timely sharing of threat information between governments and with industry partners.
Capacity Building: Collaborating on capacity-building programs in the Indo-Pacific region to help partner nations enhance their cybersecurity capabilities.
Workforce Development: Working together to enhance the collective cybersecurity workforce and pool of talented cyber professionals among member states.
Responsible Cyber Habits: Launching public campaigns like the "Quad Cyber Challenge" to improve cybersecurity awareness and habits among Internet users.
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations):
ASEAN's approach to cyber defense is focused on regional cooperation, capacity building, and harmonizing policies among its diverse member states.
Regional Cybersecurity Cooperation Strategy: ASEAN has a strategy (e.g., 2021-2025) focused on advancing cyber readiness, strengthening regional cyber policies, enhancing trust in cyberspace, and capacity building.
ASEAN CERT Network: Facilitating coordination and information sharing between national-level Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) of member states. An ASEAN CERT is being established to enable timely exchange of threat information.
Cybercrime Operations Desk: Collaborating with INTERPOL to promote information sharing on cybercrime threats and better integrated operations for the region.
Capacity Building and Training: Numerous initiatives (often supported by dialogue partners like Singapore, Japan, and the U.S.) to build technical, policy, and strategic cyber capacity among member states through training programs, workshops, and joint exercises. Examples include the ASEAN Cyber Capacity Programme (ACCP) and the ASEAN–Japan Cybersecurity Capacity Building Centre (AJCCBC).
Cyber Defense Network (ACDN): A defense-focused network aiming to link the cyber defense centers of all member states, assist in developing new centers, and identify information-sharing gaps.
Norms and Responsible Behavior: Encouraging member states to subscribe to voluntary, non-binding norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace.
Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP): Launched to allow member states to share timely cybersecurity threat information.
Common Roles Across Alliances:
Despite their differences in scope and structure, these alliances share several common roles in cyber defense:
Information and Threat Intelligence Sharing: This is foundational. By sharing insights into TTPs, vulnerabilities, and ongoing campaigns, members can collectively improve their defenses and develop more effective countermeasures.
Capacity Building: Many alliances invest in programs to uplift the cybersecurity capabilities of their members, especially those with fewer resources. This includes training, exercises, and sharing best practices.
Norm Development: Alliances contribute to the ongoing global dialogue about responsible state behavior in cyberspace, advocating for the application of international law and promoting peaceful conduct.
Policy Coordination: They provide platforms for members to discuss, coordinate, and harmonize national cybersecurity policies and regulatory frameworks, leading to more cohesive responses to transboundary threats.
Collective Response and Deterrence: For military alliances like NATO, this involves explicit commitments to collective defense. For others, it involves coordinated public attribution or diplomatic pressure, aiming to deter malicious actors.
Joint Exercises and Drills: Simulating cyberattacks and responses helps members test their readiness, identify weaknesses, and improve coordination in real-world scenarios.
In summary, global alliances are indispensable in the cyber domain. They recognize that no single nation can effectively combat sophisticated, borderless cyber threats alone, fostering a collaborative environment to enhance collective resilience, deter aggression, and shape the future of cybersecurity governance.
4 months ago
Who Owns The Future-
From Colonies to Coalitions: Can Africa Build a Unified Voice?
Africa’s history is a story of fragmentation imposed from without—borders drawn by colonial powers with no regard for people, cultures, or economic logic.
Today, the continent still wrestles with division, yet the stakes have never been higher.
As global powers jostle for influence, resources, and strategic advantage, can Africa transcend its fractured past to build a truly unified voice—one that speaks with power and purpose on the world stage?
The Colonial Legacy: A Fractured Foundation
Africa’s 54 countries were carved out in the Berlin Conference (1884-85), ignoring ethnic, linguistic, and cultural realities.
Arbitrary borders created states too small to wield global influence and often internally divided.
Colonial administrations prioritized resource extraction, not integration or development.
This legacy of division has made continental unity challenging—fostering conflict, mistrust, and fragmented policies.
Current Steps Toward Unity-
The dream of African unity is far from dead. Key initiatives include:
African Union (AU): Founded in 2001, replacing the Organization of African Unity, with a stronger mandate for political and economic integration.
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Launched in 2021, aiming to create the largest free trade zone in the world, boosting intra-African commerce.
Regional Economic Communities (RECs): ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, and others work regionally on trade, security, and infrastructure.
Agenda 2063: Africa’s strategic framework for socio-economic transformation and integration over 50 years.
Challenges to a Unified Voice-
Despite progress, obstacles remain:
1. Sovereignty vs. Supranationalism
Many nations fear losing sovereignty. Leaders hesitate to cede power to continental institutions, weakening enforcement and cooperation.
2. Economic Disparities
From Nigeria’s oil wealth to Malawi’s agrarian economy, disparities create conflicting interests and competition.
3. Political Instability and Conflicts
Civil wars, coups, and political repression distract from unity goals and complicate common foreign policy.
4. External Interference
Foreign powers exploit divisions through “divide and rule,” bilateral deals, and proxy conflicts.
5. Infrastructure and Connectivity Gaps
Poor transport, energy, and digital infrastructure hinder integration.
Why a Unified African Voice Matters Now-
-Global Bargaining Power: United, Africa can negotiate better trade terms, debt relief, and technology transfers.
-Security and Peace: Coordinated responses to terrorism, piracy, and conflicts reduce human and economic costs.
-Economic Growth: Integrated markets attract investment and enable industrialization.
-Cultural Renaissance: A shared African identity can empower youth, diaspora, and global cultural diplomacy.
How Can Africa Build This Voice?
- Strengthen Continental Institutions
Empower the AU with real enforcement mechanisms
-Foster transparency and accountability in continental governance
- Promote Economic Integration
Accelerate AfCFTA implementation
Harmonize regulations and remove non-tariff barriers
- Invest in Connectivity
Build cross-border infrastructure (roads, rail, energy grids, internet)
-Support regional digital identity and payment systems
-Encourage Political Will and Vision
Cultivate leaders who prioritize continental unity over narrow nationalism
-Engage youth and civil society in pan-African projects
-Manage External Relations Strategically
Present a united front in dealing with China, the West, and others
-Develop African-led development banks and investment funds
Conclusion: From Colonies to Coalitions
Africa’s future will not be written by outsiders but by Africans themselves—if they unite.
Building a unified voice is not easy. It requires courage to overcome colonial legacies, trust to bridge diverse peoples, and vision to see beyond immediate gains.
But in this moment of global flux, a strong, united Africa could transform from a continent of fragmented colonies to a coalition of powerful nations—one that shapes its destiny and helps shape the world.
The question is not if Africa can unite—but when and how it will seize this historic opportunity.
From Colonies to Coalitions: Can Africa Build a Unified Voice?
Africa’s history is a story of fragmentation imposed from without—borders drawn by colonial powers with no regard for people, cultures, or economic logic.
Today, the continent still wrestles with division, yet the stakes have never been higher.
As global powers jostle for influence, resources, and strategic advantage, can Africa transcend its fractured past to build a truly unified voice—one that speaks with power and purpose on the world stage?
The Colonial Legacy: A Fractured Foundation
Africa’s 54 countries were carved out in the Berlin Conference (1884-85), ignoring ethnic, linguistic, and cultural realities.
Arbitrary borders created states too small to wield global influence and often internally divided.
Colonial administrations prioritized resource extraction, not integration or development.
This legacy of division has made continental unity challenging—fostering conflict, mistrust, and fragmented policies.
Current Steps Toward Unity-
The dream of African unity is far from dead. Key initiatives include:
African Union (AU): Founded in 2001, replacing the Organization of African Unity, with a stronger mandate for political and economic integration.
African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA): Launched in 2021, aiming to create the largest free trade zone in the world, boosting intra-African commerce.
Regional Economic Communities (RECs): ECOWAS, SADC, EAC, and others work regionally on trade, security, and infrastructure.
Agenda 2063: Africa’s strategic framework for socio-economic transformation and integration over 50 years.
Challenges to a Unified Voice-
Despite progress, obstacles remain:
1. Sovereignty vs. Supranationalism
Many nations fear losing sovereignty. Leaders hesitate to cede power to continental institutions, weakening enforcement and cooperation.
2. Economic Disparities
From Nigeria’s oil wealth to Malawi’s agrarian economy, disparities create conflicting interests and competition.
3. Political Instability and Conflicts
Civil wars, coups, and political repression distract from unity goals and complicate common foreign policy.
4. External Interference
Foreign powers exploit divisions through “divide and rule,” bilateral deals, and proxy conflicts.
5. Infrastructure and Connectivity Gaps
Poor transport, energy, and digital infrastructure hinder integration.
Why a Unified African Voice Matters Now-
-Global Bargaining Power: United, Africa can negotiate better trade terms, debt relief, and technology transfers.
-Security and Peace: Coordinated responses to terrorism, piracy, and conflicts reduce human and economic costs.
-Economic Growth: Integrated markets attract investment and enable industrialization.
-Cultural Renaissance: A shared African identity can empower youth, diaspora, and global cultural diplomacy.
How Can Africa Build This Voice?
- Strengthen Continental Institutions
Empower the AU with real enforcement mechanisms
-Foster transparency and accountability in continental governance
- Promote Economic Integration
Accelerate AfCFTA implementation
Harmonize regulations and remove non-tariff barriers
- Invest in Connectivity
Build cross-border infrastructure (roads, rail, energy grids, internet)
-Support regional digital identity and payment systems
-Encourage Political Will and Vision
Cultivate leaders who prioritize continental unity over narrow nationalism
-Engage youth and civil society in pan-African projects
-Manage External Relations Strategically
Present a united front in dealing with China, the West, and others
-Develop African-led development banks and investment funds
Conclusion: From Colonies to Coalitions
Africa’s future will not be written by outsiders but by Africans themselves—if they unite.
Building a unified voice is not easy. It requires courage to overcome colonial legacies, trust to bridge diverse peoples, and vision to see beyond immediate gains.
But in this moment of global flux, a strong, united Africa could transform from a continent of fragmented colonies to a coalition of powerful nations—one that shapes its destiny and helps shape the world.
The question is not if Africa can unite—but when and how it will seize this historic opportunity.
4 months ago
How do cyber operations from groups in Iran and Vietnam compare in tactics and targets?
While both Iranian and Vietnamese cyber groups engage in state-sponsored cyber operations, their primary motivations, geopolitical contexts, and consequently, their tactics and targets, differ significantly.
Iranian Cyber Groups (e.g., APT33/Elfin, APT34/OilRig, APT35/Charming Kitten, MuddyWater)
Main Motives:
Iran's cyber activities are strongly driven by its geopolitical aspirations, regional rivalries (especially with Saudi Arabia and Israel), and desire to counter international sanctions. Their motivations include:
Espionage: Gathering intelligence on political, military, and economic developments, particularly in the Middle East, U.S., Europe, and Israel.
Disruption and Retaliation: Disrupting critical infrastructure, especially against perceived adversaries (e.g., in response to sanctions or political actions). They are willing to engage in destructive attacks.
Influence Operations: Spreading propaganda, manipulating public opinion, and sowing discord in rival nations.
Intellectual Property Theft (Secondary): While they do engage in this, it's often more opportunistic or tied to specific military/dual-use technologies rather than broad economic development.
Internal Control: Surveillance and repression of dissidents, both domestically and abroad.
Tactics:
Iranian groups often leverage a blend of technical sophistication and social engineering.
Aggressive Spear-Phishing & Social Engineering: Highly sophisticated and persistent phishing campaigns are a hallmark. They often impersonate legitimate entities (journalists, academics, government officials, recruiters) to build trust and trick targets into revealing credentials or downloading malware. They're known for using compromised accounts for further phishing.
Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities: They are quick to exploit newly disclosed vulnerabilities (N-days) in widely used software and internet-facing systems (VPNs, firewalls, Exchange servers) to gain initial access.
Living Off The Land (LotL) & OSINT: They frequently use legitimate system tools (PowerShell, RDP, Mimikatz) and open-source intelligence (OSINT) to evade detection and understand victim networks.
