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Focus on Cyber Warfare and Fraud-
How do multinational companies protect themselves from state-sponsored cyber espionage?
Multinational companies face a unique and elevated threat from state-sponsored cyber espionage due to their vast intellectual property, critical infrastructure dependencies, global reach, and often, involvement in strategic industries.
Protecting themselves requires a comprehensive, multi-layered, and continuously evolving cybersecurity strategy that goes beyond standard defenses.

Here are the key ways multinational companies protect themselves:

1. Robust Foundational Cybersecurity:
Before anything else, strong basic cybersecurity hygiene is paramount. State-sponsored actors often exploit common weaknesses.

Patch Management: Aggressive and immediate patching of all software, operating systems, and network devices, especially for known exploited vulnerabilities (N-day exploits). This includes out-of-band updates.

Strong Access Controls:
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Mandatory MFA for all employees, especially for remote access, cloud services, and privileged accounts. Hardware tokens are often preferred for highly sensitive access.

Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP): Granting users and systems only the minimum access rights necessary to perform their functions.

Privileged Access Management (PAM): Solutions to secure, manage, and monitor privileged accounts.

Network Segmentation: Dividing the network into isolated zones to limit lateral movement if a part of the network is compromised. Critical data and operational technology (OT) networks should be completely segregated.

Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) / Extended Detection and Response (XDR): Deploying advanced solutions to continuously monitor, detect, and respond to threats on endpoints (laptops, servers) and across the broader IT ecosystem.

Data Encryption: Encrypting data at rest and in transit, especially sensitive intellectual property and customer data.

2. Advanced Threat Detection and Intelligence:
State-sponsored groups are stealthy; proactive detection is crucial.

Behavioral Analytics & Anomaly Detection: Implementing tools that use AI and machine learning to establish baselines of "normal" user and network behavior, and then flag deviations that could indicate a compromise.

Threat Hunting Teams (Red Teaming/Blue Teaming): Employing internal or external teams to proactively search for hidden threats within the network, rather than just reacting to alerts. This includes simulating attacks (red teaming) to test defenses.

Comprehensive Logging and Monitoring: Centralized collection and analysis of logs from all systems, applications, and network devices to identify suspicious activity.

Threat Intelligence Integration: Subscribing to and actively consuming high-quality threat intelligence feeds from government agencies (like CISA, NCSC), cybersecurity vendors, and industry-specific ISACs (Information Sharing and Analysis Centers). This intelligence provides insights into the latest TTPs of state-sponsored actors, enabling proactive defense.

Dark Web Monitoring: Monitoring for mentions of the company, its employees, or stolen data on underground forums.

3. Supply Chain and Third-Party Risk Management:
State-sponsored actors often target weaker links in the supply chain.

Thorough Vendor Due Diligence: Rigorous cybersecurity assessments of all third-party vendors, suppliers, and partners, especially those with access to sensitive systems or data. This includes contractual security requirements.

Continuous Monitoring of Third-Parties: Not just a one-time assessment, but ongoing monitoring of third-party security postures and potential vulnerabilities in their products or services.

Supply Chain Visibility: Mapping the entire digital supply chain to understand dependencies and identify potential weak points.

Software Bill of Materials (SBOMs): Requiring SBOMs from software vendors to understand all components (including open-source) in their products and track potential vulnerabilities.

4. Human Element and Insider Threat Mitigation:
Employees are often the primary target for initial access.

Security Awareness Training: Regular, up-to-date, and engaging training for all employees on phishing, social engineering tactics, safe Browse, and reporting suspicious activity. Tailored training for executives and high-value targets (HVT) is essential.

Phishing Simulations: Conducting frequent and varied phishing simulations to test employee vigilance and reinforce training.

Insider Threat Programs: Establishing programs to detect and mitigate risks from malicious or unwitting insiders, including monitoring user behavior and data access patterns.

5. Incident Response and Resilience:
Assuming compromise is inevitable, preparation is key.

Well-Defined Incident Response Plan: A detailed, tested, and regularly updated plan for how to detect, contain, eradicate, and recover from a state-sponsored cyberattack. This includes clear roles, responsibilities, and communication protocols.

Secure Backups: Regular, encrypted, and offline backups of critical data and systems to ensure recovery from destructive attacks.

Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (BCDR) Plans: Comprehensive plans to maintain essential business operations even during and after a significant cyber incident.

Post-Incident Analysis: Conducting thorough post-mortem analyses after any incident to learn lessons and improve defenses.

6. Collaboration with Government and Intelligence Agencies:
Governments often have unique insights into nation-state threats.

Information Sharing: Actively participating in information-sharing initiatives with government cybersecurity agencies (e.g., CISA in the US, NCSC in the UK), industry-specific ISACs, and threat intelligence alliances.

Trusted Relationships: Building direct, trusted relationships with relevant government cyber defense and intelligence agencies to facilitate rapid two-way sharing of classified or sensitive threat intelligence.

Reporting Incidents: Urgently reporting suspected state-sponsored cyberattacks to relevant government authorities to aid in national defense and enable coordinated responses.

By implementing these advanced and comprehensive measures, multinational companies can significantly enhance their resilience against state-sponsored cyber espionage, protect their valuable assets, and maintain their competitive edge in a contested digital landscape.

US and Russia suggest ‘West Bank-style occupation of Ukraine’
The U.S. and Russia are set to suggest a “West Bank-style” occupation of Ukraine as a way of ending the war, according to The London Times.

Under the proposed plans, Russia would have both economic and military control of the occupied parts of Ukraine, utilizing its own governing body, mimicking Israel’s control of Palestinian territory taken from Jordan during the 1967 conflict.

The suggestion was put forward during discussions between President Donald Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff and his Russian counterparts, a source with insight into the U.S. National Security Council told the paper.

Witkoff, who also serves as the White House’s Middle East envoy, reportedly backs the suggestion, which the U.S. believes will solve the issue of the Ukrainian constitution prohibiting giving up territory without organizing a referendum. While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has rejected any notion of ceding territory, the new occupation proposal may lead to a truce following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022.

According to the proposal, Ukraine’s borders would remain officially unchanged, similar to the borders of the West Bank, even as Israel controls the territory.

“It’ll just be like Israel occupies the West Bank,” the source told The Times.
“With a governor, with an economic situation that goes into Russia, not Ukraine. But it’ll still be Ukraine, because … Ukraine will never give up its sovereignty. But the reality is it’ll be occupied territory and the model is Palestine,” the source added to the paper.

The proposal will almost certainly be part of discussions between Trump and Russian president Vladimir Putin set for Friday in Alaska. On Wednesday, Zelensky met with European leaders and Trump ahead of the Russia summit. Zelensky is not set to attend Friday’s summit in person.

Trump reaffirmed during the Wednesday meeting that territorial issues can only be negotiated between Russia and Ukraine, according to French president Emmanuel Macron. The French leader also said Trump wants a ceasefire plan to be finalized during his Friday meeting.
“Any issue which deals with the territorial integrity of Ukraine cannot be discussed just like that, without looking at our constitution and the will of our people,” Zelensky told the press on Friday. “As to our principles, as to our territorial integrity, in the end, will be decided on the level of leaders. Without Ukraine (at the table), it’s impossible to achieve,” Zelensky added.

Zelensky said that a ceasefire should be reached and then security guarantees. He also said that sanctions against Russia should be imposed if no ceasefire deal is reached in Alaska.
As details of any potential ceasefire are being discussed, the U.S. believes that the “West Bank-style” deal is the reality of war and the refusal of other nations to directly fight Russia, according to The Times.

In May, U.S. Senior Director for Counterterrorism Sebastian Gorka, told Politico that “The Trump administration lives in the real world.”
“We recognize the reality on the ground,” he added. “No. 1, that’s the beginning because we’re not utopianists and we’re not human engineers. We’re not some kind of pie-in-the-sky believers in utopia.”

He went on to say that “We recognize the reality on the ground and we have one priority above all else, whether it’s the Middle East or whether it’s Ukraine. It’s to stop the bloodshed. Everything else comes after the bloodshed has been halted.”

The International Court of Justice has ruled that Israel’s occupation of the West Bank is illegal. The occupation isn’t recognized by the U.S., and it’s only partially recognized by Russia.

Last September, the United Nations ordered Israel to end the occupation by a vote of 124 to 14, with 43 countries abstaining. The resolution stated that Israel must adhere to international law within 12 months, pull back its military, end all settlement efforts, evacuate all settlers from the occupied territories, and remove parts of the wall separating the West Bank. Israel has ignored the resolution and voted against the measure, as did the U.S.

Israel has faced widespread condemnation over its occupation and the settlement efforts. More than 150 have been established in recent years. Citizens of Israel who live in the West Bank must adhere to Israeli law, while Palestinians are subject to martial law, and they’re unable to vote in Israeli national elections.
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
How much territory does Russia control in Ukraine?
U.S. President Donald Trump has said that both Kyiv and Moscow will have to cede territory to end the war in Ukraine, so how much territory does Russia control in Ukraine?

Russia controls nearly 114,500 square km (44,600 square miles), or 19%, of Ukraine, including Crimea, and a major chunk of territory in the east and south-east of the country, according to open source maps of the battlefield. Ukraine does not control any internationally recognised Russian territory.

Russia says Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson - which were recognised by Moscow as part of Ukraine as the Soviet Union collapsed - are now parts of Russia.

Ukraine has repeatedly said it will never recognise Russian occupation of its land, and most countries recognise Ukraine's territory within its 1991 borders.

Following are details on the territory, Russian claims and Ukraine's position.

CRIMEA-
Russian forces in 2014 took control of Crimea, which juts out into the Black Sea off southern Ukraine, and after a disputed referendum on joining Russia, Moscow absorbed the region into Russia. Its area is about 27,000 square km.

Russia says Crimea is legally part of Russia. Ukraine's position is that Crimea is part of Ukraine, though privately some Ukrainian officials admit that it would be very hard to return Crimea to Ukrainian control by force.

Crimea was absorbed into the Russian empire by Catherine the Great in the 18th century. Russia's Black Sea naval base at Sevastopol was founded soon afterwards.

In 1921, Crimea became part of Russia within the Soviet Union until 1954, when it was handed to Ukraine, also then a Soviet republic, by Communist Party chief Nikita Khrushchev, an ethnic Ukrainian.

DONBAS-
Russia controls about 46,570 square km, or 88%, of the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine, including all of the Luhansk region and 75% of the Donetsk region.

About 6,600 square km is still controlled by Ukraine but Russia has been focusing most of its energy along the front in Donetsk, pushing towards the last remaining major cities.

Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions broke away from Ukrainian government control in 2014 and proclaimed themselves independent "people's republics".

Putin in 2022 recognised them as independent states just days before the invasion of Ukraine.

ZAPORIZHZHIA AND KHERSON-
Russian forces control about 74% of the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions of southeastern Ukraine, or about 41,176 square km. Ukraine controls about 14,500 square km across the two regions.

Putin in 2024 said that he would be willing to agree peace if Ukraine withdrew from all regions claimed but not fully controlled by Russia - an area currently of about 21,000 square km - and officially renounced its ambitions to join NATO.

Reuters reported in 2024 that Putin was open to discussing a Ukraine ceasefire deal with Trump but ruled out making any major territorial concessions and insisted that Kyiv abandon ambitions to join NATO. Two sources said Putin might be willing to withdraw from the relatively small patches of territory it holds in other areas of Ukraine.

Putin's conditions for peace include a legally binding pledge that NATO will not expand eastwards, Ukrainian neutrality and limits on its armed forces, protection for Russian speakers who live there, and acceptance of Russia's territorial gains, sources told Reuters earlier this year.

KHARKIV, SUMY AND DNIPROPETROVSK-
Russia also controls small parts of the Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk regions of Ukraine. Across the Sumy and Kharkiv regions, Russia controls about 400 square km of territory. In Dnipropetrovsk, Russia has a tiny area near the border.

Russia has said it is carving out a buffer zone in Sumy to protect its Kursk region from Ukrainian attack.

LEGAL STATUS OF THE TERRITORIES

Russia classes the Republic of Crimea, Sevastopol, the Luhansk People's Republic, the Donetsk People's Republic, and the regions of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson as subjects of the Russian Federation. Ukraine says the territories are part of Ukraine.

Most countries do not recognise the areas as part of Russia but some do. Crimea has been recognised by Syria, North Korea and Nicaragua. The United Nations General Assembly declared in 2014 the annexation illegal and recognised Crimea as part of Ukraine. The resolution was opposed by 11 countries.

Putin has repeatedly compared the fate of Kosovo and Crimea. He has accused the West of having double standards for recognizing Kosovo as an independent country in 2008 against the wishes of Serbia but opposing the recognition of Crimea. Russia opposed the independence of Kosovo.

Focus Nigeria-
Why do so many Nigerians seek medical treatment abroad?
Nigerians, across various socioeconomic strata, frequently seek medical treatment abroad for a multitude of reasons, highlighting significant systemic issues within Nigeria's healthcare sector. This phenomenon, known as medical tourism, has a substantial economic drain on the country.