Web Shells & Backdoors: Deployment of web shells for persistent access and custom backdoors.
Destructive Malware/Wipers: Iranian groups have a history of deploying destructive malware (e.g., Shamoon, ZeroCleare) to wipe data and disable systems, particularly against targets in the energy and industrial sectors.
Hybrid Operations: Increasingly, they combine hacking and data theft with information operations, leaking stolen data online, and using social media for amplification and harassment.
Ransomware (Collaborative/Opportunistic): While not their primary goal like North Korea, some Iranian groups have been observed collaborating with cybercriminal ransomware affiliates or directly deploying ransomware for financial gain or disruption.
Targets:
Middle East Region: Heavily focused on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (especially Saudi Arabia, UAE), Israel, and other regional rivals.
Government & Military: Foreign ministries, defense contractors, intelligence agencies, and government officials, particularly those involved in nuclear policy, sanctions, or regional security.
Energy Sector (Oil & Gas): A long-standing target for both espionage and potential disruption, reflecting Iran's strategic interests.
Critical Infrastructure (OT/ICS): Increasing focus on industrial control systems and operational technology, potentially for pre-positioning or disruptive attacks.
Telecommunications & Financial Services: For intelligence gathering and network access.
Journalists, Academics, Dissidents, Human Rights Activists: Both within Iran and among the diaspora, for surveillance and repression.
Vietnamese Cyber Groups (e.g., APT32/OceanLotus, APT30/Naikon)
Main Motives:
Vietnamese cyber operations are strongly linked to national economic development, protecting sovereignty claims (especially in the South China Sea), and maintaining political stability.
Economic Espionage: Stealing intellectual property, trade secrets, and competitive intelligence to support Vietnamese industries and accelerate economic growth. This is a very significant motivation.
Political Espionage: Gathering intelligence on foreign governments, political organizations, and diplomats relevant to Vietnam's geopolitical interests, particularly concerning regional rivals and partners.
Surveillance and Monitoring: Tracking and monitoring political dissidents, journalists, NGOs, and foreign entities perceived as a threat to the ruling party or national stability.
South China Sea Disputes: Gaining intelligence on rival claimants and international actors involved in the South China Sea disputes.
Tactics:
Vietnamese groups often demonstrate high levels of sophistication and persistence, with a focus on long-term access and stealth.
Sophisticated Spear-Phishing: Highly customized and contextualized spear-phishing emails, often impersonating trusted contacts or organizations, are a primary initial access vector.
Watering Hole Attacks: Compromising websites frequented by specific targets and implanting malware to infect visitors.
Custom Malware and Backdoors: Development and use of sophisticated custom malware (Remote Access Trojans, info-stealers) designed for covert data exfiltration and persistent access.
Exploitation of Zero-Day and N-Day Vulnerabilities: While less frequent than Iranian groups' aggressive N-day exploitation, they are capable of exploiting zero-days.
Supply Chain Attacks: There have been instances where Vietnamese groups have targeted software or hardware vendors to compromise their clients downstream.
Leveraging Cloud Services: Using legitimate cloud services for command and control (C2) or data exfiltration to blend in with normal network traffic.
Evasion Techniques: Employing various techniques to avoid detection by security software, including code obfuscation and anti-analysis checks.
Targets:
Southeast Asian Governments: Particularly those involved in the South China Sea disputes, for political intelligence.
Foreign Businesses & Multinational Corporations: Across various sectors (e.g., automotive, media, hospitality, manufacturing, technology, healthcare, e-commerce) for economic espionage and IP theft.
Political Dissidents & Human Rights Activists: Both domestic and international, for surveillance and control.
Journalists and NGOs: Especially those reporting on Vietnam or human rights issues.
Critical Infrastructure (Limited Public Reporting): While less publicly highlighted than Iranian or Chinese groups, there have been some reports of Vietnamese groups targeting critical infrastructure, but often for intelligence gathering rather than overt disruption.
Comparison Summary:
Feature- Iranian Cyber Groups----
Primary Motive- Geopolitical influence, regional rivalries, countering sanctions, disruption, espionage, retaliation.
Willingness for Disruption- High – known for destructive attacks/wipers.
Key Regions of Focus- Middle East (GCC, Israel), U.S., Europe.
Tactics Emphasis- Aggressive spear-phishing, N-day exploitation, LotL, web shells, destructive malware, information operations.
Financial Crime- Opportunistic ransomware or collaboration with criminals.
Vietnamese Cyber Groups-
Primary Motive-
Economic development (IP theft), political espionage (Sovereignty, South China Sea), internal control.
Willingness for Disruption-
Lower – focus on stealth, long-term access, and data exfiltration, less on overt disruption.
Key Regions of Focus-
Southeast Asia (ASEAN), U.S. (related to economic/political ties).
Tactics Emphasis-
Sophisticated spear-phishing, custom malware, watering holes, supply chain (less common), long-term stealth, cloud usage.
Financial Crime-Less prominent, but some engagement in cybercrime for revenue.
Export to Sheets-
In essence, Iranian groups are more overt and willing to engage in destructive actions driven by immediate geopolitical tensions, while Vietnamese groups are generally more focused on stealthy, long-term espionage and IP theft to support national development and strategic interests in their region.
While both Iranian and Vietnamese cyber groups engage in state-sponsored cyber operations, their primary motivations, geopolitical contexts, and consequently, their tactics and targets, differ significantly.
Iranian Cyber Groups (e.g., APT33/Elfin, APT34/OilRig, APT35/Charming Kitten, MuddyWater)
Main Motives:
Iran's cyber activities are strongly driven by its geopolitical aspirations, regional rivalries (especially with Saudi Arabia and Israel), and desire to counter international sanctions. Their motivations include:
Espionage: Gathering intelligence on political, military, and economic developments, particularly in the Middle East, U.S., Europe, and Israel.
Disruption and Retaliation: Disrupting critical infrastructure, especially against perceived adversaries (e.g., in response to sanctions or political actions). They are willing to engage in destructive attacks.
Influence Operations: Spreading propaganda, manipulating public opinion, and sowing discord in rival nations.
Intellectual Property Theft (Secondary): While they do engage in this, it's often more opportunistic or tied to specific military/dual-use technologies rather than broad economic development.
Internal Control: Surveillance and repression of dissidents, both domestically and abroad.
Tactics:
Iranian groups often leverage a blend of technical sophistication and social engineering.
Aggressive Spear-Phishing & Social Engineering: Highly sophisticated and persistent phishing campaigns are a hallmark. They often impersonate legitimate entities (journalists, academics, government officials, recruiters) to build trust and trick targets into revealing credentials or downloading malware. They're known for using compromised accounts for further phishing.
Exploitation of Known Vulnerabilities: They are quick to exploit newly disclosed vulnerabilities (N-days) in widely used software and internet-facing systems (VPNs, firewalls, Exchange servers) to gain initial access.
Living Off The Land (LotL) & OSINT: They frequently use legitimate system tools (PowerShell, RDP, Mimikatz) and open-source intelligence (OSINT) to evade detection and understand victim networks.
Web Shells & Backdoors: Deployment of web shells for persistent access and custom backdoors.
Destructive Malware/Wipers: Iranian groups have a history of deploying destructive malware (e.g., Shamoon, ZeroCleare) to wipe data and disable systems, particularly against targets in the energy and industrial sectors.
Hybrid Operations: Increasingly, they combine hacking and data theft with information operations, leaking stolen data online, and using social media for amplification and harassment.
Ransomware (Collaborative/Opportunistic): While not their primary goal like North Korea, some Iranian groups have been observed collaborating with cybercriminal ransomware affiliates or directly deploying ransomware for financial gain or disruption.
Targets:
Middle East Region: Heavily focused on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (especially Saudi Arabia, UAE), Israel, and other regional rivals.
Government & Military: Foreign ministries, defense contractors, intelligence agencies, and government officials, particularly those involved in nuclear policy, sanctions, or regional security.
Energy Sector (Oil & Gas): A long-standing target for both espionage and potential disruption, reflecting Iran's strategic interests.
Critical Infrastructure (OT/ICS): Increasing focus on industrial control systems and operational technology, potentially for pre-positioning or disruptive attacks.
Telecommunications & Financial Services: For intelligence gathering and network access.
Journalists, Academics, Dissidents, Human Rights Activists: Both within Iran and among the diaspora, for surveillance and repression.
Vietnamese Cyber Groups (e.g., APT32/OceanLotus, APT30/Naikon)
Main Motives:
Vietnamese cyber operations are strongly linked to national economic development, protecting sovereignty claims (especially in the South China Sea), and maintaining political stability.
Economic Espionage: Stealing intellectual property, trade secrets, and competitive intelligence to support Vietnamese industries and accelerate economic growth. This is a very significant motivation.
Political Espionage: Gathering intelligence on foreign governments, political organizations, and diplomats relevant to Vietnam's geopolitical interests, particularly concerning regional rivals and partners.
Surveillance and Monitoring: Tracking and monitoring political dissidents, journalists, NGOs, and foreign entities perceived as a threat to the ruling party or national stability.
South China Sea Disputes: Gaining intelligence on rival claimants and international actors involved in the South China Sea disputes.
Tactics:
Vietnamese groups often demonstrate high levels of sophistication and persistence, with a focus on long-term access and stealth.
Sophisticated Spear-Phishing: Highly customized and contextualized spear-phishing emails, often impersonating trusted contacts or organizations, are a primary initial access vector.
Watering Hole Attacks: Compromising websites frequented by specific targets and implanting malware to infect visitors.
Custom Malware and Backdoors: Development and use of sophisticated custom malware (Remote Access Trojans, info-stealers) designed for covert data exfiltration and persistent access.
Exploitation of Zero-Day and N-Day Vulnerabilities: While less frequent than Iranian groups' aggressive N-day exploitation, they are capable of exploiting zero-days.
Supply Chain Attacks: There have been instances where Vietnamese groups have targeted software or hardware vendors to compromise their clients downstream.
Leveraging Cloud Services: Using legitimate cloud services for command and control (C2) or data exfiltration to blend in with normal network traffic.
Evasion Techniques: Employing various techniques to avoid detection by security software, including code obfuscation and anti-analysis checks.
Targets:
Southeast Asian Governments: Particularly those involved in the South China Sea disputes, for political intelligence.
Foreign Businesses & Multinational Corporations: Across various sectors (e.g., automotive, media, hospitality, manufacturing, technology, healthcare, e-commerce) for economic espionage and IP theft.
Political Dissidents & Human Rights Activists: Both domestic and international, for surveillance and control.
Journalists and NGOs: Especially those reporting on Vietnam or human rights issues.
Critical Infrastructure (Limited Public Reporting): While less publicly highlighted than Iranian or Chinese groups, there have been some reports of Vietnamese groups targeting critical infrastructure, but often for intelligence gathering rather than overt disruption.
Comparison Summary:
Feature- Iranian Cyber Groups----
Primary Motive- Geopolitical influence, regional rivalries, countering sanctions, disruption, espionage, retaliation.
Willingness for Disruption- High – known for destructive attacks/wipers.
Key Regions of Focus- Middle East (GCC, Israel), U.S., Europe.
Tactics Emphasis- Aggressive spear-phishing, N-day exploitation, LotL, web shells, destructive malware, information operations.
Financial Crime- Opportunistic ransomware or collaboration with criminals.
Vietnamese Cyber Groups-
Primary Motive-
Economic development (IP theft), political espionage (Sovereignty, South China Sea), internal control.
Willingness for Disruption-
Lower – focus on stealth, long-term access, and data exfiltration, less on overt disruption.
Key Regions of Focus-
Southeast Asia (ASEAN), U.S. (related to economic/political ties).
Tactics Emphasis-
Sophisticated spear-phishing, custom malware, watering holes, supply chain (less common), long-term stealth, cloud usage.
Financial Crime-Less prominent, but some engagement in cybercrime for revenue.