Here are the primary reasons why so many Nigerians opt for foreign medical care:

Inadequate Healthcare Infrastructure and Technology:

Obsolete Equipment: Many Nigerian hospitals, especially public ones, lack modern medical equipment (e.g., advanced MRI/CT scanners, specialized surgical tools, radiotherapy machines for cancer treatment). Where equipment exists, it's often poorly maintained or frequently breaks down.

Lack of Specialization: While Nigeria has many general practitioners, there's a severe shortage of highly specialized medical professionals in complex fields like oncology, neurosurgery, advanced cardiology, organ transplantation, and specialized orthopedics.

Dilapidated Facilities: Many hospitals suffer from poor maintenance, overcrowding, unreliable power supply (leading to dependence on expensive generators), and lack of basic amenities like clean water and proper waste disposal.

Shortage and Brain Drain of Medical Professionals:

Mass Exodus: Nigeria faces a severe "brain drain" of qualified doctors, nurses, and other healthcare professionals. Lured by better remuneration, working conditions, access to advanced technology, and professional development opportunities, many migrate to countries like the UK, USA, Canada, and Saudi Arabia.

High Patient-to-Doctor Ratio: The emigration of medical personnel exacerbates the existing shortage, leading to an extremely high patient-to-doctor ratio (far below WHO recommendations), overworking the remaining staff and compromising patient care.

Loss of Expertise: The departure of highly skilled specialists means that certain complex procedures or sophisticated diagnostic interpretations are simply not available in Nigeria.

Lack of Trust in the Local Healthcare System:

Perceived Low Quality of Care: Decades of underfunding and poor performance have eroded public confidence in the Nigerian healthcare system. Many Nigerians, including the elite, believe they will receive superior care, more accurate diagnoses, and better treatment outcomes abroad.

Fear of Misdiagnosis/Malpractice: There's a widespread fear of misdiagnosis, medical negligence, and inadequate follow-up care within Nigeria, prompting individuals to seek second opinions or primary treatment elsewhere.

High-Profile Cases: When prominent Nigerians (including politicians and government officials) consistently seek medical attention abroad, it further reinforces the perception that the local system is not good enough, even for the nation's leaders.

Poor Funding and High Out-of-Pocket Payments:

Low Budgetary Allocation: The Nigerian government's allocation to healthcare consistently falls far below international recommendations (e.g., the Abuja Declaration's 15% target). This limits investment in infrastructure, training, and research.

Out-of-Pocket Expenses: The vast majority of Nigerians pay for healthcare directly out of their pockets, as the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) covers a very small percentage of the population. This means that even basic care can be financially burdensome. For complex treatments, the cost can be prohibitive, making the "all-inclusive" price for treatment abroad (which often seems high in Naira) sometimes comparable or even more appealing if it guarantees a better outcome.

Long Waiting Times and Bureaucracy:
Even when certain treatments are available, patients might face long waiting lists for appointments, diagnostic tests, or surgeries in public hospitals, leading them to seek faster access abroad.

Bureaucratic hurdles and administrative inefficiencies can also frustrate patients and their families.

Desire for Privacy and Confidentiality:
Some high-profile individuals or those seeking treatments for sensitive conditions may travel abroad for greater privacy and confidentiality, away from public scrutiny.

Aggressive Marketing by Foreign Hospitals:
Countries like India, Turkey, and some in the Middle East have developed robust medical tourism industries. They actively market their advanced facilities, specialized doctors, and relatively affordable (compared to Western countries) treatment packages directly to Nigerians.

The collective impact of this medical tourism is a significant drain on Nigeria's foreign exchange reserves (estimated to be billions of dollars annually), a disincentive for investment in local healthcare, and a perpetuation of a system where those who can afford it simply bypass local services, undermining efforts to improve the domestic health sector for the general populace.

Mystery of why Chinese bombers flew near Alaska in 2024 exposed...
Deploying military forces is the strongest of political signals, and the most potent of these deployments is to move nuclear weapons or launch platforms near a potential adversary.

So when nuclear-capable Chinese bombers joined their Russian counterparts in joint patrols near Alaska in 2024, as well as similar flights deep into the Pacific, Western observers assumed there was a political message. Russia had been conducting such provocative flights dating back to the Cold War, but this is something new for China. Was Beijing signaling its displeasure with America over Taiwan, or warning NATO not to get involved in Asia? Was invoking the specter of Chinese bombers over America a reminder that the vast Pacific was no barrier to the long arm of Chinese power?

However, China may have had other motives for these flights, according to a U.S. expert. Beijing may have been demonstrating that nuclear bombers were now a fully functional part of its strategic triad, alongside ICBMs and ballistic missile submarines.

“It is clear that their true significance lies in China’s years-long effort to complete its nuclear triad,” Derek Solen, a researcher at the U.S. Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute, wrote in a report for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s Air and Space Studies Institute.

Another possibility is that the flights were intended as a warning to the U.S. not to engage in “nuclear sharing,” in which America would station nuclear weapons in non-nuclear allies, especially Japan and South Korea. “China probably fears that the limited exchange between NATO and America’s Asian allies will eventually lead to the integration of America’s European and Asian alliance networks, resulting in the formation of a global, nuclear-armed anti-China alliance,” Solen wrote.

Deciphering Beijing’s intentions behind the bomber missions isn’t easy. There have been just nine Sino-Russian flights since the first mission in 2019, when two Chinese H-6K and two Russian Tu-95MS bombers flew over the Sea of Japan and East China Sea. Though the actual number of flights is somewhat larger — China counts multiple flights on the same day as a single flight — this leaves a small dataset to analyze.

The joint flights were mostly confined to the Sea of Japan and East China Sea until July 24, 2024, when two H-6Ks and two Tu-95s flew near Alaska. Though they didn’t penetrate U.S. airspace, they did enter the air defense identification zone, triggering interception by U.S. and Canadian fighters.

“This represented the first time that PLAAF [People’s Liberation Army Air Force] aircraft participating in a combined patrol sortied from a foreign country as well as the first time that PLAAF aircraft approached U.S. territory,” Solen noted.

A few days later came more joint flights over the Sea of Japan, East China Sea and Western Pacific, which included more advanced H-6N bombers from the 106th Brigade in Henan province, which is primarily tasked with delivering nuclear weapons. The H-6N has a range of 3,700 miles and can launch KD-21 air-launched cruise missiles with an estimated range of up to 1,300 miles. Particularly ominous was a Nov. 30, 2024, flight in which H-6Ns came within cruise missile range of Guam in what Solen believes may have been “the first serious training to conduct a nuclear strike against Guam from the air.”

Solen told Defense News that he initially believed that the flights were a political signal.

“I thought that Beijing was signaling two things simultaneously,” he said. “It was signaling that its relationship with Russia was tight and, by using the H-6, sending an indirect message to Washington that it possesses the means and the will to counter what it perceived as Washington’s moves with respect to nuclear sharing.”

But Solen was troubled by some inconsistencies. For example, the Chinese government was incensed by a July 2024 NATO summit that criticized China for supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as suggestions that NATO might expand its focus to Asia. Yet if the November 2024 flights near Guam were intended as a signal, then why wait until four months after the summit?

The joint flights also coincided with the deployment of the long-range and nuclear-capable H-6N.

“In 2019 the PLAAF officially adopted the H-6N, and in the same year renovations to the 106th Brigade’s base were likely finished,” Solen wrote. “It is interesting that the Sino-Russian combined patrols began that same year.”

Of course, the Alaska flights may have both a military and political purpose. However, Solen thinks that purely military training flights would have been confined to the East China Sea or the Sea of Japan.

Perhaps the West may never know China’s true motivations. Nonetheless, the question remains: Will China again send bombers near — or into — American airspace? China continues to be an indispensable supplier of Russia’s campaign in Ukraine, and the Chinese and Russian navies have just announced joint patrols in the Pacific. A Chinese government spokesman last year urged “relevant countries to abolish the nuclear sharing arrangement, withdraw the large number of nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, and refrain from replicating such arrangements in any form in the Asia-Pacific region.”

For now, China isn’t provoking the Trump administration, especially in the midst of a fight over tariffs.

“The fact that China and Russia still haven’t done any combined flights this year is probably a political decision,” Solen said. “At a time when they are trying to work things out with the new administration, they probably decided that it’s best to avoid action that may agitate Washington or distract from the agenda in the negotiations.”

Regular flights near U.S. territory are unlikely “because the training juice won’t be worth the squeeze,” Solen added. On the other hand, China has an incentive to practice long-range bomber flights, even just for non-nuclear missions like striking ships and bases.

“I suppose that once they’ve either resolved things with Washington or just given up on negotiations, we’ll see the combined flights resume and eventually see regular flights without the Russians,” Solen said.

The wealth of Mali, Songhai, and Ghana empires—especially under Mansa Musa.
The Wealth of the Mali, Songhai, and Ghana Empires: Africa’s Golden Age:-
For centuries, West Africa was home to some of the richest and most powerful empires in history.
The Ghana, Mali, and Songhai empires built vast wealth through control of trade routes, abundant natural resources—especially gold—and sophisticated governance.
These empires not only shaped regional economies but also had lasting influence on global history.

Ghana Empire (c. 300 – 1200 AD)
Often called the “Land of Gold,” the Ghana Empire was the earliest of the great West African kingdoms. Located in what is today southeastern Mauritania and western Mali, Ghana controlled major trans-Saharan trade routes. They traded gold, ivory, and kola nuts for salt, cloth, and other goods from North Africa.

Gold Wealth: Ghana’s control over gold mines made it one of the richest empires of its time.

Trade Monopoly: Ghana taxed merchants traveling through its territory, creating steady revenue.

Political Power: Its rulers, known as Ghana or “war chiefs,” maintained a strong military and centralized government.

Mali Empire (c. 1235 – 1600 AD)
The Mali Empire rose after Ghana's decline, expanding even further. Mali became legendary for its wealth, culture, and Islamic scholarship.

Mansa Musa: Mali’s most famous ruler (1312–1337), Mansa Musa, is often considered the richest person in history. His legendary pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324 showcased Mali’s immense wealth—he reportedly distributed so much gold on the journey that it caused inflation in the regions he passed through.

Gold and Salt: Mali controlled the gold mines of Bambuk and Bure, as well as important salt mines in Taghaza, making it a hub of economic power.

Cultural Center: Timbuktu and Djenné flourished as centers of learning, housing famous universities and libraries.

Trade Networks: Mali’s strategic location allowed it to dominate trade routes connecting sub-Saharan Africa with North Africa and beyond.

Songhai Empire (c. 1430 – 1591 AD)
Following Mali’s decline, the Songhai Empire rose to dominate West Africa’s political and economic landscape.

Trade and Military Strength: Under rulers like Sunni Ali and Askia Muhammad, Songhai expanded its territory and controlled key trade routes along the Niger River.

Wealth from Commerce: Songhai’s wealth came from taxing trade in gold, salt, and other goods, as well as agriculture and fishing.

Cultural Influence: Like Mali, Songhai invested in Islamic education and governance, making cities like Gao and Timbuktu cultural centers.

Administrative Innovation: Askia Muhammad reorganized the empire’s administration and expanded its influence through diplomacy and military campaigns.

Mansa Musa’s Legacy: The Richest Man in History
Mansa Musa’s reign marked the peak of Mali’s wealth and influence. His pilgrimage to Mecca not only displayed Mali’s riches but also connected West Africa to the broader Islamic world culturally and economically.

Economic Impact: His lavish spending and generous distribution of gold on his journey reportedly disrupted economies, demonstrating the sheer scale of his wealth.

Religious and Cultural Impact: Mansa Musa invested in building mosques, madrasas, and promoting Islamic scholarship, especially in Timbuktu.

Global Recognition: His wealth and pilgrimage put Mali on medieval maps and attracted scholars, traders, and travelers from across the world.

Conclusion
The Ghana, Mali, and Songhai empires exemplify Africa’s rich pre-colonial history of wealth, governance, and culture.
Their control of gold and trade routes made them global players long before European colonization.
Mansa Musa’s legendary riches symbolize a golden age of African civilization that still inspires pride today.

Data, Dollars, and Drones: Who Controls Tomorrow’s Tools?
“He who controls the data, programs the future. He who owns the drones, defends—or dictates—it. And he who prints the dollars, plays God with the global economy.”

The 21st century won’t be ruled by empires of land—it will be ruled by empires of data, capital, and surveillance technology. In this new world, algorithms shape minds, money moves faster than people, and drones fly where diplomacy dares not go.

But who truly owns these tools? Who benefits? And who is being left behind—or watched from above?

Data: The New Oil or the New Chains?
4.6 billion people are now online—most on mobile phones

Africa contributes a massive stream of digital behavior—but stores little of it locally

American and Chinese tech giants own 90% of global data traffic and storage

While data is harvested from Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia, it’s analyzed in Silicon Valley, processed in Shenzhen, and monetized without consent.

“We are not just users—we are the unpaid labor feeding AI.”

Even worse: data colonialism is rising—where nations are reduced to mere sources of behavioral raw material.

Dollars: Still King of a Decaying Kingdom
Despite talk of "de-dollarization":

The US dollar dominates 88% of global trade

Countries like Ghana, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka still face currency collapse based on Fed decisions

Dollar scarcity creates austerity, debt dependency, and policy handcuffs for many Global South nations

The IMF and World Bank, still largely Western-controlled, act as gatekeepers to emergency funds—often in exchange for structural reforms that weaken local industries and sovereignty.

“When Washington sneezes, African currencies catch pneumonia.”

Meanwhile, crypto and fintechs try to provide escape routes—but they face crackdowns or co-option.

Drones: From Warfare to Watchdogs
Once a futuristic fantasy, drones are now:

Weapons in proxy wars (Libya, Ethiopia, Ukraine)

Surveillance tools for regimes monitoring protests

Delivery agents for aid and vaccines in hard-to-reach zones

Business tools for agriculture and logistics

But who owns the skies?

China’s DJI controls over 70% of the global commercial drone market

US and Israeli military drones dominate combat zones

African countries import rather than manufacture—despite strong use cases

Drones may save lives—or spy on them. Liberate farmers—or be used to suppress dissent.

Who’s Really in Control?
Let’s break it down:

Tool Controlled By Impact on Global South
Data Big Tech (US, China) Extracted, not owned
Dollars US Federal Reserve Externalized pain
Drones China, US, Israel Imported, rarely made

In all three, the Global South is a consumer, not a controller. And Africa, in particular, risks becoming the testing ground, resource mine, and data farm for tomorrow’s tech empires.

The Risks of Dependency
Surveillance authoritarianism (via foreign-built tech)

Digital dictatorships (where information flow is centralized)

Economic instability (due to external financial control)

Policy blackmail (based on foreign data or financial leverage)

If tomorrow’s tools are not domestically owned or ethically governed, Africa and other regions may end up technologically colonized—even as they go digital.

What Can Be Done?
-Data Sovereignty
-Build local data centers
-Enact data protection laws
Push for digital commons and open-source alternatives

Financial Autonomy
Explore pan-African payment systems and stable coins

Create sovereign wealth tech funds

Reduce dependency on external aid tied to conditionalities

Drone & Tech Manufacturing
Invest in STEM education and hardware innovation

Support tech hubs and partnerships with ethical manufacturers

Use drones for development, not just surveillance

Conclusion: Tools Are Not Neutral
Data, dollars, and drones will define this century. But they are not just neutral instruments—they are extensions of power, control, and ideology.

Africa and the rest of the Global South must ask:

Will we own the tools of tomorrow—or be owned by them?

This is not just a tech question.
It’s a question of sovereignty, freedom, and the shape of the future.

What are some known North Korean hacking groups (e.g., Lazarus Group) and their main motives?
North Korea's hacking groups are distinct from those of many other nations due to their overwhelming primary motivation: generating revenue for the regime and funding its illicit weapons programs, particularly nuclear and ballistic missile development, in circumvention of severe international sanctions.
While they also engage in espionage, the financial imperative is paramount.

Here are some of the most well-known North Korean hacking groups (often considered sub-groups or operations under the broader "Lazarus Group" umbrella) and their main motives and alleged activities:

Lazarus Group (Aliases: APT38, Hidden Cobra, Guardians of Peace, ZINC, Diamond Sleet)
The Lazarus Group is the overarching umbrella term for North Korea's state-sponsored cyber operations. It's a highly sophisticated and prolific entity with various subdivisions specializing in different types of attacks.

Main Motives of Lazarus Group as a Whole:

Financial Gain (Primary): To generate illicit revenue for the Kim Jong Un regime, circumventing international sanctions that heavily restrict North Korea's access to traditional financial systems. This funding directly supports their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs.

Cyber Espionage: To gather strategic intelligence on foreign governments, military capabilities, advanced technologies, and internal political dynamics, particularly concerning South Korea, the U.S., and Japan.

Destruction/Disruption: To cause disruption, sow fear, or retaliate against perceived adversaries.

Influence Operations: To shape public opinion or undermine trust in institutions, especially in South Korea.

Accusations and Notable Activities:

Sony Pictures Entertainment Hack (2014): One of their most infamous early operations, involving the theft of massive amounts of data (unreleased films, emails, personal employee info) and destructive wiper attacks on Sony's network, seemingly in retaliation for the film "The Interview."

Bangladesh Bank Heist (2016): A sophisticated operation that attempted to steal nearly $1 billion from Bangladesh Bank's account at the New York Federal Reserve via SWIFT messages, with $81 million successfully stolen and laundered.

WannaCry Ransomware Attack (2017): Widely attributed to Lazarus, this global ransomware worm exploited a Windows vulnerability (EternalBlue) to encrypt data and demand ransom payments, causing massive disruption to critical services worldwide.

Extensive Cryptocurrency Thefts: This has become their most consistent and lucrative line of effort. They have stolen billions of dollars in cryptocurrencies from exchanges, DeFi platforms, and individual wallets globally through phishing, social engineering, and exploiting vulnerabilities. Examples include the hacks of Harmony's Horizon Bridge ($100M+), Sky Mavis' Ronin Bridge ($600M+), and Bybit ($1.5B+ in 2025).

Sub-Groups of Lazarus:
North Korea often operates through specialized sub-groups that share resources and coordinate under the broader Lazarus umbrella.

1. BlueNoroff (Aliases: APT38, Sapphire Sleet, Alluring Pisces, TraderTraitor, UNC4899, CryptoCore)

Main Motive: Exclusively focused on large-scale financial theft, particularly targeting banks, financial institutions, and more recently, cryptocurrency exchanges and Web3 companies. They aim to steal vast sums of money for the regime.

Accusations and Notable Activities:

Bank Heists: Known for sophisticated attacks on traditional financial institutions, often involving deep reconnaissance of bank systems and SWIFT networks (e.g., the Bangladesh Bank Heist, attacks on banks in Poland, Mexico, Taiwan, etc.).

Cryptocurrency Theft: Currently one of the most active in this domain, using highly sophisticated social engineering tactics (e.g., fake job offers, deepfake Zoom calls) to trick employees of crypto firms into installing malware that facilitates the theft of digital assets. They often create elaborate fake companies and profiles.

2. Kimsuky (Aliases: Emerald Sleet, Velvet Chollima, TEMP.Firework)

Main Motive: Primarily focused on cyber espionage and intelligence gathering, specifically targeting South Korean government entities, think tanks, academic institutions, defense companies, and individuals involved in foreign policy and national security related to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. They also target individuals in the US and Japan.

Accusations and Notable Activities:

Spear-Phishing Campaigns: Known for highly targeted spear-phishing emails, often impersonating legitimate contacts or organizations (e.g., South Korean government officials, journalists, academics) to deliver malware for intelligence collection. They use clever social engineering to trick victims into running malicious PowerShell scripts or installing backdoors.

Theft of Sensitive Data: Accused of stealing information related to inter-Korean affairs, nuclear negotiations, and sanctions enforcement.

Use of Illicit IT Worker Schemes: Some reporting links Kimsuky to the broader scheme of North Korean IT workers fraudulently gaining remote jobs globally, with the salaries funneled back to the regime. (While this scheme also funds the regime, Kimsuky's primary cyber mission remains espionage).

3. Andariel (Aliases: APT45, Silent Chollima, Onyx Fleet)

Main Motive: A mix of financial gain (often through ransomware) and cyber espionage, with a particular focus on military and defense information, especially targeting South Korea. They are also linked to direct revenue generation for the regime.

Accusations and Notable Activities:

Ransomware Deployments: Known for deploying ransomware, including Maui ransomware, against healthcare and critical infrastructure organizations to extort funds.

Stealing Defense Information: Accused of stealing technical information related to anti-aircraft weapon systems from South Korean defense companies.

ATM Cash-outs and Fraud: Engaging in activities like hacking into ATMs to withdraw cash or stealing bank card information for sale on the black market.

Illicit IT Worker Schemes: Recent U.S. sanctions (July 2025) have directly linked an individual associated with Andariel (Song Kum Hyok) to the fraudulent IT worker scheme that funnels money back to North Korea's weapons programs. This indicates a more direct role in generating revenue through non-cyber-attack means, complementing their cyber-enabled activities.

In summary, North Korean hacking groups are unique in their pervasive focus on generating illicit funds, primarily through large-scale cryptocurrency theft and financial fraud, to sustain the isolated regime and its nuclear ambitions. This financial imperative often goes hand-in-hand with strategic cyber espionage and, at times, disruptive operations designed to achieve Pyongyang's geopolitical goals.

Should countries name and shame China for cyberattacks, or work diplomatically behind the scenes?
The decision of whether to "name and shame" China for cyberattacks or work diplomatically behind the scenes is a complex one, with both approaches having potential benefits and drawbacks.
Many countries, including the U.S., its Five Eyes allies (UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), and increasingly the EU and Japan, often employ a combination of both, adapting their strategy based on the severity of the attack, the geopolitical context, and their specific objectives.

Arguments for Naming and Shaming (Public Attribution):
Imposing Reputational Costs: China, like any major power, is sensitive to its international image. Publicly calling out its malicious cyber activities, especially when done in a coordinated manner by a coalition of states (as seen with the Microsoft Exchange hack attribution), can impose reputational damage and diplomatic costs.

Deterrence (Long-Term): While direct deterrence of nation-state cyberattacks is difficult, public attribution can contribute to a long-term deterrence strategy. It signals that:

The victim state has the capability to identify the attacker, challenging the notion of anonymity in cyberspace.

There will be consequences, even if not immediate kinetic retaliation.

Such behavior is unacceptable and violates international norms.

Norm-Setting: Public attribution, especially when accompanied by legal condemnations and statements about international law (even if not universally agreed upon), helps build and reinforce norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace. It draws a line in the sand and clarifies what actions are considered unacceptable.

Rallying Allies and Partners: Coordinated public attribution strengthens alliances and fosters collective security. It encourages intelligence sharing and collaboration on cybersecurity defense among like-minded nations, presenting a united front.

Raising Awareness and Improving Defenses: Public disclosures of nation-state TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) force organizations and governments to update their defenses against specific threats. The Hafnium attribution, for example, spurred widespread patching and improved vigilance.

Domestic Accountability/Public Opinion: In democratic countries, public attribution can inform citizens about threats to national security and critical infrastructure, potentially generating public support for stronger cybersecurity measures or policy responses.

Arguments for Diplomatic, Behind-the-Scenes Engagement:
De-escalation: Public accusations can sometimes lead to an escalatory cycle. Diplomatic channels allow for discreet communication, negotiation, and de-escalation, especially in sensitive situations where a public spat could worsen tensions.

Preserving Channels for Cooperation: Despite competition, there are areas where cooperation with China is necessary (e.g., climate change, pandemic response, nuclear non-proliferation). Public "shaming" could jeopardize these essential diplomatic avenues.

Intelligence Protection: Revealing attribution publicly often requires disclosing intelligence sources and methods, which can compromise future intelligence gathering capabilities. Behind-the-scenes diplomacy allows intelligence to be leveraged without exposure.

Lack of Immediate Impact: China routinely denies all accusations of state-sponsored hacking. Critics argue that "naming and shaming" has little immediate impact on China's behavior, as it simply issues boilerplate denials and continues operations.

Risk of Misattribution/Retaliation: Despite advances, definitive attribution can be challenging. A mistaken public accusation could severely damage diplomatic relations and potentially trigger retaliatory actions against the falsely accused state.

Specific Objectives: Sometimes the goal is to recover stolen data, gain access to compromised systems, or secure specific commitments. These objectives might be better achieved through quiet negotiations than public confrontation.

Maintaining Strategic Ambiguity: Some states prefer to keep their red lines and response capabilities ambiguous in cyberspace, believing this ambiguity can enhance deterrence. Public attribution might reduce this ambiguity.

A Hybrid Approach is Often Preferred:
In practice, many countries (like the US, UK, EU, and now increasingly Taiwan, as seen with recent public statements about UNC3886) adopt a hybrid approach:

Public Attribution for Major Incidents: When attacks are widespread, highly impactful (like the Microsoft Exchange hack or critical infrastructure targeting), or involve significant intellectual property theft, public attribution (especially when multilateral) is used to impose costs and set norms.

Behind-the-Scenes for Ongoing Issues or Sensitive Intelligence: For continuous espionage, specific intelligence exchanges, or when sensitive sources might be compromised, quiet diplomatic engagement or private warnings are often preferred.

Layered Response: Public attribution can be followed by diplomatic démarches, sanctions, or other policy responses, combining different tools of statecraft.

Given Taiwan's unique geopolitical position and direct exposure to Chinese cyber threats, a carefully calibrated approach is crucial.
Publicly exposing certain attacks can rally international support and highlight Beijing's aggressive cyber posture, which aligns with Taiwan's strategy of garnering international sympathy and support.
However, it must also balance this with pragmatic considerations for maintaining stability across the Strait and managing potential escalations.
The recent public statements from Singapore regarding UNC3886, despite initial Chinese denials, indicate a growing willingness among affected nations to be more transparent about the origins of serious cyberattacks.