Export to Sheets-
In essence, Iranian groups are more overt and willing to engage in destructive actions driven by immediate geopolitical tensions, while Vietnamese groups are generally more focused on stealthy, long-term espionage and IP theft to support national development and strategic interests in their region.
4 months ago
How can Nigeria make quality education more accessible in rural areas?
Making quality education more accessible in rural areas of Nigeria is a complex undertaking that requires a holistic and sustained approach, addressing issues across infrastructure, human resources, technology, community engagement, and funding.
Here's how it can be achieved:
I. Infrastructure and Facilities Development:
Context-Specific School Construction and Renovation:
Durable & Local Materials: Build and renovate school buildings using durable, locally sourced, and climate-appropriate materials. Designs should consider natural lighting and ventilation.
Essential Amenities: Ensure all schools have basic facilities: clean and functional toilets (separate for boys and girls), access to clean water, reliable electricity (solar power is a viable option), and proper ventilation.
Flexible Learning Spaces: Create adaptable classrooms that can accommodate different learning styles and potentially multi-grade teaching, which is common in smaller rural schools.
Libraries and Labs: Equip schools with functional libraries and basic science/computer laboratories. These can be shared resources among clusters of schools.
Mobile and Satellite Learning Centers:
For extremely remote or sparsely populated areas, explore mobile classrooms or "learning hubs" that rotate among communities, or satellite learning centers that provide access to digital resources and connectivity.
II. Qualified and Motivated Teachers:
Incentives for Rural Deployment:
Improved Remuneration: Offer attractive salary packages, allowances, and hardship pay for teachers willing to serve in rural areas.
Housing and Utilities: Provide subsidized or free housing, access to reliable electricity, and potable water to make rural living more appealing.
Career Advancement Opportunities: Create clear pathways for career progression for rural teachers, linked to performance and continuous professional development.
Loan Forgiveness/Scholarships: Offer student loan forgiveness or scholarships to aspiring teachers who commit to serving in rural schools for a specified period.
Targeted Recruitment and Training:
Local Recruitment: Prioritize recruiting teachers from within or near rural communities, as they are often more likely to stay due to existing ties.
Specialized Training: Equip teachers with skills for multi-grade teaching, differentiated instruction, and managing large classes. Training should also cover culturally sensitive pedagogy and community engagement.
Continuous Professional Development (CPD): Implement regular, accessible, and relevant CPD programs, utilizing blended learning models (online modules, local workshops) to reduce travel burdens.
Mentorship Programs: Pair experienced urban teachers with rural counterparts for mentorship and support.
III. Leveraging Technology (Bridging the Digital Divide):
Sustainable Power and Connectivity:
Solar Power: Prioritize equipping rural schools with reliable solar power systems to run computers, projectors, and charging stations.
Affordable Internet: Work with telecom providers and government agencies (e.g., NCC, NITDA) to extend affordable, reliable internet connectivity to rural areas, perhaps through community Wi-Fi hotspots or satellite internet.
Digital Learning Resources:
Tablets/E-readers: Provide students and teachers with rugged, low-cost tablets preloaded with digital textbooks, educational apps, and interactive learning content (e.g., "Solar-Powered Tablets").
Learning Management Systems (LMS): Implement simple LMS platforms that can deliver content offline and sync when connectivity is available.
Educational TV/Radio: Utilize existing media (radio, TV) to deliver curriculum-aligned lessons, especially in areas with limited internet access.
Teacher Digital Literacy Training:
Train teachers not just on how to use technology, but how to integrate it effectively into their pedagogy to enhance learning outcomes.
IV. Community Engagement and Ownership:
School-Based Management Committees (SBMCs):
Strengthen and empower SBMCs with genuine decision-making authority and training in financial management, school development planning, and monitoring.
Encourage active participation of parents, traditional leaders, and community members in school governance, resource mobilization, and monitoring teacher attendance and performance.
Community Contributions:
Foster a sense of community ownership by encouraging local contributions (labor, materials, financial support) for school development projects.
Integrate schools into community life, making them centers for community development, adult literacy programs, and health awareness.
Sensitization and Advocacy:
Conduct targeted campaigns to raise awareness among rural parents about the value of education, especially for girls, and discourage child labor or early marriage.
V. Funding and Policy:
Increased and Targeted Funding:
Higher Education Allocation: Significantly increase the overall budget allocation to education, ensuring a substantial portion is dedicated to rural school development and teacher welfare.
Specific Rural Education Fund: Establish a dedicated fund for rural education, managed transparently, to address unique challenges.
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): Encourage and incentivize private sector involvement through CSR initiatives, grants, and direct investment in rural schools.
Innovative Financing: Explore mechanisms like education bonds, diaspora engagement, and philanthropic partnerships to supplement government funding.
Flexible and Context-Specific Policies:
Local Curriculum Adaptation: Allow for some flexibility in curriculum delivery to address local contexts, needs, and cultural nuances, while maintaining national standards.
Remote Learning Policies: Develop clear policies for remote and blended learning that can be effectively deployed during emergencies or to support continuous learning.
Data-Driven Planning: Establish robust data collection and analysis systems to identify out-of-school children, monitor learning outcomes in rural areas, and allocate resources effectively based on needs.
Making quality education accessible in rural Nigeria requires sustained political will, a commitment to transparent resource utilization, and genuine collaboration among all stakeholders to overcome the geographical, economic, and social barriers.
Making quality education more accessible in rural areas of Nigeria is a complex undertaking that requires a holistic and sustained approach, addressing issues across infrastructure, human resources, technology, community engagement, and funding.
Here's how it can be achieved:
I. Infrastructure and Facilities Development:
Context-Specific School Construction and Renovation:
Durable & Local Materials: Build and renovate school buildings using durable, locally sourced, and climate-appropriate materials. Designs should consider natural lighting and ventilation.
Essential Amenities: Ensure all schools have basic facilities: clean and functional toilets (separate for boys and girls), access to clean water, reliable electricity (solar power is a viable option), and proper ventilation.
Flexible Learning Spaces: Create adaptable classrooms that can accommodate different learning styles and potentially multi-grade teaching, which is common in smaller rural schools.
Libraries and Labs: Equip schools with functional libraries and basic science/computer laboratories. These can be shared resources among clusters of schools.
Mobile and Satellite Learning Centers:
For extremely remote or sparsely populated areas, explore mobile classrooms or "learning hubs" that rotate among communities, or satellite learning centers that provide access to digital resources and connectivity.
II. Qualified and Motivated Teachers:
Incentives for Rural Deployment:
Improved Remuneration: Offer attractive salary packages, allowances, and hardship pay for teachers willing to serve in rural areas.
Housing and Utilities: Provide subsidized or free housing, access to reliable electricity, and potable water to make rural living more appealing.
Career Advancement Opportunities: Create clear pathways for career progression for rural teachers, linked to performance and continuous professional development.
Loan Forgiveness/Scholarships: Offer student loan forgiveness or scholarships to aspiring teachers who commit to serving in rural schools for a specified period.
Targeted Recruitment and Training:
Local Recruitment: Prioritize recruiting teachers from within or near rural communities, as they are often more likely to stay due to existing ties.
Specialized Training: Equip teachers with skills for multi-grade teaching, differentiated instruction, and managing large classes. Training should also cover culturally sensitive pedagogy and community engagement.
Continuous Professional Development (CPD): Implement regular, accessible, and relevant CPD programs, utilizing blended learning models (online modules, local workshops) to reduce travel burdens.
Mentorship Programs: Pair experienced urban teachers with rural counterparts for mentorship and support.
III. Leveraging Technology (Bridging the Digital Divide):
Sustainable Power and Connectivity:
Solar Power: Prioritize equipping rural schools with reliable solar power systems to run computers, projectors, and charging stations.
Affordable Internet: Work with telecom providers and government agencies (e.g., NCC, NITDA) to extend affordable, reliable internet connectivity to rural areas, perhaps through community Wi-Fi hotspots or satellite internet.
Digital Learning Resources:
Tablets/E-readers: Provide students and teachers with rugged, low-cost tablets preloaded with digital textbooks, educational apps, and interactive learning content (e.g., "Solar-Powered Tablets").
Learning Management Systems (LMS): Implement simple LMS platforms that can deliver content offline and sync when connectivity is available.
Educational TV/Radio: Utilize existing media (radio, TV) to deliver curriculum-aligned lessons, especially in areas with limited internet access.
Teacher Digital Literacy Training:
Train teachers not just on how to use technology, but how to integrate it effectively into their pedagogy to enhance learning outcomes.
IV. Community Engagement and Ownership:
School-Based Management Committees (SBMCs):
Strengthen and empower SBMCs with genuine decision-making authority and training in financial management, school development planning, and monitoring.
Encourage active participation of parents, traditional leaders, and community members in school governance, resource mobilization, and monitoring teacher attendance and performance.
Community Contributions:
Foster a sense of community ownership by encouraging local contributions (labor, materials, financial support) for school development projects.
Integrate schools into community life, making them centers for community development, adult literacy programs, and health awareness.
Sensitization and Advocacy:
Conduct targeted campaigns to raise awareness among rural parents about the value of education, especially for girls, and discourage child labor or early marriage.
V. Funding and Policy:
Increased and Targeted Funding:
Higher Education Allocation: Significantly increase the overall budget allocation to education, ensuring a substantial portion is dedicated to rural school development and teacher welfare.
Specific Rural Education Fund: Establish a dedicated fund for rural education, managed transparently, to address unique challenges.
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): Encourage and incentivize private sector involvement through CSR initiatives, grants, and direct investment in rural schools.
Innovative Financing: Explore mechanisms like education bonds, diaspora engagement, and philanthropic partnerships to supplement government funding.
Flexible and Context-Specific Policies:
Local Curriculum Adaptation: Allow for some flexibility in curriculum delivery to address local contexts, needs, and cultural nuances, while maintaining national standards.
Remote Learning Policies: Develop clear policies for remote and blended learning that can be effectively deployed during emergencies or to support continuous learning.
Data-Driven Planning: Establish robust data collection and analysis systems to identify out-of-school children, monitor learning outcomes in rural areas, and allocate resources effectively based on needs.
Making quality education accessible in rural Nigeria requires sustained political will, a commitment to transparent resource utilization, and genuine collaboration among all stakeholders to overcome the geographical, economic, and social barriers.
4 months ago
How can Nigeria bridge the gap between education and employable skills?
Bridging the gap between education and employable skills in Nigeria is a critical challenge that requires a holistic and multi-pronged approach involving government, educational institutions, the private sector, and civil society.
The current system often produces graduates ill-equipped for the demands of the modern job market, leading to high youth unemployment.
Here's how Nigeria can effectively bridge this gap:
I. Curriculum Reform & Relevance:
Industry-Driven Curriculum Development:
Regular Review & Updates: Curricula at all levels (primary, secondary, tertiary, and TVET) must be regularly reviewed and updated in close collaboration with industry experts, employers, and professional bodies. This ensures that what is taught aligns directly with the skills demanded by the job market.
Competency-Based Learning: Shift the focus from rote memorization and theoretical knowledge to competency-based education. This means assessing students on their ability to apply knowledge and skills to real-world problems.
Inclusion of 21st-Century Skills: Integrate critical thinking, problem-solving, creativity, communication, collaboration, digital literacy, and data analysis across all disciplines. These "soft skills" are highly valued by employers.
Emphasis on STEM and Digital Skills:
Strengthen Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education: Invest heavily in STEM education from an early age, ensuring adequate laboratories, equipment, and qualified teachers.
Digital Literacy: Make digital literacy a foundational skill across all levels of education. Introduce coding, data analytics, cybersecurity, and AI/Machine Learning at appropriate stages. Initiatives like NITDA's 3MTT (Three Million Technical Talent) are good starts but need massive scaling.
Mandatory Entrepreneurship Education:
Integrate practical entrepreneurship education into all tertiary curricula. This should go beyond theoretical concepts to include business plan development, mentorship, access to seed funding (even if small), and incubation support. The goal is to produce job creators, not just job seekers.
II. Strengthen Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET):
Rebranding and Destigmatization:
Launch nationwide campaigns to change the societal perception of TVET. Highlight successful TVET graduates, showcase the lucrative nature of skilled trades (e.g., plumbing, welding, carpentry, ICT repairs), and emphasize their vital role in economic development. Combat the notion that TVET is for "school dropouts."
Increased Investment and Modernization:
Adequately fund TVET institutions with modern tools, equipment, workshops, and technology that reflect current industry standards.
Upgrade and maintain existing polytechnics, technical colleges, and vocational centers.
Industry-Led TVET:
Ensure that TVET programs are directly developed and run in partnership with industries. Companies should be involved in curriculum design, practical training, and certification.
Promote apprenticeships and on-the-job training programs, where students learn practical skills directly in a workplace setting.
III. Enhance Industry-Academia Collaboration:
Structured Partnerships:
MOU and Joint Projects: Facilitate Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between universities/polytechnics and industries for joint research projects, curriculum development, and student internships.
Research & Development (R&D): Encourage industries to fund university research that addresses their specific needs and challenges, creating a symbiotic relationship.
Advisory Boards: Establish industry advisory boards for academic departments to provide direct input on curriculum, necessary skills, and emerging trends.
Internship and Apprenticeship Programs:
Make internships (Industrial Attachment) mandatory, well-structured, and adequately supervised. Ensure students gain relevant, hands-on experience that aligns with their studies.
Incentivize companies (e.g., through tax breaks) to offer quality internships and apprenticeships.
Guest Lecturers and Adjunct Faculty:
Invite industry professionals to serve as guest lecturers, adjunct faculty, or mentors, bringing real-world experience into the classroom.
IV. Teacher Training and Professional Development:-
Skills-Focused Pedagogy:
Train educators at all levels to adopt practical, problem-solving, and project-based teaching methodologies that foster skill development rather than rote learning.
Equip teachers with the skills to integrate technology effectively into their teaching.
Continuous Professional Development:
Provide ongoing training for teachers and lecturers to keep them updated on industry trends, new technologies, and modern pedagogical approaches.
Encourage lecturers to undertake sabbaticals in relevant industries to gain practical experience.
Industry Experience for Educators:
Implement programs that allow academic staff to spend time in relevant industries, gaining practical experience that they can then bring back to the classroom.
V. Leverage Technology and Digital Learning:
E-Learning Platforms:
Invest in robust e-learning platforms and digital resources to complement traditional classroom learning, making education more accessible and flexible.
Promote blended learning models that combine online and in-person instruction.
Access to ICT Infrastructure:
Address the challenges of internet connectivity and reliable power supply, especially in rural areas, to ensure equitable access to digital learning tools.
Provide affordable digital devices to students and educators.
Virtual Labs and Simulations:
Utilize virtual laboratories and simulation software to provide practical experience where physical equipment is limited or too expensive.
VI. Government Policies & Funding:
Increased and Targeted Funding:
Significantly increase the budget allocation to education, specifically earmarking funds for curriculum reform, TVET modernization, industry collaboration initiatives, and teacher training.
Ensure transparent and accountable use of these funds.
Policy Cohesion:
Develop a coherent national education policy that links educational outcomes directly to labor market needs, with clear implementation strategies and monitoring mechanisms.
Avoid frequent policy changes that disrupt progress.
Incentives for Private Sector Engagement:
Offer tax incentives, grants, or subsidies to private companies that invest in skills development, apprenticeships, or collaborate with educational institutions.
Strengthen Career Guidance & Counseling:
Implement effective career guidance and counseling services in schools and universities to help students make informed choices about their academic and career paths, aligning their interests with market demands.
By addressing these areas comprehensively, Nigeria can transform its educational system into a powerful engine for skill development, producing a workforce that is not only educated but also highly employable and capable of driving economic growth and innovation.
Bridging the gap between education and employable skills in Nigeria is a critical challenge that requires a holistic and multi-pronged approach involving government, educational institutions, the private sector, and civil society.
The current system often produces graduates ill-equipped for the demands of the modern job market, leading to high youth unemployment.
Here's how Nigeria can effectively bridge this gap:
I. Curriculum Reform & Relevance:
Industry-Driven Curriculum Development:
Regular Review & Updates: Curricula at all levels (primary, secondary, tertiary, and TVET) must be regularly reviewed and updated in close collaboration with industry experts, employers, and professional bodies. This ensures that what is taught aligns directly with the skills demanded by the job market.
Competency-Based Learning: Shift the focus from rote memorization and theoretical knowledge to competency-based education. This means assessing students on their ability to apply knowledge and skills to real-world problems.
Inclusion of 21st-Century Skills: Integrate critical thinking, problem-solving, creativity, communication, collaboration, digital literacy, and data analysis across all disciplines. These "soft skills" are highly valued by employers.
Emphasis on STEM and Digital Skills:
Strengthen Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education: Invest heavily in STEM education from an early age, ensuring adequate laboratories, equipment, and qualified teachers.
Digital Literacy: Make digital literacy a foundational skill across all levels of education. Introduce coding, data analytics, cybersecurity, and AI/Machine Learning at appropriate stages. Initiatives like NITDA's 3MTT (Three Million Technical Talent) are good starts but need massive scaling.
Mandatory Entrepreneurship Education:
Integrate practical entrepreneurship education into all tertiary curricula. This should go beyond theoretical concepts to include business plan development, mentorship, access to seed funding (even if small), and incubation support. The goal is to produce job creators, not just job seekers.
II. Strengthen Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET):
Rebranding and Destigmatization:
Launch nationwide campaigns to change the societal perception of TVET. Highlight successful TVET graduates, showcase the lucrative nature of skilled trades (e.g., plumbing, welding, carpentry, ICT repairs), and emphasize their vital role in economic development. Combat the notion that TVET is for "school dropouts."
Increased Investment and Modernization:
Adequately fund TVET institutions with modern tools, equipment, workshops, and technology that reflect current industry standards.
Upgrade and maintain existing polytechnics, technical colleges, and vocational centers.
Industry-Led TVET:
Ensure that TVET programs are directly developed and run in partnership with industries. Companies should be involved in curriculum design, practical training, and certification.
Promote apprenticeships and on-the-job training programs, where students learn practical skills directly in a workplace setting.
III. Enhance Industry-Academia Collaboration:
Structured Partnerships:
MOU and Joint Projects: Facilitate Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between universities/polytechnics and industries for joint research projects, curriculum development, and student internships.
Research & Development (R&D): Encourage industries to fund university research that addresses their specific needs and challenges, creating a symbiotic relationship.
Advisory Boards: Establish industry advisory boards for academic departments to provide direct input on curriculum, necessary skills, and emerging trends.
Internship and Apprenticeship Programs:
Make internships (Industrial Attachment) mandatory, well-structured, and adequately supervised. Ensure students gain relevant, hands-on experience that aligns with their studies.
Incentivize companies (e.g., through tax breaks) to offer quality internships and apprenticeships.
Guest Lecturers and Adjunct Faculty:
Invite industry professionals to serve as guest lecturers, adjunct faculty, or mentors, bringing real-world experience into the classroom.
IV. Teacher Training and Professional Development:-
Skills-Focused Pedagogy:
Train educators at all levels to adopt practical, problem-solving, and project-based teaching methodologies that foster skill development rather than rote learning.
Equip teachers with the skills to integrate technology effectively into their teaching.
Continuous Professional Development:
Provide ongoing training for teachers and lecturers to keep them updated on industry trends, new technologies, and modern pedagogical approaches.
Encourage lecturers to undertake sabbaticals in relevant industries to gain practical experience.
Industry Experience for Educators:
Implement programs that allow academic staff to spend time in relevant industries, gaining practical experience that they can then bring back to the classroom.
V. Leverage Technology and Digital Learning:
E-Learning Platforms:
Invest in robust e-learning platforms and digital resources to complement traditional classroom learning, making education more accessible and flexible.
Promote blended learning models that combine online and in-person instruction.
Access to ICT Infrastructure:
Address the challenges of internet connectivity and reliable power supply, especially in rural areas, to ensure equitable access to digital learning tools.
Provide affordable digital devices to students and educators.
Virtual Labs and Simulations:
Utilize virtual laboratories and simulation software to provide practical experience where physical equipment is limited or too expensive.
VI. Government Policies & Funding:
Increased and Targeted Funding:
Significantly increase the budget allocation to education, specifically earmarking funds for curriculum reform, TVET modernization, industry collaboration initiatives, and teacher training.
Ensure transparent and accountable use of these funds.
Policy Cohesion:
Develop a coherent national education policy that links educational outcomes directly to labor market needs, with clear implementation strategies and monitoring mechanisms.
Avoid frequent policy changes that disrupt progress.
Incentives for Private Sector Engagement:
Offer tax incentives, grants, or subsidies to private companies that invest in skills development, apprenticeships, or collaborate with educational institutions.
Strengthen Career Guidance & Counseling:
Implement effective career guidance and counseling services in schools and universities to help students make informed choices about their academic and career paths, aligning their interests with market demands.
By addressing these areas comprehensively, Nigeria can transform its educational system into a powerful engine for skill development, producing a workforce that is not only educated but also highly employable and capable of driving economic growth and innovation.
4 months ago
Israeli rabbi: 'Macron should prepare his coffin' for 'declaring war on God'
"This French president, we must let him know, he has every interest in preparing his coffin," said Rabbi Daniel David Cohen, casting Emmanuel Macron in the vein of Roman Emperor Titus.
An Israeli rabbi, who made incendiary remarks warning President Emmanuel Macron of death by divine judgement over his decision to recognize a Palestinian state, was reported to the French justice system by French Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau on Friday.
In a YouTube sermon last Sunday, Rabbi Daniel David Cohen said Macron’s July 24 foreign policy shift was not just against Jewish people but a “declaration of war on God,” who decided to whom the land of Israel would be given.
“This French president, we must let him know, he has every interest in preparing his coffin,” said Cohen, casting Macron in the vein of Roman emperor Titus, who, according to rabbinic tradition, died from divine retribution. The coffin was the destination of others besides Macron, continued Cohen, indicating that France would share the fate of Iran and collapse. The rabbi urged Jews to flee France before the Republic collapsed.
Retailleau said on X/Twitter that Cohen had made several threats, including those against the French president, and moved to block the video’s dissemination. He also reported the remarks to the courts, and France24 reported that the Paris Prosecutor’s office had opened an investigation.
Israeli rabbi: Jews, flee France before the country collapses like Iran
Image of French President Emmanuel Macron in front of images of the French and Israeli flag. (credit: REUTERS/STEPHANE MAHE)
Image of French President Emmanuel Macron in front of images of the French and Israeli flag. (credit: REUTERS/STEPHANE MAHE)
Cohen was condemned by France Chief Rabbi Haim Korsia, whose remarks he called intolerable. Korsia emphasized that Cohen, who had lived in France, had “never held a rabbinical position in France, and that he was neither trained nor graduated from the French rabbinical school.”
Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF) president Yonathan Arfi also said on social media that Cohen had made “hateful and unacceptable threats.”
“These statements against the President of the Republic in no way are connected to the Jewish institutions of France,” said Arfi.
The Torah-Box Jewish religious education platform was quick to distance itself from Cohen, telling The Jerusalem Post that the organization simply distributed the classes of hundreds of rabbis, one of whom was him.
“Torah-Box has never hosted or distributed the video in which the rabbi is incriminated,” Torah-Box said on Sunday.
Cohen was still listed on the site on July 11, according to the Internet Archive, but by Sunday was no longer displayed by Torah-Box as a contributor.
According to a 2023 Rav Dori Connection profile on Cohen, he was born in Algeria and moved to France after the fall of the French-North African colony. Cohen moved to Israel in 1976.
"This French president, we must let him know, he has every interest in preparing his coffin," said Rabbi Daniel David Cohen, casting Emmanuel Macron in the vein of Roman Emperor Titus.