“Sky Is NOT The Limit”: Su-57, S-500, R-37M In Spotlight As IAF Thrilled By Super Success Of S-400 & BrahMos (Part2)

Let us look at the two Russia-origin systems.

S-400 Missile System “Sudarshan Chakra”
The S-400 is a Russian mobile SAM system developed in the 1990s by Russia’s NPO Almaz as an upgrade to the S-300 family of missiles.

The S-400 joined the Russian armed forces in 2007. The system is complemented by its successor, the S-500. The S-400 system has four radars and four sets of missiles covering different ranges and vertical bubbles.

The maximum target detection range is 600 kilometres, and targets can be engaged as far as 400 kilometres. The five S-400 batteries contracted by India in 2018 cost $5.43 billion, including reserve missiles.

All the sub-units are data-linked and controlled by a central command and control system with sufficient redundancy. The system is capable of layered defence and integrates with other Indian air defences.

One system can control 72 launchers, with a maximum of 384 missiles. All missiles are equipped with directed explosion warheads, which increases the probability of complete destruction of aerial targets.

The system is designed to destroy aircraft, cruise, and ballistic missiles, and can also be used against ground targets. It can engage targets up to 17,000 km/h or Mach 14. It can intercept low-flying cruise missiles at a range of about 40 km due to the line-of-sight requirement. The anti-ballistic missile (ABM) capabilities of the S-400 system are near the maximum allowed under the (now void) Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The number of simultaneously engaged targets by the full system is 36.

The system ground mobility speed is close to 60 km/h on roads and 25 km/h cross-country. It takes 5 minutes to be operational and fire when ordered while driving. Otherwise, the system response time is just 10 seconds. The time between major overhauls is 10,000 hours. The Service life is at least 20 years.

In Russia, the system was made operational around Moscow in 2007. Russia reportedly deployed S-400 in Syria. The system has been widely used in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and it is claimed to have shot down many aircraft.

Meanwhile, Ukraine has reportedly used Western weapons, mainly U.S.-made ATACMS missiles, to hit S-400 units on the ground.

Belarus has unspecified numbers of S-400 units. Deliveries to China, of the six batteries ordered, began in January 2018. Four batteries consisting of 36 fire units and 192 or more missiles were delivered to Turkey.

Algeria is another operator. Some other countries, like Iran, Egypt, Iraq, and Serbia, have also shown interest. South Korea is developing the KM-SAM, a medium-range SAM system based on technology from S-400 missiles, with assistance from NPO Almaz.

Three of the five batteries have arrived in India. India took deliveries despite the American threat of CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act).

The remaining two are expected in 2025/26. The recent conflict has revealed the rough location of two systems, one each in Punjab and Gujarat. As per open sources, the third is somewhere in the east. The systems have been tested in various Indian military exercises.

BrahMos
The BrahMos is a long-range ramjet supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from land, submarines, ships, and fighter aircraft. It is a joint venture between the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the Russian Federation’s NPO Mashinostroyeniya, which together have formed BrahMos Aerospace.

The missile is based on Russian P-800 Oniks. The name BrahMos is a portmanteau formed from the names of two rivers, the Brahmaputra of India and the Moskva of Russia. India holds 50.5 percent share of the joint venture. 75 percent of the missile is manufactured in India and there are plans to increase this to 85 percent.

Large numbers of land-launched, ship-launched as well as air-launched versions have been inducted and are in service with the Indian armed forces.

The missile guidance has been developed by BrahMos Aerospace. In 2016, after India became a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), India and Russia gradually increased the range of the missile to 800 km. The latest deliveries to the Indian Navy are of this type.

The cruise missile has anti-ship and land-attack roles, and has been in service since June 2007. The other operator is the Philippine Marine Corps. The unit cost is around $ 3.5 million.

The extended range variant costs around $4.85 million. Many futuristic variants are evolving. The BrahMos-A is a modified air-launched variant of the missile with a reduced size and weight (2.55 tons). It has a range of 500 km when launched from Su-30 MKI, and it can carry only one BrahMos missile.

50 IAF SU-30MKI were modified to carry the BrahMos-A missile. Smaller-sized variants like BrahMos-NG could be carried on more types of aircraft, even on LCA. Additionally, the BrahMos-NG will have an AESA radar rather than the current mechanically scanned one.

The Sukhoi Su-30MKI will carry three NG missiles, while other IAF fighters will carry one. The BrahMos-NG will be ready by the end of 2025. BrahMos-II will be a hypersonic cruise missile. A UCAV variant is planned.

This solid propellant missile can carry a 200–300 kg warhead that could be nuclear or conventional semi-armour-piercing. Max operational ranges are up to 8-900 kilometres. Export variants are currently restricted to 290 kilometres.

The BrahMos is generally considered the world’s fastest supersonic cruise missile. Currently, the missile speed is Mach 3. Later variants will be hypersonic (M 5+). The missile is very accurate with a CEP of less than one metre.

BrahMos was first test-fired on 12 June 2001 from the Integrated Test Range (ITR), Chandipur, in a vertical launch configuration. The September 2010 test of BrahMos created a world record for being the first cruise missile to be tested at supersonic speeds in a steep-dive mode.

BrahMos was tested with an Indian seeker for the first time in March 2018, and was tested with an India-developed propulsion system, airframe, and power supply in September 2019. On 30 September 2020, India successfully test-fired an extended-range BrahMos, offering a range of around 350 km, at speeds up to Mach 2.8.

The submarine-launched variant of BrahMos was test-fired successfully for the first time from a submerged pontoon on 20 March 2013. Even BrahMos Block III land-attack variants are operational. There are plans to have missiles with a range of 1500 km or more.

BrahMos is operationally deployed in large numbers by the three services. Additional missile orders have been recently placed for extended-range variants.

The Philippines has placed a substantial order for their services, and deliveries began in 2024. Russia, too, has plans to buy many missiles. Brazil has shown interest in the missile system. Vietnam and Indonesia have already signed deals.

Sky Is Not The Limit
Resolute political will, choice of targets, weapon matching and accuracy, actionable intelligence, strong Indian air defences, and great IAF professionals. and hitting strategic targets in depth were the clear clinchers.

Aerospace has become the primary means of prosecuting war. India-Russia relations are time-tested. Nearly 60 percent of IAF aircraft are of Russian origin.

Russian platforms and weapons with the Indian armed forces have performed exceedingly well for many decades, since the MiG-21s of the 1960s. The S-400 and Su-30MKI-BrahMos combination have excelled in Op Sindoor.

Could S-500 (600 km) be the next acquisition? Will India select the Su-57 fifth-generation aircraft and Make in India? Can Russia help accelerate the Indian nuclear submarine program? Should India acquire the “AWACS Killer” Russian R-37M AAM and collaborate on developing futuristic long-range aerial missiles?

Should there be more work together on the Su-30MKI upgrade? Can the two enter into a joint venture for Kamikaze drones required by both sides in large numbers, and India can help scale up production?

The Sky is NO more the limit!

“Sky Is NOT The Limit”: Su-57, S-500, R-37M In Spotlight As IAF Thrilled By Super Success Of S-400 & BrahMos (Part1)

Speaking at the “Katre Memorial Lecture,” a function organised by the Air Force Association at Bengaluru, the Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief, AP Singh made a specific mention of the deterrent capability of the S-400 Air Defence system, and the accuracy of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles that had a game changer role in “Op Sindoor”.

For long, IAF strategy, tactics, and inventories have been designed for offensive strikes against the Western neighbour with whom India has had three full-fledged wars and many shorter skirmishes.

Having a smaller economy and military, Pakistan was conscious and built an air force that is air defence oriented. In recent decades, India has also had to prepare to take on a potential threat from China.

Notwithstanding the known positions, the Indian strikes against both terror and military targets all across Pakistan proved very successful, and Pakistan’s defensive systems could not engage or thwart them.

Op Sindoor saw weapon platforms and armaments belonging to many countries at play. These included the USA, Russia, China, France, and Turkey, among others.

Most analysts have been comparing and analysing the performance of major weapons. This was also of interest to the manufacturing companies and their host countries.

Some of the writings were also part of the narrative building to introduce motivated biases with politico-commercial considerations. Both sides claimed to have shot down each other’s aircraft on the opening round, but since no aircraft crossed the border, or even came close to it, the wreckage, if at all, would have fallen in their own territories, and so proof may have been concealed.

But 3 months after the operation, more facts have come out.

The Air Chief talked of nearly five Pakistani fighter aircraft having been shot down in the air by an Indian S-400. Interestingly, the S-400 achieved its farthest kill ever by destroying a High Value Air asset (HVAA) at nearly 300 kilometres. In addition, at least three F-16s and one C-130 were destroyed during airfield strikes, Air Chief said.

Major Weapons at Play
The proof of the results of the strikes by French Scalp and BrahMos anti-surface cruise missiles, and indigenous SkyStriker loiter munitions (LM) was available from Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) satellite pictures. Israeli Harop, large Loiter Munitions, were also very effective.

The Chinese HQ-9 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system, a poor copy of the Russian S-300, could not intercept any of the Indian strikes. Nor did Pakistan claim any aircraft had been shot down using these SAMs, as all claims were being assigned to the much-touted Chinese PL-15 Air-to-Air Missile (AAM).

Pakistan claimed shooting down a few Indian aircraft and attributed all kills to the Chinese PL-15. A few of them landed in India in complete form, perhaps having been fired at ranges outside the envelope or having had technical failures, and will allow India to evaluate the system and technology.

There were also doubts about the variant of PL-15 supplied to Pakistan. The upend variant with China has a claimed range of 180 kilometres. Pakistan was supposed to have the export variant, the PL-15E, with a range of 145 kilometres.

There was a unanimous opinion of all global experts on the good performance of two weapons, the S-400 SAM system and the BrahMos anti-surface missiles (ASM).

Both performed flawlessly. Both are of Russian origin, and both are universally feared (respected) for their range, speed of engagement, and precision. At least 15 Indo-Russian BrahMos missiles were fired. The number of S-400 system missiles fired is still not in the public domain.

Cross-Border Air Strikes
Just to recap, in the early hours of 7 May 2025, India launched air strikes on nine terrorist targets in Pakistan using 24 stand-off weapons. The missiles targeted only the camps and infrastructure of militant groups Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba, and no Pakistani military or civilian facilities were engaged.

The 23-minute duration initial Indian strikes were reportedly carried out by the Rafale aircraft using SCALP missiles, and Su-30 MKI firing BrahMos cruise missiles as well as the Indian Army’s Indo-Israeli SkyStriker loitering munitions.

Satellite and intelligence photographic proof of the success of strikes was presented to the Indian and Global media.

Pakistan responded with significant drone and missile strikes at Indian military and civilian targets under the operation codenamed Operation Bunyan-un-Marsoos.

This included targeting airfields from Kashmir to Gujarat. India negated these strikes with its integrated air defence and counter-drone systems.

The S-400 missile system was deployed, marking India’s first combat use of this missile system. India’s indigenous Akash AD system played a huge role.

Pakistani strikes caused insignificant damage and very few civilian casualties. Meanwhile, the IAF carried out SEAD/DEAD operations, neutralizing Pakistani air defence systems, including the Chinese HQ-9 in Lahore, starting on 9th May.

On 10 May, in response to Pakistani strikes against Indian military targets, the IAF made a major airstrike across the length and depth of the country, targeting a variety of military targets, including airfields, AD systems, weapons, and logistic storage sites.

The “Nur Khan” military airfield at Chaklala, which is just next to the Capital, Islamabad, and the Pakistan Army’s HQs at Rawalpindi were also hit.

Other airfields hit were Sargoda, Rafiqi, Rahim Yar Khan, and radars and storage dumps at Pasrur, Malir, Chunian, Sukkur, Pasrur, and the Sialkot aviation base. India also inflicted extensive damage on air bases at Skardu, Jacobabad, and Bholari in Pakistan.

During its retaliatory strikes on Indian military targets, Pakistan claimed that the BrahMos storage facilities at Beas and Nagrota were destroyed, and that two S-400 systems at Adampur and Bhuj were neutralised.

International media acknowledged that all such claims were false. Immediately after the ceasefire, Indian Prime Minister Modi visited Adampur and addressed the personnel with the S-400 launcher forming the background. A similar visit was made by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to Bhuj.

Debt-ridden Pakistan, which was already seeking financial bailout from the IMF, was rattled by the audacity and accuracy of the air strikes, and its Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) called his Indian counterpart on the hotline, requesting a ceasefire.

A new normal had been set between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. Similar strikes could be triggered again in case of another Pakistan-backed terror attack.

There was significant cyber warfare. There was also a war of narratives fought across the globe, especially to highlight the success or failure of specific military hardware for commercial reasons.

Turkey had supplied a large quantity of drones to Pakistan. These were used, but caused little damage on the ground. While the two sides were effectively at war, neither side had fully mobilized its ground forces. A fragile ceasefire was achieved around midday on 10 May. India called it a pause in hostilities. But it has held ever since.

India said that 21 of its civilians and five military personnel had died in the conflict. The casualties and the majority of the injuries occurred due to cross-LoC firing.

Pakistan said that 51 of its people had died in the clashes, including 40 civilians and 11 military personnel.

India claimed nearly 130 terrorists had been killed. India got global backing against terror; however, not many were willing to take sides during the conflict.

Few systems got universal praise. These included the S-400 AD System, India’s indigenous Akash AD system, the DRDO 4D (Drone, Detect, Deter, Destroy) counter-drone system, and the BrahMos anti-surface missiles. The French Scalp missile proved extremely accurate and destructive.

Powering India’s AMCA, Will Japan’s XF9-1 Outclass GE F414, Safran M-88 To Boost IAF’s 5th-Gen Fighter:

The Economic Times on August 8 confirmed an earlier Bloomberg report that India is negotiating with aeroengine manufacturers from at least three other countries to jointly develop fighter jet engines.

The exploratory talks are aimed at expanding India’s aeroengine development partnerships beyond the US to quickly plug capability gaps in view of heightened threat perceptions.

On May 30, Bloomberg reported that India was exploring alternatives to the GE F414 engines for powering twin-engine fighter jets currently under development.

Citing a senior Indian official who asked not to be named, the report stated that HAL was considering engine offers from the UK, France, and Japan.

In a statement issued on June 5, 2025, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) clarified: “HAL reiterates that negotiations with GE are on track and progressing well, and that HAL is not in talks with any other company regarding engines for LCA Mk.2. Any information suggesting otherwise is incorrect.”

The HAL denial was cleverly worded. It reiterated HAL’s commitment to using the F414 engine to power the LCA Mk.2, which is a single-engined fighter. The Bloomberg report specifically mentioned twin-engine fighter jets.

Besides the LCA Mk.2, DRDO plans to use the GE F414 as an interim powerplant for the AMCA. An accurate interpretation of the Bloomberg report would be that HAL is looking at alternatives to the GE F414 for powering the AMCA and other future twin-engine fighter jets that the DRDO may develop, such as the TEDBF — Twin Engine Deck Based Fighter.

So, what alternatives to the GE F414 from the UK, France, and Japan is HAL considering?

Rolls-Royce Offer
During a visit by senior Indian MoD officials to the UK in April, the UK’s Rolls-Royce reportedly proposed a partnership with India to co-develop engines for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), offering full transfer of intellectual property rights to enable India’s ownership of critical engine technology.

The proposal envisages co-design, knowledge transfer, and local manufacturing.

The collaboration would be supported by the UK government under the India-UK Defence Partnership.

To sweeten the offer further, Rolls-Royce also plans to double its supply chain sourcing from India by 2030, fostering job creation and innovation.

Rolls-Royce has reportedly proposed an engine designed to deliver approximately 75 kN of dry thrust (without afterburner) and 110 kN with afterburner, with potential scalability to 120–130 kN for future variants like the AMCA Mk.2.

Rolls-Royce’s proposal reportedly involves developing a range of high-thrust turbofan engines for potential use in transport and civilian aircraft.

French Safran Offer
France’s Safran’s offer is the oldest on the table. In July 2023, the French government reportedly gave a nod to Safran to jointly design, develop, test, manufacture, and certify an engine with India that will power twin-engine advanced multi-role combat aircraft (AMCA) and the twin-engine deck-based fighter for Indian aircraft carriers.

Safran proposes to develop the AMCA engine by enhancing its proven M88 engine. Safran will enhance the M88’s core technology, which produces 50 kN dry and 75 kN with afterburner, to achieve a higher thrust output of approximately 75–80 kN dry and 110–120 kN with afterburner.

Because it leverages proven technology, the engine’s development timeframe can be aligned with the AMCA’s development timeline, with prototypes expected by 2026–27 and first flights by 2028.

Safran’s offer includes full technology transfer, covering critical technologies like single-crystal blades, thermal barrier coatings, and advanced combustors, ensuring India gains indigenous manufacturing and design capabilities.

This enhanced engine will incorporate new components, such as an improved compressor and afterburner, to meet the AMCA’s performance needs, including supercruise capability.

In addition, the offer includes Safran setting up a centre of excellence in gas turbine technology in India with full design and metallurgical precision software tools.

Japan’s Offer
Japan reportedly made its offer to co-develop an AMCA engine in May.

Unlike the UK and France, Japan does not have an aeroengine manufacturing track record. However, Japan has been actively developing a military fighter jet engine called the IHI XF9-1.

The development is spearheaded by IHI Corporation in collaboration with the Japan Ministry of Defense’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA).

The IHI XF9-1 is a low-bypass afterburning turbofan being developed for Japan’s Mitsubishi F-X (F-3) stealth fighter program, which has since been integrated into the multinational Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) with the UK (Rolls-Royce) and Italy (Avio-Aero).

The XF9-1 generates 107 kN of dry thrust and 147 kN with afterburner, with potential scalability up to 196 kN for future sixth-generation platforms. It features advanced materials to withstand turbine inlet temperatures of 1,800°C, a slim design for stealth, and thrust-vectoring nozzles for enhanced maneuverability.

The XF9-1 is conceptually advanced, and its potential scalability is very impressive.

Conclusion
HAL’s commitment to the GE F414 engine as the LCA Mk.2 powerplant notwithstanding, it would be in the nation’s interest if HAL were to explore alternatives to the GE F414 as the powerplant, interim or otherwise, for the AMCA.

Both Rolls-Royce and Safran have offered to collaborate with DRDO’s Bengaluru-based GTRE (Gas Turbine Research Establishment) lab and provide full ToT and IPR, the government official said.

The Safran offer is based on proven M88 technology, so it’s less risky. However, it makes one wonder why Safran, even after being hired as consultants, didn’t help GTRE upgrade the Kaveri engine by sharing M88 technology, in which case, GTRE itself could have developed the AMCA engine leveraging Kaveri engine technology.

The proposed Rolls-Royce engine is a bit of a wild card, since it is merely a concept at this point in time. However, Rolls-Royce has upped the ante by offering to co-develop a range of high-thrust turbofan engines for potential use in transport and civilian aircraft.

Japan’s lack of an aeroengine manufacturing track record makes the XF9-1 an underdog amidst the competition. However, it’s interesting to note that the XF9-1 is conceptually advanced. Also, when it comes to the current state of development, the XF9-1 stands out amid the competition.

The XF9-1 has undergone prototype testing (2018), including conceptual design and test flights on the Mitsubishi X-2 Shinshin demonstrator (2016–2018). Research from 2010–2019 focused on high-temperature combustors, lightweight compressors, and stealth-optimized inlet designs.

The big downer is the GCAP partnership. Development progress could easily fall well behind AMCA development timelines due to differing priorities among partner nations, the UK, and France.

Ahead Of Trump-Putin Talks, Russia Readies World’s 1st Nuclear-Powered Cruise Missile — 9M730 Burevestnik: Reports

As Russian President Vladimir Putin heads to Alaska for a rare face-to-face meeting with his US counterpart, President Donald Trump, for Ukraine peace talks, Moscow is busy preparing another surprise for the world.

According to multiple media reports, Russia is preparing for new tests of its much-discussed and feared 9M730 Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, a “one-of-a-kind” weapon in Moscow’s arsenal.

If these tests are successful, Russia will become the first country in history to have an operational cruise missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead that moves on a nuclear propulsion system, giving it an unlimited range that can hit any other point on the planet from any point.

“Russia appears to be on the verge of conducting a new test of its controversial nuclear-powered cruise missile, the 9M730 Burevestnik (NATO code: SSC-X-9 Skyfall), from the Pankovo range in the Arctic archipelago of Novaya Zemlya,” Defense Romania reported.

While Moscow has not made any official announcement, multiple clues point in this direction. Firstly, a NOTAM (Notice to Airmen) warning has been issued from August 7 to August 12, covering 40,000 square kilometers over Novaya Zemlya.

Secondly, at least four russian vessels, previously anchored near the Pankovo test site, have moved into observation positions in the eastern Barents Sea, a standard safety measure taken during large missile trials.

Besides, two Rosatom aircraft are currently based at Rogachevo air base. Furthermore, in recent weeks, cargo ships have made multiple stops at Novaya Zemlya, suggesting logistical operations.

“Preparations have been underway for weeks at the Pankovo launch site on Novaya Zemlya in the Russian Arctic,” Norway’s ‘The Barents Observer‘ reported.

Notably, the Novaya Zemlya archipelago has been Rosatom’s chosen site for testing nuclear weapons and related technology since the late 1950s.

The 9M730 Burevestnik: World’s First Nuclear-Powered Missile
The Burevestnik represents a revolutionary weapon, and its specificity lies in the combination of nuclear energy propulsion and the ability to carry nuclear warheads, which gives it an almost unlimited range and the ability to avoid advanced anti-missile defense systems.

President Putin has described this missile as an “invincible” weapon, as its nuclear propulsion allows it to fly with an almost unlimited range. This means that the ‘Burevestnik’ can fly for a long time, changing its direction and trajectory to bypass the opponent’s defense systems, which makes it extremely difficult to intercept.

According to the United States Air Force’s National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) report, if Burevestnik were to enter service, it would give Russia a “unique weapon with intercontinental-range capability.”

“The aim with the ground-launched Burevestnik, however, is to give the missile alone intercontinental range… between 10,000–20,000km. This would allow the missile to be based anywhere in Russia and still be able to reach targets in the continental US,” the Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) said in its research paper.

Furthermore, a Russian military paper noted that the missile would maintain a notional altitude of 50–100 metres throughout almost all of its flight. While Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) fly in space along fixed and predictable trajectories, making them easy to intercept, cruise missiles fly at low altitudes and frequently change their path, which makes them difficult to intercept.

The theoretical attraction of nuclear propulsion for a cruise-missile application is that it offers a long-endurance power source far in excess of the traditional turbojet or turbofan engine. For missiles based on turbojet or turbofan engine propulsion systems, the range is in effect a function of how much fuel can be carried on them.

Information about its technology is top secret, but the missile is believed to use a conventional engine for launch, after which it activates a small nuclear reactor. This reactor superheats the incoming air, generating sustained propulsion and giving it a theoretically “unlimited” intercontinental range.

By comparison, Russia’s longest-range liquid-fuelled cruise missile, the Kh-102 (RS-AS-23 Kodiak), has a claimed maximum range of 4,500 kilometres.

However, there remain considerable technical challenges in ensuring the reliable performance of the nuclear-propulsion unit, and there have been multiple failed tests in the past.

Multiple Failed Tests And An Accident
According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies’ Missile Defense Project, Russia has already conducted over a dozen tests of Burevestnik, with only a few of them achieving partial success.

The first test of the missile was reportedly performed in 2016. However, analysts believe that Russia must have started working on the concept in the early 2000s.

The concept of a nuclear propulsion system is not itself new. In the 1960s, the US experimented with its own design of a nuclear-powered delivery system, but this line of experimentation was abandoned before the actual missile design was ever tested.

The risks associated with this program are significant, as demonstrated by the Nenoksa accident in August 2019. At that time, an explosion during an operation to recover a nuclear propulsion source from the seabed killed several Russian scientists. It also caused a temporary increase in radiation levels in the city of Severodvinsk, underlining the significant risks and technical difficulties associated with a nuclear propulsion system.

On August 8, 2019, the Russian Defense Ministry put out a statement saying that that day, a liquid-propellant rocket engine blast had caused the death of two scientists and had
injured six, but there was no radiation released.

Two days later, Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear agency, issued its first statement on the accident, stating that five Rosatom scientists had died during work on an “isotope power source in a liquid-propulsion system.”

The death toll would rise to seven, and the Kremlin would attribute the accident to a
“nuclear-propelled missile.” Rosatom would go on to say that the test was conducted from
a sea platform and to say that it involved a “nuclear battery.”

“The testing carries a risk of accidents and local radioactive emissions,” Norway’s Intelligence Service (NIS) warned in its threat assessment report published last year. The NIS said that testing of both missiles and torpedoes is expected to continue.

There were further tests conducted in 2021, 2022, and 2023.

Burevestnik’s development, along with that of the Poseidon nuclear torpedo, is part of a broader effort by Russia to diversify and modernize its nuclear triad, giving Moscow assured second-strike capabilities.

However, critics warn that the missile’s large size, over 12 meters, subsonic speed, and emission of radioactive material from its exhaust mean it could be detectable and vulnerable to some types of point and short-range missile defences. Subsonic Russian land-attack cruise missiles have, for instance, been reportedly intercepted in the Ukraine War.

U.S. Fights Su-57 Fighter Threat With F-16’s New Paint Scheme; Is USAF Acknowledging The Might Of Felons?

A Top Aces’ F-16A fighter jet has been spotted in an eye-catching new adversary paint scheme. The fighter aircraft, formerly with the Israeli Air Force, was seen supporting a Russian Su-57 Felon-inspired paint scheme.