An Israeli rabbi, who made incendiary remarks warning President Emmanuel Macron of death by divine judgement over his decision to recognize a Palestinian state, was reported to the French justice system by French Interior Minister Bruno Retailleau on Friday.
In a YouTube sermon last Sunday, Rabbi Daniel David Cohen said Macron’s July 24 foreign policy shift was not just against Jewish people but a “declaration of war on God,” who decided to whom the land of Israel would be given.
“This French president, we must let him know, he has every interest in preparing his coffin,” said Cohen, casting Macron in the vein of Roman emperor Titus, who, according to rabbinic tradition, died from divine retribution. The coffin was the destination of others besides Macron, continued Cohen, indicating that France would share the fate of Iran and collapse. The rabbi urged Jews to flee France before the Republic collapsed.
Retailleau said on X/Twitter that Cohen had made several threats, including those against the French president, and moved to block the video’s dissemination. He also reported the remarks to the courts, and France24 reported that the Paris Prosecutor’s office had opened an investigation.
Israeli rabbi: Jews, flee France before the country collapses like Iran
Image of French President Emmanuel Macron in front of images of the French and Israeli flag. (credit: REUTERS/STEPHANE MAHE)
Image of French President Emmanuel Macron in front of images of the French and Israeli flag. (credit: REUTERS/STEPHANE MAHE)
Cohen was condemned by France Chief Rabbi Haim Korsia, whose remarks he called intolerable. Korsia emphasized that Cohen, who had lived in France, had “never held a rabbinical position in France, and that he was neither trained nor graduated from the French rabbinical school.”
Representative Council of Jewish Institutions of France (CRIF) president Yonathan Arfi also said on social media that Cohen had made “hateful and unacceptable threats.”
“These statements against the President of the Republic in no way are connected to the Jewish institutions of France,” said Arfi.
The Torah-Box Jewish religious education platform was quick to distance itself from Cohen, telling The Jerusalem Post that the organization simply distributed the classes of hundreds of rabbis, one of whom was him.
“Torah-Box has never hosted or distributed the video in which the rabbi is incriminated,” Torah-Box said on Sunday.
Cohen was still listed on the site on July 11, according to the Internet Archive, but by Sunday was no longer displayed by Torah-Box as a contributor.
According to a 2023 Rav Dori Connection profile on Cohen, he was born in Algeria and moved to France after the fall of the French-North African colony. Cohen moved to Israel in 1976.
6 months ago
President Donald Trump said on Monday he has no plans to discontinue Starlink at the White House but might move his Tesla off-site, following his announcement over the weekend that his relationship with Elon Musk, the billionaire CEO of both companies, was over.
"I may move the Tesla around a little bit, but I don't think we'll be doing that with Starlink. It's a good service," Trump told reporters, referring to the satellite internet company that provides high-speed broadband access. It is a unit of Musk's SpaceX.
In March, Trump said he had purchased a red Tesla Model S from Musk, Trump's then-close ally.
Last week, a White House official said Trump might get rid of it after a public feud erupted between the two men. The Tesla was seen parked at the White House over the weekend.
On Saturday, Trump said he had no intention of repairing ties with Musk. On Monday, the president said he would not have a problem if Musk called.
"We had a good relationship, and I just wish him well," Trump said. Musk responded with a heart emoji to a video on X showing Trump's remarks.
Last week, Trump and Musk exchanged a flurry of insults after the world's richest man denounced Trump's tax and spending bill as a "disgusting abomination."
Musk's opposition has complicated Republican efforts to pass Trump's "big, beautiful bill" in Congress, where the party holds slim majorities in the House of Representatives and Senate.
Since the dispute began last Thursday, Musk has deleted some social media posts critical of Trump, including one signaling support for impeaching the president.
Sources close to Musk said his anger has started to subside, and they believe he may want to repair his relationship with Trump.
"I may move the Tesla around a little bit, but I don't think we'll be doing that with Starlink. It's a good service," Trump told reporters, referring to the satellite internet company that provides high-speed broadband access. It is a unit of Musk's SpaceX.
In March, Trump said he had purchased a red Tesla Model S from Musk, Trump's then-close ally.
Last week, a White House official said Trump might get rid of it after a public feud erupted between the two men. The Tesla was seen parked at the White House over the weekend.
On Saturday, Trump said he had no intention of repairing ties with Musk. On Monday, the president said he would not have a problem if Musk called.
"We had a good relationship, and I just wish him well," Trump said. Musk responded with a heart emoji to a video on X showing Trump's remarks.
Last week, Trump and Musk exchanged a flurry of insults after the world's richest man denounced Trump's tax and spending bill as a "disgusting abomination."
Musk's opposition has complicated Republican efforts to pass Trump's "big, beautiful bill" in Congress, where the party holds slim majorities in the House of Representatives and Senate.
Since the dispute began last Thursday, Musk has deleted some social media posts critical of Trump, including one signaling support for impeaching the president.
Sources close to Musk said his anger has started to subside, and they believe he may want to repair his relationship with Trump.
6 months ago
Authorities in southern China announced on Thursday they were offering rewards of more than $1,000 for the arrest of 20 people they say are Taiwanese military hackers, drawing an angry reaction from Taiwan's defence ministry.
The public security bureau in the Chinese city of Guangzhou said the hackers were part of the Taiwan military's Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command, and published their pictures, names and Taiwan identity card numbers.
Rewards of 10,000 yuan ($1,392.25) will be offered to those who provide clues or cooperate in their arrest, it said in a statement carried by Chinese state media.
The hackers were involved in organising, planning and premeditating attacks on key sectors such as military, aerospace, government departments, energy and transportation, maritime affairs, science and technology research firms in China as well as Hong Kong and Macau, Xinhua news agency said.
Xinhua, citing a cybersecurity report, said the Taiwan "information, communication and digital army" had cooperated with U.S. anti-Chinese forces to conduct public opinion and cognitive warfare against China, secretly instigate revolution and attempt to disrupt public order in China.
Taiwan's defence ministry's Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command said in a statement it was not carrying out any "corporate cyber attacks", and that China's offers of a bounty highlighted "the rude and unreasonable attitude of the Chinese communists in intimidating and coercing the Taiwanese people".
"Recent statements by the European Union, the United States and the Czech Republic condemning the Chinese communists' hacking organisations for carrying out cyber-attacks prove that the Chinese communists are not only a regional troublemaker, but a common threat to the global internet," it added.
A senior Taiwan security official told Reuters that the Chinese allegations were invented, saying Beijing was trying to shift the focus from Czech and European scrutiny over alleged Chinese hacking activities there.
"They fabricated a false narrative to shift the focus. It's a very typical behaviour by the Chinese Communist Party," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the matter.
The public security bureau in the Chinese city of Guangzhou said the hackers were part of the Taiwan military's Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command, and published their pictures, names and Taiwan identity card numbers.
Rewards of 10,000 yuan ($1,392.25) will be offered to those who provide clues or cooperate in their arrest, it said in a statement carried by Chinese state media.
The hackers were involved in organising, planning and premeditating attacks on key sectors such as military, aerospace, government departments, energy and transportation, maritime affairs, science and technology research firms in China as well as Hong Kong and Macau, Xinhua news agency said.
Xinhua, citing a cybersecurity report, said the Taiwan "information, communication and digital army" had cooperated with U.S. anti-Chinese forces to conduct public opinion and cognitive warfare against China, secretly instigate revolution and attempt to disrupt public order in China.
Taiwan's defence ministry's Information, Communications and Electronic Force Command said in a statement it was not carrying out any "corporate cyber attacks", and that China's offers of a bounty highlighted "the rude and unreasonable attitude of the Chinese communists in intimidating and coercing the Taiwanese people".
"Recent statements by the European Union, the United States and the Czech Republic condemning the Chinese communists' hacking organisations for carrying out cyber-attacks prove that the Chinese communists are not only a regional troublemaker, but a common threat to the global internet," it added.
A senior Taiwan security official told Reuters that the Chinese allegations were invented, saying Beijing was trying to shift the focus from Czech and European scrutiny over alleged Chinese hacking activities there.
"They fabricated a false narrative to shift the focus. It's a very typical behaviour by the Chinese Communist Party," the official said, speaking on condition of anonymity given the sensitivity of the matter.
6 months ago
How does Tehran get Israelis to betray their homeland?
Last week, news broke of the arrest in Israel of two 24-year-old Israelis, Roy Mazrahi and Almoog Attias, on charges of spying for the Islamic Republic of Iran's intelligence services.
The two were childhood friends, residents of the town of Nasher near the Israeli port of Haifa, had become addicted to gambling and amassed a lot of debt, the Jerusalem Post reported.
According to the report, Mazrahi met an unknown person through an Internet group, who offers him good money in exchange for doing seemingly irrelevant and harmless things. This young Israeli sees the situation as an opportunity to escape his financial crisis.
At first, Mazrahi was asked to photograph the areas around his home and then document the sales sign of a car dealership. His next assignment was to burn a note containing a message against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
As the missions went on, police said, they found more dangerous aspects, and Mazrahi realised at some point that his employers were Iranian. On another mission, he moved a briefcase, which he thought contained a bomb, from place to place.
Then came the main mission. He bought CCTV cameras and rented a room in a hotel in Tel Aviv, along with Almoog Attias, who had been attracted by the same unidentified person. The two then went to the village of Kfar Ahim, the residence of Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz in the south of the country.
Their mission was to install the camera facing the entrance road to Mr. Katz's home, which was not successful due to the presence of security forces.
Israeli defence officials told the court that the CCTV work was part of a larger operation to assassinate Katz.
However, although Roy Mazrahi and Almog Attias are the latest reported case of such espionage operations, several other cases had already been recorded. In fact, almost every few weeks, there is a new report of Israeli citizens being recruited as spies by Iranian intelligence forces.
According to a report by Israel's Internal Security Agency (SHINBET), espionage cases in Israel will increase by about 400 percent in 2024 compared to the previous year.
The detention of Roy Mazrahi and Almoog Attias was the 20th case linked to espionage for Iran's intelligence services in Israel in the past year, and Tehran appears to be seizing the opportunity of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza in their efforts to recruite Israeli citizens, said Maor Goren, head of the security department of the Israeli police's National Crime Combating Unit (Lahav 433). Spying has increased in the country.
Who do Iran's intelligence services target?
Although the stories of the cases vary, there are clear patterns in all of them, the Jerusalem Post reported. The targetted persons are all facing financial difficulties and looking for a shortcut way to pay off their debts. Many of these people are immigrants who have recently arrived in Israel and have less national and patriotic belonging than older Israelis.
Yossi Mellman, an expert on espionage affairs and author of the book “Spies Against Armageddon,” said, “Most of the people being recruited are worthless and from the fringes of Israeli communities. But the worrying thing is that a country that is constantly calling for the destruction of Israel has been able to infiltrate its society.”
He said of the reason for the success of the Islamic Republic of Iran: “This is linked to the social collapse of Israel in recent years. The society has lost its sense of solidarity and cohesion. Even the government is only concerned with its own survival. People say to themselves that now that government officials are working for Qatar, why not work for Iran?”
Maor Goren stressed, however, that many of the people who contact Iranian agents cut off contact after a while, and then brief the police.
The method of recruiting forces by the intelligence services of the Islamic Republic of Iran is also relatively simple and does not require complex planning or macro-investment. Iranian agents mostly carry out the recruitment process through social networks and with simple messages.
According to the report, Iranian agents typically target specific groups such as fundamentalist orthodox Jews opposed to Zionism, new immigrants, former criminals, and ordinary citizens mired in financial hardship. Some of those detained were immigrants from former Soviet states, and this may have led to a general distrust of certain strata of society. In fact, social media has given Iranian agents access to a part of Israeli society that was previously unavailable or unknown to them.
How do the intelligence services of Iran operate?