Dubbed the “Felon Paint Job,” the aircraft was spotted in Arizona. It flew from Mesa Gateway Airport, where Top Aces performs maintenance on its F-16s, to Luke AFB, Arizona, as ACES 51.

After reaching Luke AFB, Arizona, the fighter jet took part in a local mission under the callsign ACES 1.

Though the fighter jet, formerly known as Netz 284, was also photographed while being wheeled out of the paint barn at Mesa, its return to Luke AFB, Arizona, offered a better look.

The F-16, tail number N871TA and bort number “284” Red, features a low-visibility, splinter-style grey camouflage pattern similar to that used by Russia’s fifth-generation stealth fighter.

The two-tone scheme includes angular transitions across the airframe, mimicking the faceted radar-evading design philosophy of the T-50/Su-57, the Aviationist reported.
The “Felon Paint Job” was complete with Soviet-style red stars on its tail and wings. The tail fin also carried Cyrillic script that read “Опыт Важен” (which translates to “Experience Matters”).

Notably, despite the “Felon Paint Job,” the fighter jet still retains the kill marking it earned in September 1981, when Netz 284 shot down a Syrian MiG-23.

Last year, another F-16 fighter jet from the Top Aces fleet was spotted sporting a “Flanker Blue” color scheme, inspired by the one used by some F-16s of the U.S. Air Force’s 64th Aggressor Squadron at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada.

It remains to be seen what other paint schemes the Top Aces F-16 fleet will support in the coming days.

F-16’s Journey: From Israeli Air Force To Top Aces
The F-16A Netz 284 was one of the fighter jets that were retired from the Israeli Air Force at the end of 2016 and delivered to the US in 2021.

The aircraft was part of the 29 F-16 Netz (Hawk) fighter jets, which retired from the Israeli Air Force in 2016 after 36 years in service, and were subsequently bought by Top Aces for adversary training.

In 2021, the Israeli Ministry of Defense acknowledged the unprecedented sale of 29 F-16 Netz (Hawk) aircraft to Top Aces.

“Following negotiations led by SIBAT, the MoD has signed an unprecedented agreement to supply 29 F-16 aircraft to TOP ACES. These will be employed as staged adversary aircraft in U.S. Air Force training,” the Israeli Ministry of Defense posted on social media site X in 2021.
The first four of these F-16s were received at Phoenix-Mesa Gateway Airport in February 2021.

The four F-16s, with their wings, tail, and tailerons removed, were loaded on a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 at Tel Aviv-Ben Gurion airport on January 27 and, after a stop in Keflavik, Iceland, they arrived a day later at Phoenix-Mesa Gateway airport.

With these F-16s, Top Aces became the first company to provide a 4th-generation aircraft for staged adversary aircraft training. Till today, these F-16s remain the world’s only privately owned F-16s.

The F-16s were subsequently upgraded to a standard that is known as F-16 AAF (Advanced Aggressor Fighter).

These upgrades included the proprietary Advanced Aggressor Mission System (AAMS), which allows the F-16s to accurately replicate near-peer adversary fighters, enhancing training realism for U.S. pilots, AESA radars, infrared search and track (IRST), helmet-mounted cueing systems, datalinks, and electronic countermeasures to replicate near-peer threats.

The Top Aces’ F-16 fleet has also been equipped with IRST pods.

The “Felon Paint Job” for the F-16 suggests that in the coming days, the US Air Force pilots want to train against the threat posed by advanced fifth-generation Russian aircraft, the Su-57 Felon.

The Su-57 Felon Threat
After struggling with slow deliveries, it seems that Russia is finally making progress with expanding Su-57 production lines.

While the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aviation Plant is the primary production facility, new facilities have been opened to support this.

Officials have put into operation new development facilities related to the fuel system and started construction of a hangar for avionics testing at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur factory in eastern Russia, the state-owned aerospace conglomerate United Aircraft Corporation announced in August last year.

Russia only has a small number of Su-57 aircraft and they have played a limited role in the war in Ukraine, confined mainly to long-range strikes from within Russian territory.

The contract for the production of 76 planes by the end of 2027 was signed by the Defense Ministry at the Army Forum in June 2019, with Komsomolsk-on-Amur specified as the leading production site.

However, the plant was quickly deemed too small, forcing officials to spend time expanding production space, which entailed changing and adding new equipment.

The Su-57, designed to compete with NATO’s fifth-generation fighters, such as the US F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightning II, boasts cutting-edge stealth technology, supermaneuverability, and advanced avionics. The VKS received three batches of aircraft over the last year, with the last delivery recorded in December 2024.

Furthermore, in February this year, Yuri Kondratyev, Director of the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Production Association (KnAAPO), said that a new version of the aircraft will be delivered to the VKS in 2025.

He did not specify any particular improvements, although there is speculation that the new version might feature the more advanced AL-51F1 or product 30 engines, which could improve the fighter’s performance.

Russian aerospace engineers are also continuously improving the Su-57 avionics and armaments.

Earlier this year, UAC chief Vadim Badekha said that as production expands, the aircraft will be integrated with newer features.

“The Su-57 platform has been created for a minimum of 40-50 years. It has an open architecture and can use a broad range of technologies with minimal changes to the basic solutions. Su-57 integration with unmanned aerial vehicles will be the central element of future combat systems. In the coming years, new features will be introduced into the serial Su-57 in the framework of the modernization program,” he said.

Additionally, last week, Chief of the Main Staff and First Deputy Commander in Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces Lieutenant General Alexander Maksimtsev said that the Su-57 fifth-generation fighter has been equipped with hypersonic weapons.

“In accordance with the state defense order, the Aerospace Forces annually receive advanced and modernized weapon systems. The pace of deliveries of fifth-generation Su-57 aircraft is increasing, along with modern aviation strike systems and hypersonic weapons,” the commander reported in an interview.

There is speculation that the hypersonic weapon referred to is an air-launched derivative of the Zircon hypersonic cruise missile. Integrating the Zircon hypersonic cruise missile with the Su-57 will make it a much more lethal platform.

The F-16’s “Felon paint job” suggests that the USAF pilots are finally gearing up to train against the Russian Air Force’s most advanced fighter jet.

Russia’s “Most Daring” Operation Or Massacre? 5 Months After Op Stream, Ukraine Says ‘They Were Unprepared’.
It was compared to the biblical story where a small force of soldiers emerged from beneath the earth and surprised and overwhelmed a much larger force to save the motherland.

In Russia, the soldiers who took part in the so-called pipeline offensive in the Kursk region (Operation Stream – Potok in Russian) in March this year, became the stuff of legends and were welcomed back home as “heroes.” Russian bloggers commented that the Operation would “go down in history books,” and many of the soldiers were awarded for their bravery.

“Blow up all your pipes out of fear… We’ll still come to you from under the ground,” boasted a new Russian war song on the daring mission, first performed outside a church in central Russia, with a 50-foot replica of the pipeline in the background for the people to admire.

However, in Ukraine, the story flipped 180 degrees. The operation was termed a ‘total failure,’ which resulted in the “massacre” of hundreds of Russian soldiers. The Russian soldiers who took part in the ill-planned operation were not heroes, but victims of poor and careless military planning, Kyiv claimed.

There is little clarity on what precisely the operation achieved and whether it should be termed a success or failure. All analysts, irrespective of their nationality, agree that the mission was daring and unconventional, but did it achieve its goals?
Now, more than five months after the operation, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) finally seem to be acknowledging, though grudgingly, that they were taken by surprise and the operation might have helped Russia in taking back substantial territory in the Kursk region.

Ukraine Acknowledges ‘They Were Unprepared’
Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Alexander Syrsky has admitted that the Ukrainian army did not expect Russian troops to take bold actions such as their Operation Pipeline in the Kursk Region.

“We had intelligence that they might use gas pipelines. Our forces were ordered to take those under control and monitor the areas where enemy soldiers could come to the surface. Still, we must have missed something out, or, perhaps, we did not expect them to be that bold,” Syrsky said in an interview with Ukraine’s TSN TV channel.

Further, Syrsky admitted that the Russian army’s operation had made it more complicated for Ukrainian forces to retreat from the Kursk Region.

However, despite these setbacks, Syrsky termed the Kursk operation a spectacular success.

First Anniversary Of Ukraine’s Kursk Operation
Notably, August 6 marked the first anniversary of Ukraine’s Kursk operation in which Kyiv was able to occupy hundreds of miles of Russian territory.

According to Syrsky, Ukrainian troops were able to break through Russian defense, enter deep into the Russian military’s rear, and disrupt the logistical support of the Russian forces operating in Ukrainian territory.

“During the most active period of the operation, the Ukrainian Armed Forces controlled up to 1,300 square kilometers of the territory of the Kursk region of the Russian Federation,” Syrsky claimed.

“The operation forced Russia to shift significant reserves to the north, which weakened its pressure on other sections of the front. We did not allow the enemy to carry out an offensive and created a buffer zone. It is thanks to this that Sumy and Kharkiv remain free,” Syrsky emphasized.

He also claimed that Russia lost more than 77,000 soldiers (killed and wounded) in Kursk, of which nearly 4,000 were citizens of North Korea.

“Ukrainian defenders also captured 1,018 Russian soldiers, which allowed for exchanges and the return home of hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers, including those who had been in captivity since 2022,” Syrsky said.

According to the commander-in-chief, Ukrainian forces still maintain a presence in the Glushkovsky district of the Kursk region, holding back part of the Russian offensive group.

Russian Counteroffensive In Kursk
Ukraine’s Kursk operation was a major setback for Russia, both militarily and in terms of Russian prestige.

It was the first time since the Second World War that Russia had lost part of its territory. The operation was also a big morale booster for the Ukrainian armed forces as it was the first time since the start of the war that Kyiv had taken the battle to Russian territory.

After being taken by surprise and losing hundreds of square miles of territory within weeks, Russia began its slow and grinding counteroffensive, which involved throwing thousands of soldiers into frontal meat grinder assaults.

By October-end, Ukrainian intelligence reported the presence of about 12,000 North Korean soldiers, including 500 officers and three generals, in the Kursk theatre of operation.

Despite the slow progress of Russian forces and heavy casualties, by January 2025, it became apparent that the Ukrainian troops faced imminent defeat in Kursk.

Eurasian Times reported in January this year that Kyiv faces the stark choice of choosing between swift retreat or crushing defeat in Kursk.

By March, Russia had retaken from Ukrainian forces nearly 70% of the territory they had lost in Kursk.

Op Stream: Russia’s Daring ‘Pipeline Offensive’
The Operation Stream (Potok) began on March 8.

Interestingly, the US had cut intelligence-sharing with Ukraine from March 5 to March 11, following a disastrous outing by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to the White House on February 28, where he had a public spat with US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance.

Operation Stream took place within that time frame.

The operation involved 500 to 800 Russian soldiers walking nearly 15 miles inside gas pipelines to emerge behind enemy positions in the Sudzha region of Kursk.

“We had to pump the gas out, pump the oxygen in, build extra exits to the surface, transport the ammunition, food, water, military personnel,” said a Russian commander, who uses the call sign “Zombie.” He claimed all of this was carried out without Ukrainian forces noticing. “The enemy did not see us.”

Russian soldiers had to walk in brutal conditions: pitch darkness, sub-zero temperatures, lack of oxygen, and poisonous gases. At times, they had to crawl for miles as the pipeline was too narrow for them to stand.

Valery Gerasimov, Russia’s military chief, reported that 600 troops burst from the pipe and “surprised the enemy, contributing to the collapse of its defenses and the development of our offensive.”

However, at that time, Ukrainian analysts claimed that only 100 Russians had left the pipe. Ukrainian military bloggers described it as a bloodbath and claimed “hundreds” had already suffocated or been poisoned by fumes in the pipeline.

On March 9, the Russian military claimed to have recaptured three settlements, Malaya Lokhnya, Cherkasskoye Porechnoye, and Kositsa, all north of Sudzha.

On March 11, Russian media platform RT reported that “the dramatic shift in the situation on the front can be attributed to the success of Russia’s top-secret Operation Potok.”

By March 13, Russia claimed to have retaken Sudzha. Three days later, Ukraine confirmed that its forces had withdrawn from key positions in Sudzha.

On April 26, 2025, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army General Valery Gerasimov, reported to President Vladimir Putin that the operation to liberate the Kursk Region was over.

According to the Russian military, Ukraine lost more than 76,500 troops in the Kursk area, the majority of them belonging to the AFU’s elite units.

In March, Ukrainian forces had claimed that they were already in the process of withdrawing from Kursk, and Russia’s operation Potok played no role in their retreat.

However, the latest remarks by Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief Alexander Syrsky suggest that Kyiv is finally beginning to admit that they were taken by surprise, were unprepared for Russia’s bold operation, and that it might have played a role in their swift retreat from the Kursk region in March.

Russia’s S-500 Missiles Blinded? Ukraine Claims Eliminating S-500 AD System’s Yenisei Radar In Crimea.
Ukraine’s Prymary (Ghosts) special unit has claimed destroying a 98L6 Yenisei radar, deep inside Crimea. The system, part of Russia’s cutting-edge S-500 Prometey air defense network, is designed to track some of the most difficult aerial threats.

The Yenisei wasn’t the original target. During the operation, Ukraine’s intelligence (HUR) operators first believed they had located a component of the S-400 Triumf. Only after analysing combat footage did they realize the fact that they had eyes on one of Russia’s most valuable and elusive radar stations.

Destroying Yenisei is more than just a symbolic victory. It deprives Russia’s forces in Crimea of a crucial early warning tool. The radar not only serves the S 500 but can also be integrated with the S 400 Triumf, significantly boosting detection and interception capabilities across the peninsula.

By eliminating it, Ukraine has punched a hole in Russia’s air defense shield over Crimea, making it harder for Moscow to spot and respond to incoming threats in time.

A video released by HUR shows the strike in action, underscoring how Ukrainian forces have shifted toward precision operations designed to neutralize high-value assets that can not be easily replaced.
The S-500 Prometey: Russia’s Ambitious Shield
The S-500 Property is touted as Russia’s crown jewel in long-range air defense. After state trials in 2020-2021, it was officially accepted into service in April 2021, with Moscow presenting it as a next-generation system capable of countering virtually any modern aerial threat.

On paper, the Prometey’s mission set is ambitious. It is designed to intercept medium and intercontinental range ballistic missiles during their final flight phase, track and engage hypersonic weapons, destroy low orbit satellites, and shoot down enemy aircraft before they can approach Russian airspace.
Central to this defensive web is the 98L6 Yenisei radar, ‘Eyes’ of the S-500s. It is responsible for detecting and tracking high-speed, high-altitude targets, and without it, the system’s overall effectiveness drops dramatically.

According to Russian claims, the Yenisei’s core is a multielement active electronically scanned array (AESA) designed to resist heavy electronic jamming. It can in theory detect both aerodynamic and ballistic targets at ranges up to 600 km and altitudes reaching 100 km. The data it gathers is then fed to command posts, where other air defense assets such as missile batteries can act on it.

Visually, the Yenisei resembles the older 97L6E radar, sharing the same four axle MZKT chassis and a similar configuration, including a fully rotatable antenna unit mounted alongside an equipment container.

However, the two systems diverge in their antenna design. The 96L6E’s primary antenna is split into two sections of different sizes, while the Yenisei features a different array structure optimized for its expanded mission set.

One of Yenisei’s advantages is operational flexibility. It can scan in a full 360-degree mode for wide area surveillance, or focus on a narrow sector to improve its ability to spot ballistic threats. This makes it the standard radar for the S-500 systems and a critical component of Russia’s layered air defense network.

Yet, real-world performance tells a more complicated story. In 2024, when the S-500 was deployed to Crimea to protect the Kerch Bridge, it reportedly failed to intercept an incoming MGM-140 ATACMS ballistic missile.

That failure raised uncomfortable questions about whether Russia’s most advanced air defense system can live up to its sweeping promises when facing fast, unpredictable, and well-planned attacks.

A Broader Ukrainian Strategy
The Prymary unit’s Yenisei strike is part of a larger operational pattern. Ukrainian forces have adopted a methodical approach. Identify and strike the nerve centers of the Russians’ detection network, rather than just the launch systems. By doing so, they render missile batteries less effective or even blind.

Another HUR special unit, Artan, has been conducting similar missions using FPV drones. These strikes have hit Russian vehicles, ammunition depots, and communications hubs, all documented with stark, close-up footage that shows drones weaving between obstacles before detonating on target.

The Prymary unit’s recent Yenisei strike fits into this wider strategy of targeting critical radar and missile systems that threaten Ukraine’s skies.

In one recent compilation video, HUR showcased hits on several high-value assets in occupied Crimea, including Nebo SVU, Podlet 1K, and 96L6E radars, as well as a BK 16 landing craft. Russian air defense and fighter jets scrambled to stop the drones, but they dodged missiles with near cinematic agility “like Neo in the Matrix”, as Ukrainian operators quipped.

Russia’s Radar Network Under Strain
The Prymary unit’s Yenisei strike is part of a larger operational pattern. Ukrainian forces have adopted a methodical approach. Identify and strike the nerve centers of the Russian’s detection network, rather than just the launch systems. By doing so, they render missile batteries less effective or even blind.

The Yenisei’s destruction comes at a time when Russia’s radar network is already under strain.

According to ‘Euromaidanpress’, Russia may have lost up to half of its radar capabilities since the full-scale invasion began in 2022.

One of the most costly setbacks has been the loss of Beriev A-50U airborne early warning aircraft, essential for detecting threats at long range. Ukraine has destroyed or damaged at least four of these aircraft, with the most recent hit occurring during Operation Spider Web in June 2024.

At the start of the war, Russia had an estimated seven A-50U aircraft. By winter 2024, aviation analyst Tom Cooper assessed that only four remained, and by mid-2025, possibly just three.

One surviving aircraft has been spotted in Vorkuta, far in Russia’s Arctic permafrost zone, likely to keep it out of Ukrainian strike range.

Moscow has been developing a next-generation A-100 radar aircraft, but none of the three prototypes are believed to be operational.

Strategic Implications
Each radar destroyed, whether mounted on a mast in Crimea or in the nose of an A-50U circling high above Russia, weakens Moscow’s early warning net. Fewer radars mean more blind spots, and more blind spots mean greater vulnerability for high-value targets, such as the Kerch Bridge, key air bases, naval facilities, and command centers.

This depletion also forces a change in Russian operating patterns. The remaining radar assets have become too precious to risk in exposed positions.

That means fewer sorties for the A-50Us, fewer deployments of rare ground-based systems like the Yenisei near contested areas, and an overall shift toward holding these assets in reserve. While this may protect them from destruction, it also reduces their deterrent effect and limits Russia’s ability to respond to fast-moving threats.

For Ukraine, the strategy is clear. By systematically targeting the rearrest and most capable radars, Kyiv not only weakens Russia’s current defences but also imposes a long-term cost.

The Road Ahead
If current trends continue, Russia’s radar coverage over Crimea and other contested areas will continue to thin.

Ukraine’s forces have shown they can find and hit even heavily guarded assets, and each successful strike emboldens further operations. The destruction of the Yenisei shows that no part of Russia’s high-end air defense network is beyond reach.

In modern warfare, control of the skies often comes down to who can see and act first. By dismantling Russia’s ‘electronic eye’, Ukraine is betting that blinding its adversary will open the way for strikes that could reshape the battlefield in its favour.

The loss of the Yenisei radar is one more step in that process and perhaps one of the most consequential yet.

“We Are Establishing Peace In The Caucasus”! Turkey Lauds US-Brokered Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Deal.
Turkey lauded an agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan as progress towards a “lasting peace” on Friday after US President Donald Trump declared the foes had committed to end hostilities permanently.

“We welcome the progress achieved towards establishing a lasting peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the commitment recorded in Washington today in this regard,” Turkey’s foreign ministry said.

“At a time when international conflicts and crises are intensifying, this step constitutes a highly significant development for the promotion of regional peace and stability. We commend the contributions of the US administration in this process.”

Armenia, Azerbaijan To End Conflict
Armenia and Azerbaijan have committed to a lasting peace after decades of conflict, US President Donald Trump said Friday as he hosted the leaders of the South Caucasus rivals at a White House signing event.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijan’s longtime President Ilham Aliyev said Trump’s mediation should earn him a Nobel Peace Prize — an award the US leader has been vocal about seeking.

The two former Soviet republics “are committing to stop all fighting forever, open up commerce, travel, and diplomatic relations and respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity,” Trump said.

However, the fine print and binding nature of the deal between the long-time foes remained unclear.
The two leaders would have a “great relationship,” Trump said.
“But if there’s conflict… they’re going to call me and we’re going to get it straightened out,” he added.
Christian-majority Armenia and Muslim-majority Azerbaijan have feuded for decades over their border and the status of ethnic enclaves within each other’s territories.

The nations went to war twice over the disputed Karabakh region, which Azerbaijan recaptured from Armenian forces in a lightning 2023 offensive, sparking the exodus of more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians.

The Azerbaijan and Armenian leaders shook hands under the satisfied gaze of Trump, before all three signed a document the White House called a “joint declaration.”

Aliyev hailed the “historic signature” between the two countries, which were at war for more than three decades.”

“We are today establishing peace in the Caucasus,” he added.

Aliyev offered to send a joint appeal, along with Pashinyan, to the Nobel committee recommending Trump receive the Peace Prize.

“Who, if not President Trump, deserves a Nobel Peace Prize?” he asked.

Aliyev also thanked Trump for lifting restrictions on US military cooperation with Azerbaijan.

Pashinyan said the “initialing of (the) peace agreement will pave the way to end decades of conflict between our countries and open a new era.”

The Armenian leader said the “breakthrough” would not have been possible without “peacemaker” Trump, adding that the US president deserved the Nobel.

The agreement also includes establishing a transit corridor passing through Armenia to connect Azerbaijan to its exclave of Nakhchivan, a longstanding demand of Baku.

The United States will have development rights for the corridor — dubbed the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP) — in the strategic and resource-rich region.

The foreign ministry of Turkey, a longtime supporter of Azerbaijan, hailed the “progress achieved towards establishing a lasting peace” between the two nations.

Trump has repeatedly praised his own diplomatic efforts to help halt deadly conflicts, notably between Cambodia and Thailand, as well as arch-foes India and Pakistan.

However, months of efforts have yet to solve the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and the hunger plaguing Gaza during Israel’s offensive.
Armenia Gains ‘Strategic’ Partner
Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed on the text of a comprehensive peace deal in March.

But Azerbaijan had later outlined a host of demands — including amendments to Armenia’s constitution to drop territorial claims for Karabakh — before signing the document.

Pashinyan has announced plans for a constitutional referendum in 2027, but the issue remains deeply divisive among Armenians.

Asked what Armenia stood to gain from Friday’s deal, a White House official said it was “an enormous strategic commercial partner, probably the most enormous and strategic in the history of the world: the United States of America.”

“The losers here are China, Russia, and Iran,” he said, speaking on condition of anonymity.

The disputed mountainous enclave of Karabakh is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but was controlled by pro-Armenian separatists for nearly three decades after a war following the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Azerbaijan captured part of the territory during a 2020 war, then took all of it with a lightning offensive three years later. Almost the entire local population of around

Macron: Ukraine's future must not be decided without Ukrainians.
Just days before a planned meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump, French President Emmanuel Macron has stressed that Ukraine must be included in any talks on its future.

"The future of Ukraine cannot be decided without the Ukrainians, who have been fighting for their freedom and security for more than three years now," Macron wrote on X.

Because their security is also at stake, Europeans must also be part of a solution, he said.

Macron had previously spoken on the phone with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer, he wrote.

After his call with Macron, Zelensky wrote on X: "Ukraine, France, and all our partners are ready to work as productively as possible for the sake of real peace."

Trump is set to meet Putin in Alaska on Friday. According to the Wall Street Journal, Putin is seeking full Russian control over the eastern Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk — demands Zelensky firmly rejects.
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Germany's Merz to consult with Trump and Zelensky on Ukraine.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz plans to consult on Wednesday with US President Donald Trump, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and European leaders regarding the war in Ukraine, the government in Berlin said on Monday.

A video conference is planned, a government spokesman told dpa.

The discussion is to come ahead of Trump's meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska on Friday about ending the war in Ukraine.

Before the consultations with Trump and US Vice President JD Vance, a virtual meeting is planned between Merz, Zelensky and the leaders of France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Poland and Finland, the spokesman said.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte are also expected to join the call.

Emerging countries' debt payments to private lenders dwarf those to China.
Lower-income countries' external debt payments to private lenders remain three times higher than payments to China, research shows, shedding light on the complex, costly web of creditors they face as they struggle to keep up repayments.

The research, by advocacy group Debt Justice UK, underscores the power private lenders - from bondholders to commodity trading houses - have in countries across the developing world which juggle debt repayments with spending on other needs, from education to infrastructure.

Tim Jones, policy director at Debt Justice, said the data countered a narrative that China has played a primary role in creating debt crises in lower-income countries.

China has lent hundreds of billions of dollars for infrastructure and other projects in developing countries and has used earnings of commodity exports, or cash held in restricted escrow accounts, from borrower nations as security for the loans.

"Commercial high-interest lenders are receiving the greatest debt payments by lower-income countries," Jones said in a statement. "Where debt payments are too high, all external creditors need to cancel debt, in proportion to the interest rates they charged."

While a post-pandemic wave of defaults has largely crested, developing countries still struggle with unsustainable debt as concessional financing shrinks, borrowing costs remain high and spending needs for infrastructure and climate resilience rise.

Ethiopia is locked in debt restructuring negotiations with bondholders who have rejected taking haircuts, while Ghana and Zambia are still negotiating deals with some private creditors.

The International Monetary Fund also recently wrote that Malawi was in default on $439 million in loans to Afreximbank and $464 million to Trade and Development Bank.