According to the Jerusalem Post, the Islamic Republic of Iran's intelligence services have contacted Israelis via WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, LinkedIn, Instagram and X, promising large sums in exchange for doing simple things such as photographing specific locations or people or writing graffiti. They have also occasionally published private detective search ads to gather intelligence from Israeli officials. Iranian agents have also launched phishing campaigns to collect information from Israeli citizens in the form of surveys.
In none of the recruitment methods has there been a sign of Iran at first, and most intrigued Israelis have said they did not know at first that they were working for Tehran.
Israel's Internal Security Agency (SHINBET) has had a successful performance in deterring the actions of Iranian agents, and so far it appears that no serious damage has been done to Israel's security. However, spying operations continue and many may still have not been identified.
Some critics of Israel's legal system believe that the punishment for the perpetrators attracted is too light, and that a few years in prison is not a deterrent for people who have engaged in such acts in exchange for receiving sums of money. Also, the exposure and detention of these individuals has no particular consequences for Tehran. Iranian agents are only waiting for the next victim to respond to their message.
In another case, Moshe Attias, an 18-year-old from Yabneh in central Israel, received such a message: “Thank you for contacting Iranian intelligence. Message the user account below to speak to our experts on Telegram.”
Mr. Attias had received about $1,800 in his digital wallet for documentation from the hospital in Maier, where Naftali Bennett, the former Israeli prime minister, was hospitalized. He identified himself as a relative of Mr Bennett and gave information, including details of the security measures adopted at the site, to Iranian agents.
Yossi Mellman commented: “Getting this close to Mr Bennett is an achievement for the Iranian agents and it shows that they are still continuing their actions. But their influence in Israel is still negligible compared to Israel's influence in Iran.”
In August last year, Israeli police detained Moti Maman, a 73-year-old Israeli citizen on suspicion of plotting to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. According to the indictment, he travelled secretly to Iran twice to meet with Iranian relations and requested $1 million in advance payments in Iran to carry out the assassination.
“Moti Maman had told his contacts that he had no access to high-level officials and had offered to target the mayor of Aka or Nahariya,” Mellman said.
He was sentenced to ten years in prison for espionage and plotting assassinations last month.
Cash for info - but is it worth it?
Last year, an Iranian intelligence network focusing only on Jewish immigrants from the Caucasus region managed to attract a couple through an Israeli citizen from Azerbaijan. According to the indictment, the couple received $600 a day for gathering information about potential targets, including surveillance of Mossad's main headquarters.
A seven-member network dubbed the “Haifa Cell” is also accused of imaging dozens of military bases, Iron Dome systems and other strategic targets across Israel in exchange for $500 to $1,200 per mission.
According to the indictment, one of their surveillance targets was Navatim Air Base, which was later targeted by an Islamic Republic of Iran missile attack.
Not everyone attracted by Iranian agents, of course, is Jewish. Last October, seven Palestinians living in East Jerusalem were detained on suspicion of planning to assassinate a nuclear scientist and the mayor of one of Israel's major cities.
To date, Iran's intelligence efforts in Israel do not appear to have achieved much success. Because no senior Israeli official has been assassinated, and even if on occasion live and simultaneous information has been passed to Tehran, this information appears to have been superficial and did not lead to any specific action.
However, as Yossi Mellman warns: “We are ignorant of what we don't know, and the most worrying thing is that some Israelis are willing to betray their homeland for a fistful of dollars.”
Last week, news broke of the arrest in Israel of two 24-year-old Israelis, Roy Mazrahi and Almoog Attias, on charges of spying for the Islamic Republic of Iran's intelligence services.
The two were childhood friends, residents of the town of Nasher near the Israeli port of Haifa, had become addicted to gambling and amassed a lot of debt, the Jerusalem Post reported.
According to the report, Mazrahi met an unknown person through an Internet group, who offers him good money in exchange for doing seemingly irrelevant and harmless things. This young Israeli sees the situation as an opportunity to escape his financial crisis.
At first, Mazrahi was asked to photograph the areas around his home and then document the sales sign of a car dealership. His next assignment was to burn a note containing a message against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
As the missions went on, police said, they found more dangerous aspects, and Mazrahi realised at some point that his employers were Iranian. On another mission, he moved a briefcase, which he thought contained a bomb, from place to place.
Then came the main mission. He bought CCTV cameras and rented a room in a hotel in Tel Aviv, along with Almoog Attias, who had been attracted by the same unidentified person. The two then went to the village of Kfar Ahim, the residence of Israeli Defense Minister Yisrael Katz in the south of the country.
Their mission was to install the camera facing the entrance road to Mr. Katz's home, which was not successful due to the presence of security forces.
Israeli defence officials told the court that the CCTV work was part of a larger operation to assassinate Katz.
However, although Roy Mazrahi and Almog Attias are the latest reported case of such espionage operations, several other cases had already been recorded. In fact, almost every few weeks, there is a new report of Israeli citizens being recruited as spies by Iranian intelligence forces.
According to a report by Israel's Internal Security Agency (SHINBET), espionage cases in Israel will increase by about 400 percent in 2024 compared to the previous year.
The detention of Roy Mazrahi and Almoog Attias was the 20th case linked to espionage for Iran's intelligence services in Israel in the past year, and Tehran appears to be seizing the opportunity of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza in their efforts to recruite Israeli citizens, said Maor Goren, head of the security department of the Israeli police's National Crime Combating Unit (Lahav 433). Spying has increased in the country.
Who do Iran's intelligence services target?
Although the stories of the cases vary, there are clear patterns in all of them, the Jerusalem Post reported. The targetted persons are all facing financial difficulties and looking for a shortcut way to pay off their debts. Many of these people are immigrants who have recently arrived in Israel and have less national and patriotic belonging than older Israelis.
Yossi Mellman, an expert on espionage affairs and author of the book “Spies Against Armageddon,” said, “Most of the people being recruited are worthless and from the fringes of Israeli communities. But the worrying thing is that a country that is constantly calling for the destruction of Israel has been able to infiltrate its society.”
He said of the reason for the success of the Islamic Republic of Iran: “This is linked to the social collapse of Israel in recent years. The society has lost its sense of solidarity and cohesion. Even the government is only concerned with its own survival. People say to themselves that now that government officials are working for Qatar, why not work for Iran?”
Maor Goren stressed, however, that many of the people who contact Iranian agents cut off contact after a while, and then brief the police.
The method of recruiting forces by the intelligence services of the Islamic Republic of Iran is also relatively simple and does not require complex planning or macro-investment. Iranian agents mostly carry out the recruitment process through social networks and with simple messages.
According to the report, Iranian agents typically target specific groups such as fundamentalist orthodox Jews opposed to Zionism, new immigrants, former criminals, and ordinary citizens mired in financial hardship. Some of those detained were immigrants from former Soviet states, and this may have led to a general distrust of certain strata of society. In fact, social media has given Iranian agents access to a part of Israeli society that was previously unavailable or unknown to them.
How do the intelligence services of Iran operate?
According to the Jerusalem Post, the Islamic Republic of Iran's intelligence services have contacted Israelis via WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram, LinkedIn, Instagram and X, promising large sums in exchange for doing simple things such as photographing specific locations or people or writing graffiti. They have also occasionally published private detective search ads to gather intelligence from Israeli officials. Iranian agents have also launched phishing campaigns to collect information from Israeli citizens in the form of surveys.
In none of the recruitment methods has there been a sign of Iran at first, and most intrigued Israelis have said they did not know at first that they were working for Tehran.
Israel's Internal Security Agency (SHINBET) has had a successful performance in deterring the actions of Iranian agents, and so far it appears that no serious damage has been done to Israel's security. However, spying operations continue and many may still have not been identified.
Some critics of Israel's legal system believe that the punishment for the perpetrators attracted is too light, and that a few years in prison is not a deterrent for people who have engaged in such acts in exchange for receiving sums of money. Also, the exposure and detention of these individuals has no particular consequences for Tehran. Iranian agents are only waiting for the next victim to respond to their message.
In another case, Moshe Attias, an 18-year-old from Yabneh in central Israel, received such a message: “Thank you for contacting Iranian intelligence. Message the user account below to speak to our experts on Telegram.”
Mr. Attias had received about $1,800 in his digital wallet for documentation from the hospital in Maier, where Naftali Bennett, the former Israeli prime minister, was hospitalized. He identified himself as a relative of Mr Bennett and gave information, including details of the security measures adopted at the site, to Iranian agents.
Yossi Mellman commented: “Getting this close to Mr Bennett is an achievement for the Iranian agents and it shows that they are still continuing their actions. But their influence in Israel is still negligible compared to Israel's influence in Iran.”
In August last year, Israeli police detained Moti Maman, a 73-year-old Israeli citizen on suspicion of plotting to assassinate Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. According to the indictment, he travelled secretly to Iran twice to meet with Iranian relations and requested $1 million in advance payments in Iran to carry out the assassination.
“Moti Maman had told his contacts that he had no access to high-level officials and had offered to target the mayor of Aka or Nahariya,” Mellman said.
He was sentenced to ten years in prison for espionage and plotting assassinations last month.
Cash for info - but is it worth it?
Last year, an Iranian intelligence network focusing only on Jewish immigrants from the Caucasus region managed to attract a couple through an Israeli citizen from Azerbaijan. According to the indictment, the couple received $600 a day for gathering information about potential targets, including surveillance of Mossad's main headquarters.
A seven-member network dubbed the “Haifa Cell” is also accused of imaging dozens of military bases, Iron Dome systems and other strategic targets across Israel in exchange for $500 to $1,200 per mission.
According to the indictment, one of their surveillance targets was Navatim Air Base, which was later targeted by an Islamic Republic of Iran missile attack.
Not everyone attracted by Iranian agents, of course, is Jewish. Last October, seven Palestinians living in East Jerusalem were detained on suspicion of planning to assassinate a nuclear scientist and the mayor of one of Israel's major cities.
To date, Iran's intelligence efforts in Israel do not appear to have achieved much success. Because no senior Israeli official has been assassinated, and even if on occasion live and simultaneous information has been passed to Tehran, this information appears to have been superficial and did not lead to any specific action.
However, as Yossi Mellman warns: “We are ignorant of what we don't know, and the most worrying thing is that some Israelis are willing to betray their homeland for a fistful of dollars.”
8 months ago
Fools without identity on internet fraud in a country that worships China-Good for them for safe return to motherland.
Cambodia has deported an unknown number of Taiwanese citizens to China after they were arrested working in telecom fraud centres, the island's foreign ministry said on Monday, a move that comes ahead of China's President Xi Jinping visit to the country.
The ministry said in a statement that Cambodia had recently arrested 180 Taiwanese fraud centre suspects and that on Sunday and early on Monday deported almost 190 people to China at the Chinese government's request.
"Cambodia, under pressure from China, did not provide a list of our country's nationals or the total number deported, and the ministry not only continues to urge Cambodia to provide the list as soon as possible, but also expresses its serious concern and protest," it said.
Neither the Cambodia nor Chinese foreign ministries immediately responded to requests for comment.
Cambodia has deported an unknown number of Taiwanese citizens to China after they were arrested working in telecom fraud centres, the island's foreign ministry said on Monday, a move that comes ahead of China's President Xi Jinping visit to the country.
The ministry said in a statement that Cambodia had recently arrested 180 Taiwanese fraud centre suspects and that on Sunday and early on Monday deported almost 190 people to China at the Chinese government's request.
"Cambodia, under pressure from China, did not provide a list of our country's nationals or the total number deported, and the ministry not only continues to urge Cambodia to provide the list as soon as possible, but also expresses its serious concern and protest," it said.
Neither the Cambodia nor Chinese foreign ministries immediately responded to requests for comment.
8 months ago
The Trump administration's nominee to oversee a $42 billion government fund to bring high-speed broadband internet to unserved or underserved parts of the United States denied on Thursday that she would administer the program to benefit Starlink owner Elon Musk.
Democrats have suggested that Musk, a billionaire and close adviser to President Donald Trump, could receive as much as $20 billion of the funding by eliminating the program's preference for fiber and boosting satellite service.