Debt Justice's research, using World Bank data, found that between 2020 and 2025, 39% of external debt payments by 88 lower-income countries and small island developing states - a total of $354 billion - went to private lenders, compared with 34% to multilaterals, 13% to Chinese public and private lenders and 14% to repay bilateral loans to other governments.

Of the 32 countries with the highest external debt payments, 21 of them sent more than 30% of payments to private lenders.

Only six of them - Angola, Cameroon, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Laos and Zambia sent more than 30% of external debt payments to Chinese lenders.

The data also showed a sharp increase in repayments to multilateral lenders - from $30 billion in 2020 to $70 billion in 2025.

Jones said the rise followed a rapid increase in multilateral lending from 2019, which accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of those loans are starting to come due now, he said, while those with floating interest rates would have become more expensive during the global interest rate hiking cycle.
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Anyone who has two shirts should share with the one who has none, and anyone who has food should do the same.
- Luke 3:11

Did You Know Africa Had Universities Before Oxford?
Highlight institutions like Timbuktu’s Sankore University (Mali) and Al-Qarawiyyin (Morocco).

“Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.” – Nelson Mandela

“The African Libraries That Held the World’s Knowledge”

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#UKIntakes #UKIntakes2025 #UKUniversityIntakes #SeptemberIntakeUK #JanuaryIntakeUK #MayIntakeUK #UKIntakesForInternationalStudents #UKStudyIntakeDates #IntakesInUKForOverseasStudents #UKUniversityAdmissionIntakes #UKCollegeIntakes #UKSemesterIntakes #BestIntakeForUK #UKAdmissionCycle #UKUniversityDeadlines #UKApplicationIntakeDates #StudyInUKIntakes #UKEducationIntakes #UndergraduateIntakesUK #PostgraduateIntakesUK

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Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday that drones had played a major role in the conflict in Ukraine and called for the rapid development and deployment of separate drone forces within the military.

"We are currently creating unmanned systems troops as a separate branch of the military and we need to ensure their rapid and high-quality deployment and development," Russian news agencies quoted him as saying at a meeting on arms development.

Drones have played a leading role for both sides in the more than three-year-old conflict pitting Moscow against Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has since the outbreak of the war in February 2022 stressed the importance of developing a domestic drone development and production industry.

Putin told the second day of the gathering that Russia was well aware how Ukraine was dealing with the issue.

"But on the whole, I do not believe we are lagging behind on anything," he was quoted as saying. "More to the point, it seems to me we are bringing together good experience with a view to creating just such forces."

Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov proposed the creation of a drone force late last year, setting a target date of the third quarter of 2025.

Putin also stressed developing air defences, which he said had destroyed more than 80,000 targets during the conflict that Russia still calls a special military operation.

"In this respect, a new state armaments programme must ensure the construction of a versatile air defence system capable of operating in any circumstances and efficiently striking air attack weapons, regardless of their type," he said.

On the opening day of the meeting, Putin called for due attention to be paid to the nuclear triad of land-based, sea-based and aircraft-launched weapons.

NIGERIA-
June 12th: A Day for Reflection and Resolve – Nigeria’s Unfinished Journey Towards Democracy and Unity.
#June12 #NigeriaDemocracyDay #RememberMKO #NeverForget

June 12th is not just a date on Nigeria’s calendar—it is a solemn reminder of a people’s unyielding hope for democracy and justice. Just like the scars left by the Nigerian Civil War of 1967–1970, June 12th demands national reflection and courage to build a future that heals old wounds. For Nigerians at home and abroad, this date represents both a tragedy and a triumph—a stolen mandate, a silenced voice, and yet, a powerful turning point in our democratic history.

Why June 12th Matters

On June 12, 1993, millions of Nigerians went to the polls in what is widely regarded as the freest and fairest election in the country’s history. Moshood Kashimawo Olawale (MKO) Abiola, a business mogul and philanthropist, was poised to lead the nation as president. However, the military regime under General Ibrahim Babangida annulled the results, plunging Nigeria into political turmoil.

For many Nigerians, especially in the South-West, this was more than electoral injustice—it was the suppression of a national dream. But more importantly, it sparked a pro-democracy movement that forced the military back into the barracks and birthed the Fourth Republic in 1999.

In 2018, the Nigerian government declared June 12th the official Democracy Day, replacing May 29th. This act was a long-overdue recognition of the sacrifices made in the pursuit of democratic freedom. Yet, the spirit of June 12th continues to call for more than just a holiday. It calls for national soul-searching.

Parallels With the Civil War (1967–1970)

Just like June 12th, the Nigerian Civil War was a defining chapter. It was born out of deep political mistrust, ethnic division, and failed dialogue. Over 1 million lives were lost, and while the war ended with the slogan "No victor, no vanquished," its wounds still linger.

Both events—June 12 and the Civil War—stemmed from crises of representation and inclusion. Both are reminders that Nigeria's unity must never be taken for granted, and that when justice is delayed or denied, the consequences echo across generations.

For Nigerians at Home: The Call to Action-

Nigeria’s democracy, though over two decades old, still struggles with credibility, corruption, voter apathy, and insecurity. On June 12, we must ask ourselves:

Are we living the ideals of that historic election?

Is our government truly reflective of the people’s will?

Do we treat every Nigerian, regardless of ethnicity or religion, as an equal stakeholder in the national project?

This is a time to demand accountability from leaders, to organize peacefully, and to resist tribal divisions. June 12 reminds us that democracy is not a destination—it is a fight we must renew every day.

For the Diaspora: The Role Beyond Borders

To Nigerians abroad, June 12th is not a memory left behind—it is a legacy to carry forward. You are ambassadors of Nigerian resilience and intelligence.

Whether you're in the UK, US, Canada, the UAE, Germany, or South Africa, you have the power to:

Support democratic institutions and civic education back home.

Advocate for good governance and human rights in international forums.

Invest in youth-driven innovation and development initiatives.

Challenge the narratives that paint Nigeria as a land of only corruption and chaos.

Many in the diaspora have tasted what functional governance looks like—use that perspective to challenge mediocrity and demand better for your homeland.

June 12: Not Just a Remembrance, But a Recommitment-
Let us not allow June 12th to become a ceremonial date devoid of meaning. It is a mirror to Nigeria’s past and a map to her future. It teaches us that true power lies not in government houses or military tanks, but in the collective will of a people ready to stand for justice.

Conclusion
From the gunfire of the Civil War to the silent disenfranchisement of June 12, Nigeria has walked through fire and survived. But survival is not enough—we must now thrive. Whether at home in Lagos or Kano, or abroad in Houston or London, this June 12, let us reflect, remember, and rise—together.

Because if democracy was once stolen from us, we must never again let it slip away.
And if unity was once torn apart, we must now weave it back with every choice we make.

By Jo Ikeji-Uju
https://corkroo.com/
https://afriprime.net/

How America can fast-track critical metals production—and disrupt the leverage that China just used...

Critical minerals are finally getting the attention they deserve. This year, rare earth elements have dominated headlines, whether because of geopolitical tensions in Greenland and Ukraine or escalating trade disputes with China. They loomed large in U.S.-China trade talks this week, allowing China to drive a hard bargain.

The 17 rare earth elements (REEs) are indispensable. They exhibit unique electromagnetic properties that make numerous technologies function—think smartphones, electric vehicles, artificial intelligence, humanoid robotics, advanced defense systems, and more.

The Trump administration seems to understand this. Recent actions by President Donald Trump—including his executive order “Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production” and his use of Section 232—have made clear America’s interest in rare earths. Indeed, long before this administration, bipartisan recognition of these minerals’ strategic value already existed, for national security and a vast array of advanced technologies.

China dominates in rare earth elements-
As has been widely reported, China currently controls around 90% of global REE production. Its dominance is so strong that even some Western companies must send their rare earth materials to China for processing. Now, with Beijing imposing export controls on key elements and rare earths having been a central focus during this week’s U.S.-China trade talks, the challenge has been further amplified for America.

China’s grip is the result of decades of long-term investment, aggressive policy, and an economic playbook designed to corner the market. Processing rare earths is also notoriously dirty, which is something China has historically been less concerned about.

A 4-point fast-track program-
If the U.S. is serious about building a resilient, domestic REE supply chain, it must act with urgency. Here’s how we can do it, and do it fast:

Inject capital at scale-
The U.S. must follow China’s lead by strategically funding and investing in rare earth producers and infrastructure. Rare earth development, particularly refining, requires significant capital, unless the asset is already advanced and leverages existing infrastructure. That is rarely the case in the U.S., and while both private and public companies are raising funds, significant federal support is essential to compete with China at scale. America’s late start means we must move faster and spend smarter. We can’t afford to wait.

Establish price stability-
Once U.S. producers are operational, price volatility becomes the next major hurdle. China can manipulate the global market by flooding it with underpriced material, undermining U.S. startups before they can gain traction. A temporary pricing floor or purchase guarantee for U.S.-sourced rare earths would help stabilize the market and protect domestic growth. The U.S. has implemented similar pricing strategies to support other foundational industries, including oil and agriculture. America’s emerging rare earth industry is critical and could benefit from these types of pricing initiatives.

Streamline permitting-
While the U.S. rightly values environmental protection and community impact, permitting delays are hampering progress. Responsible, low-impact projects are waiting in line, when they should be fast-tracked. We must retain environmental oversight but remove unnecessary bureaucratic barriers that stifle innovation and increase costs. China has little to no concern with environmental protection in regard to REEs, so removing these roadblocks in the short term will not only allow U.S. companies to get set up to compete, but will also be better for the environment in the long term, all while delivering significant value for American stakeholders.

Create a centralized refining hub-
The rare earth bottleneck isn’t mining—it’s refining. Processing capacity outside China is severely limited. The U.S. needs a centralized, government-backed refinery that serves multiple companies, enabling cost-effective and collaborative scaling. This shared facility would accelerate production, reduce risk, and mark a crucial step toward independence from China’s stranglehold. I believe this effort is the best path forward for Americans to unite and build the industrial infrastructure required to combat the big bully in the rare earth space.

The power of a public-private partnership-
With government support and private-sector innovation, we can build a fully integrated rare earth supply chain. Doing so would neutralize one of China’s most powerful economic weapons and create a strategic advantage for the U.S. in critical industries. It’s also a smart investment in America’s long-term manufacturing future.

This isn’t just about minerals. It’s about national security, technological leadership, and economic resilience. The time to act and join forces is now.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio condemned the sanctions imposed Tuesday by Britain and other nations against two Israeli cabinet members accused of repeatedly inciting violence against Palestinians.

"These sanctions do not advance US-led efforts to achieve a ceasefire, bring all hostages home, and end the war" in Gaza, Rubio said in a statement.

Britain's foreign ministry earlier announced that Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir will be banned from entering the UK and will have any assets in the country frozen.

Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Norway also imposed fresh measures against the ministers, as the Israeli government faces growing international criticism over the conduct of its conflict with Hamas.

The sanctions mark a break between the five countries and Israel's closest ally, the United States, with Rubio urging partners "not to forget who the real enemy is" and to stand "shoulder-to-shoulder with Israel" against Hamas.

Ben Gvir and Smotrich "have incited extremist violence and serious abuses of Palestinian human rights," the foreign ministers of the five countries said in a joint statement.

"These actions are not acceptable. This is why we have taken action now –- to hold those responsible to account," they added.

A UK government official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Canada and Australia had also imposed sanctions, while Norway and New Zealand had implemented travel bans only.

Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar slammed the sanctions as "outrageous."

- 'Horrendous language' -

Smotrich and Ben Gvir are part of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's fragile ruling coalition.

Both have drawn criticism for their hard-line stance on the Gaza war and comments about settlements in the occupied West Bank, the other Palestinian territory.

Smotrich, who lives in a West Bank settlement, has supported the expansion of settlements and has called for the territory's annexation.

Last month, he said Gaza would be "entirely destroyed" and that civilians would "start to leave in great numbers to third countries."

Ben Gvir has also called for Gazans to be resettled from the besieged territory.

UK Foreign Secretary David Lammy said the pair had used "horrendous extremist language" and that he would "encourage the Israeli government to disavow and condemn that language."

New Zealand Foreign Minister Winston Peters insisted the measures were not directed against the Israeli people or government.

"Rather, the travel bans are targeted at two individuals who are using their leadership positions to actively undermine peace and security and remove prospects for a two-state solution," he said in a statement.

- 'Violence must stop' -

The UK foreign ministry said in its statement that "extremist settlers have carried out over 1,900 attacks against Palestinian civilians since January last year."

It said the five countries were "clear that the rising violence and intimidation by Israeli settlers against Palestinian communities in the West Bank must stop."

"Measures today cannot be seen in isolation from events in Gaza where Israel must uphold international humanitarian law," the ministry said.

It added that the five nations "support Israel's security and will continue to work with the Israeli government to strive to achieve an immediate ceasefire in Gaza."

Britain had already suspended free-trade negotiations with Israel last month and summoned Israel's ambassador over the conduct of the war.

It also announced financial restrictions and travel bans on several prominent settlers, as well as two illegal outposts and two organizations accused of backing violence against Palestinian communities.