Arielle Roth, who has been nominated to head the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration, said at a Senate hearing that she will "administer the program to the benefit of the American people, not any single individual or company."
U.S. Senator Ed Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts, noted that the law gave preference to fiber because it was cheaper. "I strongly urge you to oppose this giveaway to Elon Musk," Markey said.
Democrats have suggested that Musk, a billionaire and close adviser to President Donald Trump, could receive as much as $20 billion of the funding by eliminating the program's preference for fiber and boosting satellite service.
Arielle Roth, who has been nominated to head the Commerce Department's National Telecommunications and Information Administration, said at a Senate hearing that she will "administer the program to the benefit of the American people, not any single individual or company."
U.S. Senator Ed Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts, noted that the law gave preference to fiber because it was cheaper. "I strongly urge you to oppose this giveaway to Elon Musk," Markey said.
10 months ago
DeepSeek's founder Liang Wenfeng skipped the two-day Artificial Intelligence Action Summit in Paris despite being invited to attend, as top Chinese experts in the field trumpeted the country's role in the global AI industry.
China's AI progress, as demonstrated by advances such as DeepSeek's open-source models, contributed to the global technology community and drove wider adoption
Since US start-up OpenAI released ChatGPT and ushered in a new AI era, the field has been developing quickly. DeepSeek showed the world a means to build AI systems at a low cost, said Andrew Yao Chi-chih, a computer scientist.
"Since [DeepSeek's AI models] are open source, they'll be able to benefit the global AI community by having all of us advance the technology together," Yao said.
DeepSeek's breakthrough has sparked a rush among local companies from advanced manufacturing sectors to internet services to adopt the start-up's low-cost, high-performance AI models.
China's AI progress, as demonstrated by advances such as DeepSeek's open-source models, contributed to the global technology community and drove wider adoption
Since US start-up OpenAI released ChatGPT and ushered in a new AI era, the field has been developing quickly. DeepSeek showed the world a means to build AI systems at a low cost, said Andrew Yao Chi-chih, a computer scientist.
"Since [DeepSeek's AI models] are open source, they'll be able to benefit the global AI community by having all of us advance the technology together," Yao said.
DeepSeek's breakthrough has sparked a rush among local companies from advanced manufacturing sectors to internet services to adopt the start-up's low-cost, high-performance AI models.
10 months ago
Ahmed al-Sheikh's excitement at returning to his homeland from neighbouring Turkey after the fall of Bashar al-Assad has turned to bitter disappointment at the grim living conditions in Syria after some 13 years of war.
Sheikh is one of 35,000 Syrians who left Turkey for Syria full of hope in the first three weeks after Assad was toppled on Dec. 8, giving up the right to come back to Turkey after signing a voluntary return document.
Turkey's refugee association says many, like him, are now disillusioned by the reality of life in a war-ravaged country.
"I was shocked by the catastrophic situation, which was beyond my expectations," said Sheikh, 35, speaking in his home after returning to Aleppo, eight years after he fled to Turkey. He said that water and electricity are frequently cut off and internet communication is almost non-existent.
Sheikh is one of 35,000 Syrians who left Turkey for Syria full of hope in the first three weeks after Assad was toppled on Dec. 8, giving up the right to come back to Turkey after signing a voluntary return document.
Turkey's refugee association says many, like him, are now disillusioned by the reality of life in a war-ravaged country.
"I was shocked by the catastrophic situation, which was beyond my expectations," said Sheikh, 35, speaking in his home after returning to Aleppo, eight years after he fled to Turkey. He said that water and electricity are frequently cut off and internet communication is almost non-existent.
11 months ago
Elon Musk met with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa to discuss an agreement that would see the South African government loosen rules regarding Black ownership that impede SpaceX from offering Starlink internet services.
Musk is turning his newfound influence in U.S. politics to his homeland of South Africa.
SpaceX CEO Elon Musk met with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa to discuss easing certain regulations that would allow for Starlink satellites to operate legally in the country, according to Bloomberg.
Specifically, Musk would like to see South Africa loosen or remove a rule that would require Starlink to be at least 30% Black-owned by sharing equity with local partners.
A possible work-around that South African officials are considering would see foreign companies like SpaceX make guarantees for levels of local investment and jobs.
In exchange for updating these regulations, Ramaphosa hopes for broader investment in South Africa from Musk’s multiple companie
Musk is turning his newfound influence in U.S. politics to his homeland of South Africa.
SpaceX CEO Elon Musk met with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa to discuss easing certain regulations that would allow for Starlink satellites to operate legally in the country, according to Bloomberg.
Specifically, Musk would like to see South Africa loosen or remove a rule that would require Starlink to be at least 30% Black-owned by sharing equity with local partners.
A possible work-around that South African officials are considering would see foreign companies like SpaceX make guarantees for levels of local investment and jobs.
In exchange for updating these regulations, Ramaphosa hopes for broader investment in South Africa from Musk’s multiple companie
11 months ago
The West found a miles-long piece of evidence backing its claim Russia is purposely cutting undersea cables.
Finland accused a Russian ship of dragging its anchor to sever undersea cables in the Baltic.
Officials said the vessel, Eagle S, is part of a "shadow fleet" transporting sanctioned oil.
The EU believes Russia is responsible for incidents that have disrupted power and internet service.
Western nations have long suspected that Russia has been deliberately severing vital underseas cables — but without much to prove it.
That may have changed after officials in Finland pointed to an unusually vivid piece of evidence tied to a Russia-linked ship.
Finnish officials on Sunday said they found miles and miles of tracks on the bed of the Baltic Sea that indicate a Russia-linked tanker could be responsible for slicing a cluster of valuable data and power cables.
Finland accused a Russian ship of dragging its anchor to sever undersea cables in the Baltic.
Officials said the vessel, Eagle S, is part of a "shadow fleet" transporting sanctioned oil.
The EU believes Russia is responsible for incidents that have disrupted power and internet service.
Western nations have long suspected that Russia has been deliberately severing vital underseas cables — but without much to prove it.
That may have changed after officials in Finland pointed to an unusually vivid piece of evidence tied to a Russia-linked ship.
Finnish officials on Sunday said they found miles and miles of tracks on the bed of the Baltic Sea that indicate a Russia-linked tanker could be responsible for slicing a cluster of valuable data and power cables.
11 months ago
Finnish authorities on Thursday seized a ship carrying Russian oil in the Baltic Sea on suspicion it caused the outage of an undersea power cable connecting Finland and Estonia a day earlier, and that it also damaged or broke four internet lines.
The Cook Islands-registered ship, named by authorities as the Eagle S, was boarded by a Finnish coast guard crew that took command and sailed the vessel to Finnish waters, a coast guard official said at a press conference.
"From our side we are investigating grave sabotage," said Robin Lardot, director of the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation.
"According to our understanding, an anchor of the vessel that is under investigation has caused the damage," he added.
The Finnish customs service said it had seized the vessel's cargo and that the Eagle S was believed to belong to Russia's so-called shadow fleet of ageing tankers that seek to evade sanctions on the sale of Russian oil.
The Cook Islands-registered ship, named by authorities as the Eagle S, was boarded by a Finnish coast guard crew that took command and sailed the vessel to Finnish waters, a coast guard official said at a press conference.
"From our side we are investigating grave sabotage," said Robin Lardot, director of the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation.
"According to our understanding, an anchor of the vessel that is under investigation has caused the damage," he added.
The Finnish customs service said it had seized the vessel's cargo and that the Eagle S was believed to belong to Russia's so-called shadow fleet of ageing tankers that seek to evade sanctions on the sale of Russian oil.
11 months ago
The Root Causes of Extremist Violence
Digital Propaganda: The internet has become a powerful tool for spreading extremist ideologies. Encrypted platforms and social media enable covert recruitment and dissemination of propaganda.
Global Grievances: Western military interventions in predominantly Muslim countries and unresolved conflicts, such as the Israel-Palestine crisis, are frequently cited as motivations by extremist groups.
Polarization and Identity Politics: Extremists exploit tensions within multicultural societies, fostering divisions between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.
Digital Propaganda: The internet has become a powerful tool for spreading extremist ideologies. Encrypted platforms and social media enable covert recruitment and dissemination of propaganda.
Global Grievances: Western military interventions in predominantly Muslim countries and unresolved conflicts, such as the Israel-Palestine crisis, are frequently cited as motivations by extremist groups.
Polarization and Identity Politics: Extremists exploit tensions within multicultural societies, fostering divisions between Muslim and non-Muslim communities.
11 months ago
China's national internet emergency response centre said on Wednesday it had found and dealt with two incidents of U.S. cyber attacks on Chinese tech firms to "steal trade secrets" since May 2023.
The National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Centre of China (CNCERT/CC) said in a statement published on its website that an advanced materials design and research unit and a large-scale high-tech company focused on intelligent energy and digital information were "suspected of being attacked by a U.S. intelligence agency", without naming the agency.
The hacks led to the theft of "a large amount of trade secrets" in both cases, said CNCERT/CC, which says it is a non-governmental technical centre that serves as China's "national computer emergency response team", with the aim of preventing and detecting cybersecurity threats to the country.
After years of being accused by Western governments of cyberattacks and industrial espionage.
The National Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Centre of China (CNCERT/CC) said in a statement published on its website that an advanced materials design and research unit and a large-scale high-tech company focused on intelligent energy and digital information were "suspected of being attacked by a U.S. intelligence agency", without naming the agency.
The hacks led to the theft of "a large amount of trade secrets" in both cases, said CNCERT/CC, which says it is a non-governmental technical centre that serves as China's "national computer emergency response team", with the aim of preventing and detecting cybersecurity threats to the country.
After years of being accused by Western governments of cyberattacks and industrial espionage.
12 months ago
A Chinese ship is suspected of severing two critical internet cables in the Baltic Sea in an act of sabotage that may have been orchestrated by Russia.
Investigators believe that the Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-registered bulk carrier, deliberately severed the two key cables last week by dragging its anchor along the Baltic seabed for more than 100 miles.
The investigation is now focused on whether the captain of the 225-metre-long bulk carrier was directed to carry out the suspected sabotage by Moscow.
A senior European investigator told the Wall Street Journal: “It’s extremely unlikely that the captain would not have noticed that his ship dropped and dragged its anchor, losing speed for hours and cutting cables on the way.”
The incident has caused concern among Western nations that Russia is engaging in what the White House described as “hybrid warfare”, an accusation that the Kremlin denies.
The latest damage to cables in the Baltic Sea occurred in Swedish waters between Nov 17 an
Investigators believe that the Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-registered bulk carrier, deliberately severed the two key cables last week by dragging its anchor along the Baltic seabed for more than 100 miles.
The investigation is now focused on whether the captain of the 225-metre-long bulk carrier was directed to carry out the suspected sabotage by Moscow.
A senior European investigator told the Wall Street Journal: “It’s extremely unlikely that the captain would not have noticed that his ship dropped and dragged its anchor, losing speed for hours and cutting cables on the way.”
The incident has caused concern among Western nations that Russia is engaging in what the White House described as “hybrid warfare”, an accusation that the Kremlin denies.
The latest damage to cables in the Baltic Sea occurred in Swedish waters between Nov 17 an
1 yr. ago
A Chinese ship was near both subsea internet cables that were mysteriously cut.
Germany's defense minister said the incidents were likely to have been "caused by sabotage."
Sweden is investigating whether China was involved.
Sweden is investigating the sighting of a Chinese vessel near where two Baltic Sea internet cables were severed, the Financial Times reported.
The first cable — a 135-mile internet link between Lithuania and Sweden's Gotland Island — stopped working on Sunday.
Later on Monday, a 730-mile cable carrying data between Germany and Finland was cut.
Germany's defense minister, said on Tuesday that it was being assumed that the two incidents were "caused by sabotage."
"No one believes that the cables were accidentally damaged," he said.
France, Italy, Germany, Poland, and Britain had previously suggested that Russia was involved. However, China is now also being investigated.
Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-registered cargo ship, was traveling from Russia to Egypt.
Germany's defense minister said the incidents were likely to have been "caused by sabotage."
Sweden is investigating whether China was involved.
Sweden is investigating the sighting of a Chinese vessel near where two Baltic Sea internet cables were severed, the Financial Times reported.
The first cable — a 135-mile internet link between Lithuania and Sweden's Gotland Island — stopped working on Sunday.
Later on Monday, a 730-mile cable carrying data between Germany and Finland was cut.
Germany's defense minister, said on Tuesday that it was being assumed that the two incidents were "caused by sabotage."
"No one believes that the cables were accidentally damaged," he said.
France, Italy, Germany, Poland, and Britain had previously suggested that Russia was involved. However, China is now also being investigated.
Yi Peng 3, a Chinese-registered cargo ship, was traveling from Russia to Egypt.
1 yr. ago
China’s richest man has hit out at online shopping platforms, accusing them of starting price wars that have damaged a wide range of companies and industries as the country tackles an economic slump.
Rare remarks censored by state media, Zhong Shanshan, founder of drinks company Nongfu Springs, also took aim at the Chinese government, saying it was “negligent” in failing to prevent the trend of cut-throat pricing.
It is very unusual for Chinese businesspeople to take public aim at the government and those who have done so have often faced repercussions.
Zhong was widely quoted as taking direct aim at Pinduoduo, criticizing the popular e-commerce site owned by PDD Holdings for hurting businesses.
“Internet platforms have brought down (our) pricing system. In particular, Pinduoduo’s pricing system has done great harm to China’s brands and its industries,” . “It is not just that bad money is driving out good money. It is an industry orientation, and pricing the industry orientat
Rare remarks censored by state media, Zhong Shanshan, founder of drinks company Nongfu Springs, also took aim at the Chinese government, saying it was “negligent” in failing to prevent the trend of cut-throat pricing.
It is very unusual for Chinese businesspeople to take public aim at the government and those who have done so have often faced repercussions.
Zhong was widely quoted as taking direct aim at Pinduoduo, criticizing the popular e-commerce site owned by PDD Holdings for hurting businesses.
“Internet platforms have brought down (our) pricing system. In particular, Pinduoduo’s pricing system has done great harm to China’s brands and its industries,” . “It is not just that bad money is driving out good money. It is an industry orientation, and pricing the industry orientat
1 yr. ago
China's second-richest man has lobbed a rare public attack on Pinduoduo, a bargain e-commerce site, alleging that the platform's pricing system is hurting the industry.
Zhong Shanshan - the 69-year-old founder and chairman of China's largest packaged drinks company, Nongfu Spring, and the country's second-richest person, according to Hurun Research's latest rankings -
"The internet platforms have brought down the prices, in particular the pricing system of Pinduoduo - they are a huge harm for Chinese brands and Chinese industries," Zhong said. His speech was widely reported by Chinese media, including the Chinese internet portal Sina.com.
Pinduoduo was founded by billionaire Colin Huang Zheng in 2015. It is known for its cut-to-the-bone deals in China, serving as the blueprint for Temu, with which it shares owner PDD Holdings. Its aggressive pricing strategy has helped it quickly gain market share over the past few years.
Zhong Shanshan - the 69-year-old founder and chairman of China's largest packaged drinks company, Nongfu Spring, and the country's second-richest person, according to Hurun Research's latest rankings -
"The internet platforms have brought down the prices, in particular the pricing system of Pinduoduo - they are a huge harm for Chinese brands and Chinese industries," Zhong said. His speech was widely reported by Chinese media, including the Chinese internet portal Sina.com.
Pinduoduo was founded by billionaire Colin Huang Zheng in 2015. It is known for its cut-to-the-bone deals in China, serving as the blueprint for Temu, with which it shares owner PDD Holdings. Its aggressive pricing strategy has helped it quickly gain market share over the past few years.
1 yr. ago
Accident or sabotage? American and European officials disagree as key undersea cables are cut.
Investigators are trying to crack the mystery of how two undersea internet cables in the Baltic Sea were cut within hours of each other, with European officials saying they believe the disruption was an act of sabotage and US officials suggesting it was likely an accident.
European leaders were quick to voice their suspicions. Germany’s Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said that “nobody believes that these cables were accidentally severed.”
The foreign ministers of Finland and Germany said in a joint statement that they were “deeply concerned” about the incident and raised the possibility that it was part of a “hybrid warfare,” specifically mentioning Russia in their statement
Russia has been accused of waging a hybrid war against Europe after a string of suspicious incidents, arson attacks, explosions and other acts of sabotage across multiple European countries were traced back to
Investigators are trying to crack the mystery of how two undersea internet cables in the Baltic Sea were cut within hours of each other, with European officials saying they believe the disruption was an act of sabotage and US officials suggesting it was likely an accident.
European leaders were quick to voice their suspicions. Germany’s Defense Minister Boris Pistorius said that “nobody believes that these cables were accidentally severed.”
The foreign ministers of Finland and Germany said in a joint statement that they were “deeply concerned” about the incident and raised the possibility that it was part of a “hybrid warfare,” specifically mentioning Russia in their statement
Russia has been accused of waging a hybrid war against Europe after a string of suspicious incidents, arson attacks, explosions and other acts of sabotage across multiple European countries were traced back to
1 yr. ago
President Vladimir Putin is looking into slow speeds and disruptions on YouTube in Russia after the country's top cinema official raised the matter with him.
Critics believe YouTube is being deliberately disrupted by the authorities to prevent Russians from viewing a mass of content there that is critical of Putin and his government.
Russian internet monitoring services have reported mass outages of the online video hosting service, which is owned by Alphabet's Google, in the last few months, regulator Roskomnadzor on Friday said it was not registering any changes in the quality of YouTube's service.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the speed issue was linked to Google's failure to comply with Russian law and that technical questions should be addressed to Roskomnadzor.
"We are aware of reports of some people not being able to access YouTube in Russia," a YouTube spokesperson said in a statement. "That is not as a result of any technical issues on our side or action taken b
Critics believe YouTube is being deliberately disrupted by the authorities to prevent Russians from viewing a mass of content there that is critical of Putin and his government.
Russian internet monitoring services have reported mass outages of the online video hosting service, which is owned by Alphabet's Google, in the last few months, regulator Roskomnadzor on Friday said it was not registering any changes in the quality of YouTube's service.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the speed issue was linked to Google's failure to comply with Russian law and that technical questions should be addressed to Roskomnadzor.
"We are aware of reports of some people not being able to access YouTube in Russia," a YouTube spokesperson said in a statement. "That is not as a result of any technical issues on our side or action taken b
1 yr. ago
Gambling poses a growing worldwide threat to public health, with its rapid expansion via mobile phones and the internet harming far more people than previously thought, a report warns.
Much stronger global regulatory controls are urgently needed to curb the impact of commercial gambling on global health and wellbeing.
About 450 million people have at least one behavioural symptom or have experienced a harmful personal, social or health consequence of gambling.
80 million people suffer from gambling disorder, a mental health condition identified by a pattern of repeated and continuous betting despite negative consequences on a person’s life.
Incredibly sophisticated marketing, ever-widening easy access to the internet and mobile phones are enabling the gambling industry to reach more people than ever before. These included adolescents and younger children who were routinely exposed to advertising of gambling products in ways that were unprecedented before the digital revolutio
Much stronger global regulatory controls are urgently needed to curb the impact of commercial gambling on global health and wellbeing.
About 450 million people have at least one behavioural symptom or have experienced a harmful personal, social or health consequence of gambling.
80 million people suffer from gambling disorder, a mental health condition identified by a pattern of repeated and continuous betting despite negative consequences on a person’s life.
Incredibly sophisticated marketing, ever-widening easy access to the internet and mobile phones are enabling the gambling industry to reach more people than ever before. These included adolescents and younger children who were routinely exposed to advertising of gambling products in ways that were unprecedented before the digital revolutio
1 yr. ago
For the past decade, China has consistently ranked last in the world for internet freedom due to its all-pervading online surveillance and content control system dubbed the “Great Firewall.”
China’s neighbor Myanmar are now just as lacking.
The report from Freedom House, a US government-funded NGO, found that global internet freedom has declined for the 14th consecutive year. China and Myanmar ranked joint last for 2024, with a score of nine out of 100.
Since seizing power in a 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military junta has violently cracked down on dissent, imposing restrictions on online access and speech including widespread internet shutdowns, and built “a mass censorship and surveillance regime,” said the authors of “Freedom on the Net 2024: The Struggle for Trust Online”
The report points to censorship technology introduced in May that blocked most virtual private networks, or VPNs, “cutting residents off from tools they had relied on to safely and securely bypass internet c
China’s neighbor Myanmar are now just as lacking.
The report from Freedom House, a US government-funded NGO, found that global internet freedom has declined for the 14th consecutive year. China and Myanmar ranked joint last for 2024, with a score of nine out of 100.
Since seizing power in a 2021 coup, Myanmar’s military junta has violently cracked down on dissent, imposing restrictions on online access and speech including widespread internet shutdowns, and built “a mass censorship and surveillance regime,” said the authors of “Freedom on the Net 2024: The Struggle for Trust Online”
The report points to censorship technology introduced in May that blocked most virtual private networks, or VPNs, “cutting residents off from tools they had relied on to safely and securely bypass internet c
1 yr. ago
Starlink, the satellite internet service from SpaceX, is poised to become a crucial lifeline in parts of southern Appalachia that were devastated by Hurricane Helene.
The Biden administration has announced it is planning to deploy dozens of ground-based Starlink devices that connect with satellites to provide internet services to remote areas. And the company has said approximately 500 Starlink kits are being deployed by private individuals and organizations to help with the recovery efforts. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk has said the company is waiving costs in affected areas.
Donald Trump said he’d spoken directly with Musk, one of his most ardent and high-profile supporters, about deploying Starlink to affected areas. That quickly drew a response from a Biden administration spokesperson who noted that the Federal Emergency Management Agency already had Starlink deliveries in place.
FEMA resources in advance of the storm. President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris visited the
The Biden administration has announced it is planning to deploy dozens of ground-based Starlink devices that connect with satellites to provide internet services to remote areas. And the company has said approximately 500 Starlink kits are being deployed by private individuals and organizations to help with the recovery efforts. SpaceX CEO Elon Musk has said the company is waiving costs in affected areas.
Donald Trump said he’d spoken directly with Musk, one of his most ardent and high-profile supporters, about deploying Starlink to affected areas. That quickly drew a response from a Biden administration spokesperson who noted that the Federal Emergency Management Agency already had Starlink deliveries in place.
FEMA resources in advance of the storm. President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris visited the
1 yr. ago
Tokyo Demands China Stem Anti-Japan Hate After Fatal Attack.
Japanese officials told their Chinese counterparts to provide a full explanation of the recent stabbing death of a Japanese boy in southern China and deal with “untruthful and malicious” internet posts targeting Japan, as Tokyo stepped up pressure on Beijing to respond to the incident.
In a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in New York on Monday, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa said China must take steps to protect Japanese nationals within its borders.
Kamikawa also requested that China thoroughly deal with social media posts including those referring to Japanese schools in China. Japanese State Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoshifumi Tsuge and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong in Beijing.
The diplomatic exchanges laid bare the divisions between the neighbors amid concerns in Japan that China’s history of anti-Japan rhetoric has prompted attacks on Japanese people.
Japanese officials told their Chinese counterparts to provide a full explanation of the recent stabbing death of a Japanese boy in southern China and deal with “untruthful and malicious” internet posts targeting Japan, as Tokyo stepped up pressure on Beijing to respond to the incident.
In a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in New York on Monday, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoko Kamikawa said China must take steps to protect Japanese nationals within its borders.
Kamikawa also requested that China thoroughly deal with social media posts including those referring to Japanese schools in China. Japanese State Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoshifumi Tsuge and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong in Beijing.
The diplomatic exchanges laid bare the divisions between the neighbors amid concerns in Japan that China’s history of anti-Japan rhetoric has prompted attacks on Japanese people.